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CHAPTER I
AMERICAN LABOR UNDER

PRESIDENTS WILSON AND HARDING:
THE COMING CONFRONTATION

The preoccupation of the American federal government

involving the eventual defeat of Imperial Germany helped

generate an unprecedented growth in the United Mine Workers

of America.

Traditional antagonists recognized a temporary

truce in the struggle to unionize America’s labor force dur

ing World War I as the Wilson administration and the leaders
of organized labor avoided confrontations that would disrupt

the war effort.

Because of the absence of federal regula-

tions the United Mine Workers of America finally managed to
gain recognition among the majority of the nation's coal

Organized in 1890, the UMWA had
20,000 members out of a total 255,244 workers. 1 By November

miners during the war.

1918, membership in the UMWA had grown to 409,344 out of a
total workforce of 762,426 miners. 2

The end of the war in Europe ushered in a new policy

keo Wolman, Growth of American Trade Unions 1 9801923 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1924, p. 110.

^U.S. Geographical Survey, Coal in 1919-1920, Mineral
Federal
Resources of the United States, 1921 (Washington:
Printing Office, 1 924) , p7 497.
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-2-

toward labor by the Wilson administration.
the wages of union workers had skyrocketed.

During the war

Soon after the

armistice was signed, however, President Wilson denied an

appeal by the UMWA for increased wages for coal miners,
noting that while the miners' cause for larger wages might
•
3
a wage increase.
be fair, the time was not "propitious" for
With the exception of the left-wing sections of the

American labor movement, especially the Socialists and the

International Workers of the World, the leaders of American

labor and enthusiastically supported the First World War.

The American Federation of Labor called upon its workers in
the name of "Labor, Justice, Freedom and Humanity" to give

full devotion to the war effort, according to a story in the
4
President Wilson had invited Samuel Gompers
New York Times.
to the White House during the war to help in the political
and industrial planning concerning the United States. This

action would have been unheard of in the previous Republican
administrations of William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt.
During the war Wilson's labor policy had been to recognize

the rights of labor to organize, to have collect!* ve

bargaining, and to have a greater say in Management.

5

The miners in the United States believed that their

o

McAlister Coleman, Men and Coal (New York:
Press), p. 94; New York Times, p.

Arno

41 bi d
^The fear of socialism had caused a confrontation in

J

-3production record at home, their fighting record overseas, and
their support of the war effort on the home front would allow
unions to play an important role in postwar reconstruction.
This view frightened large industrialists.

Already disturbed

by the repercussions of the Russian Revolution in the United

States, corporations looked with dismay upon the declaration
of the Secretary of the War Labor Board in 1919 when he said

“The right of workers to organize in trade unions and to bar

gain collectively through chosen representatives is recog
That right shall not be denied, abridged,

nized and affirmed.

or interfered with by the employers in any manner whatsoever.

■.6

Many employers who had reaped huge profits during the war years

began a systematic assault on the labor unions after the war.
They attacked the

ii

high standards of living” among steel workers

and coal miners and charged that the nation was on the verge
of a Bolshevik revolution.

Non-union forces in steel and coal

hoped to start an open shop drive which would reach its climax
in 1 920.7

Officials in the Wilson administration feared a leftist labor force in the United States.

Underscoring this fear

Postmaster General Burlson placed restrictions on many

Paint Creek, West Virginia in 1912 and 1913. Socialists were
blamed by state and federal officials for causing an upris
ing in Kanawha County against living conditions among coal
miners and their families which left scores dead and home
less.
^Coleman, Men and Coal , p. 94.
7 Ib i d. , p. 95.

-4newspapers critical of the war and his censorship extended in-

to the postwar years.

Furthermore, Federal officials raided

the headquarters of the International Workers of the World and
the homes of known Socialists several months after the war coneluded.

Moreover, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer led a

reign of terror against many leftist institutions in the United
States .

He focused his attention largely on the labor unions

and their leaders.

Leftist organizations in the United States

found themselves victims of vigilante justice at the hands of
The Russian Revolution had instigated
a wave of right wing activity across the United States. 8

the American Legion.

Meanwh i1e, President Wilson had watched the growth of
the labor movement in the United States during the war years
with growing apprenhension.

The United Mine Workers of America

generated most of the President's concern.

In 1921 he wrote:

"The UMWA is the largest single organization in the United
States, but no organization can long endure that sets up its

own strength as being superior to its plighted faith to so-

ci ety at large."

q

Despite the large growth of the United Mine Workers
of America during the war years, problems crippled the union

in 1919.

Undermining currents from both the right and left

8Ibid.

Malcolm Ross, Machine Age in the Hills (New York:
The Macmillian Company, 1983), p. 152. Wilson's preoccupa
tion with the League ofNations and his failing health made
his concerns with the Union expansion take secondary import
ance.
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wing factions within its membership plagued the UMWA.

These

groups included the Communist Party and the International

Workers of the World from the left, and the arch-conservative

American Federation of Labor under Samuel Gompers from the

right.10

The divisions prevented the UMWA from forming a

concentrated effort to elect the Democratic nominee, James

Cox, to the Presidency in the Election of 1920.

The

continuation of the policies of President Wilson, which

fostered the conditions for the spectacular growth of the UMWA
during the war years, would have been assured if Cox had been

e1ected .

However, the Republican nominee, Warren G. Harding,

won the Presidency by a landslide, incidating a return of the
pre-Wi1sonian Republican restrictions on labor that had
character!’zed the Roosevelt and Taft administration.

Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, formulated
much of Harding's labor union policy.

This policy prescribed

government intervention in disputes between business and
labor.

To put pressure on the workers, Hoover encouraged the

production of non-Union coal, while attempting to convince
non-Union coal operators that voluntary price restrictions
were to their advantage.

He told a gathering of West

Virginia coal miners that "price restraint and continued
production were patriotic because of the public need. ..11

10Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War; Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 103.
]1Eugene P. Trani and David L. Wilson, The Presidency

L
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President Harding's nomination of James J. Davis as
Secretary of Labor upset leaders of organized labor.

It was

widely accepted that Harding nominated Davis to antagonize
Samuel Gompers.

Davis infuriated labor leaders because he

favored the "open-shop" policy and was a self-made million-

aire whom they feared would be totally out of touch with the
American working class. 12
Perhaps the worst enemy of organized labor in the
Harding administration was Attorney General Harry Daugherty.

Daugherty believed that Communist agents of the Union of Sov

iet Socialist Republics had infiltrated the ranks of the coal
miners and had created the distrust labor unions had for

President Harding.

Moreover, he believed that Soviet Comin-

tern head Grigori Evseyevich Zinoviev had sent Communist

agents to the United States to direct strikes among coal
mi ners. 13 This attitude, while alarmist and unrealistic,

was certainly dangerous when held by the most important legal
authority in the United States outside of the Supreme Court.

The newly elected President generated extreme suspicion among labor officials.

Warren Harding had a reputation

of being a fair employer in Ohio and his employees described

him as being kind, generous and progressive.

of Warren G. Harding (Lawrence, Kansas:
of Kansas , 1 977 J , pT 97.

However, his

The Regents Press

12 "A Secretary of Labor Who Favors the 'Open-Shop
p. 304.
Current Opinion (Vol. LXXI.
September 1921), p.

i ii

13Harry M. Daugherty, The Inside Story of the Harding

-7sympathies were with capital. 1 4

Because of his proposed

regulation of trade unions, the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers declared him "an enemy of organized labor" and of
..15 Despi te
"inspiring propaganda for industrial feudalism.

these attacks, Harding assumed a fatherly image towards the
nation's workers. During a coal strike in Illinois, Harding
stated, "I cannot believe that the thoughtful, loyal mine

workers throughout the country mean to imperil the welfare
.,16
of the people of the United States.
Harding's oversimplified views on American labor were

not set for the economic realities of post-war America.

The

post-war period promised stiff competition for jobs from
returning soldiers, inflation and stationary or declining
wages. 17 A new influx of immigration from Europe, especially

from Russia, Germany and Poland, accelerated competition for
jobs.

During World War I the demand for American coal had

caused overdevelopment.

Far too many mines had been opened,

Tragedy (New York: The Churchill Company, 1932), p. 254.
14
Samuel H. Adams, Incredible Era: The Life and Times
of Warren Gamaliel Harding (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1939), p. 264.

15New York Times (June 5, 1922, p. 2; June 20, 1922,
p. 1 ).
^Trani and Wilson, The Presidency of Warren G.
Harding, p. 98.

^Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press , 196177 p7 103.

-8especially in the bituminous fields.

In the post-war period

the economy of the United States could not support this

expanded production.

Even in the best of times, miners

could only count on working three or four days a week.

When

the miners demanded a five-day week, the coal mine operators

wanted to cut costs and lay off workers, and the public at
large wanted cheaper coal. 18
This caused a crisis which threatened the fiber of
the United Mine Workers of America.

A former Iowa miner,

John L. Lewis, had assumed leadership of the UMWA in 1919. 19

Determined to continue the improvement of the^standard of
living of coal miners that had been characteristic of the

war years , the leadership of the United Mine Workers of

America, in direct conflict with the reality of post-war
economics and the attitude of the President and his

admi ni stration, created the conditions for a confrontation.

18John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy 1921-1933 (New
Harper
& Row, Publi shers, 1 960), p7 69.
York:
19
Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary
M, Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 103.

CHAPTER II

WEST VIRGINIA IN 1919:
SYNOPSIS FOR CONFLICT
West Virginia emerged from World War I as one of the

nation's most important industrial states.

During the war

West Virginia had changed from a largely agricultural sec
tion to an area important for the production of chemicals,

steel, glass, and electrical machinery.

Large deposits of

coal and natural gas in the state aided in this evolution. 1

In 1920 West Virginia ranked second in total mineral produc2
Moret i o n , behind Pennsylvania and just ahead of Oklahoma.

over, West Virginia was spared the post-war recession that
was gripping the rest of the United States in 1919.
During the war, the production of coal had increased

The state's output of coal rose 23 per cent
3
West Virginia contained some of the
from 1919 to 1921.

dramati ca1ly.

finest seams of bituminous coal in the United States.

Coal

mined in West Virginia was easily available to the industrial

^Evelyn Harris and Frank Krebs, One Hundred Years
with West Virginia Labor (Charleston, West Virginia: West
Virginia Centennial Commission, 1963), p. 12.
2 H i c k s , Republican Ascendancy, p . 7.
3 nDale
, i « rFetherling,
o + h Q p 1 inn
Mnthpr
onp ;
Mother .1Jones:

(Carbondale, Illinois:
1924), p. 180.

The Miner's Angel

Southern
I----- - Illinois University Press,
-9-

r
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Northeast and to the Great Lakes region.

Low wages paid to

miners helped reduce costs, expand the attractiveness of
West Virginia coal, encourage outside investment, and i n-

crease the profits of West Virginia's small but wealthy coal
1andowni ng class. 4

For three decades the United Mine Workers of America
had struggled in their attempts to bring unionization to the
coalfields of West Virginia.

By 1919 they had gained control

of the major coalfields in the northern West Virginia coun
ties of Monongalia, Marion and Lewis.
met major

However, the UMWA had

resistance to unionization in southern West Vir-

By 1919 the miners were almost completely organized

gini a .

in Fayette, Kanawha and Raleigh Counties.

However, the

southwestern corner of West Virginia remained unorganized.

This area included the Tug River Valley, located on the border
with Kentucky.

Large companies controlled the coal mining in-

dustry in Logan, Mingo and McDowell Counties.

The fact that

many of the miners in these counties were members of the UMWA

complicated matters.

The coal mine operators had managed to

avoid dealing directly with the UMWA even during World War I.
In the years following World War I some of the largest coal

coal companies in the United States, including subsidiaries

4

Harris and Krebs,
g i n i a Labor, p. 12.

One Hundred Years with West Vir-

5Joseph E. Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom: The Rise and
Fal 1 of the UMWA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p7
125.

-11of U.S. Steel, the Consolidation Coal Company, and the Is-

land Creek Coal Company, developed properties in southwestern
West Virginia to escape high union wages and restrictive

work rules that were common in the coalfields of the North
east. &

Local authorities in the affected counties responded

to pro-Union activities with mass evictions, discharges for

talking about unions, paying deputy sheriffs to keep out

union sympathizers, and mobilizing the forces of law and
government of both local and state levels to maintain the

kind of order they wanted.

Company officials forced miners

to live in substandard housing.

Miners were also forced to

trade in company stores at inflated prices and to accept their
salaries in company script.

Union synpathies often resulted

in blacklisting and eviction from company housing.

Deputy

sheriffs forced miners to remain in the county at gunpoint.
The worst example of human rights violations could be found
in Logan County, which had emerged from the war years as be-

ing one of West Virginia's major coal producing counties.

In 1919 Logan County had one hundred forty seven mines which

produced 11,003,759 net tons of coal and employed 9,796 coal
miners. 7 The sheriff of Logan County was Don Chafin, who received $32,000 a year from the coal mine operators for his

6Melvin Dubofsky and Warren van Tine, John L. Lewi s:
A Biography (New York: New York Times Book Company, 1977),
p. 77.
^Elizabeth White, Development of the Bituminous Coal
Industry in Logan County, West Virginia (Unpublished Thesis:
Marshall Uni versi ty, 1 956 ), p^ 10.
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"co-operation".

Chafin, in turn, ran what amounted to a po-

lice state in Logan County that superseded even state and
Chafin kept Logan County free of union

federal authorities.
"agitation. .,8

Activities in southwestern West Virginia embarrassed
the United States not only on a national 1evel but on an in

ternational level as well.

On March 11, 1891, the Purcell's

Camp in Mercer County stood accused of holding Bohemians
g
against their will by the Austro-Hungarian Council.
In

1906, the Italian Ambassador to the United States complained
to Secretary of State, Elihu Root, that his countrymen were
being held captive in West Virginia.

New York in November, 1906.

Twenty-one workers left

The Italians hoped to find work

on the railroads of Raleigh County, West Virginia.

Instead,

they found themselves being forced to work in the mines.
They attempted to escape from Raleigh County.

Local author

ities arrested them and brought them back to Raleigh County
.
a
**
in handcuffs.

10

in Mingo County the coal mine operators hired BaldwinFelts Detectives to

II

maintain order" in the coal fields,

which in their terms meant the elimination of pro-union

o

Alexander Trachtenberg and Benjamin Glassberg, The
American Labor Yearbook 1921-1922 (New York: The Rand School
of Social Science, 1 923 ) , p7 T96.
Q

Kenneth Bailey, "Blacks and Immigrants in the West
Virginia Coal Fields," West Virginia History Quarterly, 1973,
p. 146.
1 01 bi d .

-13sentiments. 1 1

The government of the state of West Virginia

had been unresponsive to the complaints of the UMWA concern
ing the police-state type atmosphere in Mingo and Logan Counties.

The southern West Virginia operators saw their role

as that of civilizing what before had been “almost unbroken
forest. "

As they reported to the U.S. Coal Commission:

With the advent of the coal operator in this
region came the modern community life. Coal min
ing demands labor in quantity. None being avail
able, the operator had to carry his workmen with
him. He had to provide for them all the creature
comforts — houses, food, clothing, water supply,
light, medical attention, and later, roads,
schools, churches, recreation, and amusement. These
items entail a heavy fixed charge upon the coal
companies for which the only compensation is
satisfied and contented employees.12
The United States Coal Commission, in a study of 713

company-control1ed towns, most of them in West Virginia, found
great variation in the standard of living in these communi

ties :
In the worst of the company-controlled communi
ties the state of disrepair at times runs beyond
verbal description or even photographic illustra
tions, since neither words nor pictures can portray
the atmosphere of abandoned dejection or reproduce
the smells. Old, unpainted board and batten houses
— batten going or gone and board fast following,
roofs broken, porches staggering, steps sagging, a
riot of rubbish, and a medley of odors — such are
the features of the worst camps.T3

^Edward Berman, Labor Disputes and the President of
the United States (New York: Columbia University Press,
1 924), “p. 210.
1 2 Fetherling, Mother Jones: The Miner’s Angel, p. 180.
1 31 bi d .
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The coal operators had school teachers discharged if
they had any pro-Union character!stics.

The coal mine o p -

erators supervised the local doctors, whose salaries came
directly from deductions from the miners' paychecks.

The

operators also selected local ministers and town officials.
The result was a dictatorship by the coal mine operators

which eyed with suspicion federal authority and outsiders. 14

Coal mine operators often defended the use of force
to hold the miners in line by complaining to federal offi

cials in Washington that outside agitators were trying to

lead the coal miners in a Communist-style revolution.

The

fact of the matter was that there was no danger of such an
uprising.

In the hills of West Virginia "Communi sm" was

15
only a word meaning a new sect, an offshoot of Socialism.

Both Socialism and Communism were seen by most West Virgin

ians as something evil and foreign.

However, the memory of

Paint and Cabin creeks convinced some federal officials that

a Communist revolution was possible in the coal fields of

West Virginia.
Despite the obstacles to unionization in southwestern

West Virginia, John L. Lewis considered it essential that
all of the Mountain State be brought under union control.

Lewis considered West Virginia a vital cornerstone in his

** 41 b i d . , p . 181 .
^John Spivak, A Man in His Time (New York:
Press, 1 967 ), p. 67 .

Hori zon

-1 5organi zation.

West Virginia was the only state in the South-

east where the United Mine Workers of America had been suc
cessful, having failed to make significant gains in the coal-

fields of Alabama and Tennessee.

Lewis was realistic in his

evaluation that the loss of West Virginia could lead to the

eventual decline and possible extinction of the United Mine
Workers of America.

With these circumstances, a major confrontation between
organized labor against big business and the federal govern-

ment seemed inevitable. West Virginia would serve as the
battlefield.

I

CHAPTER III
WEST VIRGINIA IN INSURRECTION:

THE FIRST ARMED MARCH
Southern West Virginia, in September of 1919, was full

of rumors.

Union coal miners became frustrated and angry

concerning the violation of human rights in Logan and Mingo

Counties.

Many of them were unemployed and angry because

they had left West Virginia to fight in Europe only to re
turn to find their jobs taken away by the men who stayed be-

hind.

Rumors spread throughout the Kanawha Valley that worn-

en and children were being murdered in Logan County.

The

Cabin Creek district of Kanawha County, the site of an
earlier insurrection against state authority in 1912, became

The miners there remembered the bloodshed of
1912 and started to mobilize with rifles and guns. 1

agitated.

On September 4, miners from Kanawha County began to
assemble at the mouth of Lens Creek in the town of Marmet,

which is located ten miles from Charleston and thirty miles
from Logan County.

By nightfall five thousand miners, leader-

less but with moblike character!’s ti cs , had gathered.

This

^Winthrop Lane, Civil War in West Virginia (New York:
Arno & The New York Times ( 1 969p^ 1 06 .
-16-

-17
makeshift army intended to invade Logan County and "liber
Exactly how this was to be accomplished seemed to be a mystery. 2
ate" the people there.

At the time of the insurrection UMWA District 17 Presi

dent Keeney was in Fairmont,

Governor Cornwell sent a tele-

gram pleading with him to come to Marmet and try to dis-

perse the mob.

Keeney drove to Charleston and from there on

to Marmet, but he failed to convince the miners to go home.
He then returned to Charleston and pleaded with Governor
Cornwell asked Keeney to

Cornwell to speak with the miners.

return to Marmet and try again to calm the miners.

returned to Marmet and failed again.

Keeney

It was obvious at this

point that the miners were fully prepared to invade Logan
Keeney determined that the only man who could stop

County.

the invasion was the governor himself.

He called the governor

by telephone and urged him to come to Marmet at once to speak
to the miners or else run the risk of an invasion of Boone,
Logan and Mingo Counties by daybreak. 3

Governor Cornwell and his secretary immediately drove
without protection to Marmet.

Many of the miners were in

World War I uniforms, complete with gas masks and other

equi pment.

They had served their country in the European

theatre and were combat veterans.

Seeing an ice cream truck

2

Kyle McCormick, The New-Kanawha River and the Mine
War of West Virginia (Charleston, West Virginia: Mathews
Printing and Lithographic Company, 1959), p. 145.
3 La n e, Civil War in West Virginia, p. 106.
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as the only podium available, he jumped on the tailgate and
began speaking to the miners.4

The Governor shouted, "Boys,

do you not know that every one of you is acting in violation

of every law against bearing arms and that you are taking

the law into your own hands? u5

The miners shouted back.

II

There is no law in West Virginia except that decreed by the
coal operators, and you know it, governor. ..6 The Governor
answered ,

ii

The gunmen system is a condition that I did not

create and a system to which I am opposed, and I assure you

that my good office shall be used during the time I remain
governor in an effort to eradicate this system from your
state. ..7
Despite the governor's appeal, the miners failed to
calm down.

They had heard promises like these before.

They

I

did not believe that Governor Cornwell had any intention of
o

carrying out these promises.

A large Negro miner shouted,

"Mr. Governor, you made a nice speech, we 1i kes yo' talk,
but it don ' mean nothin’, and I'se erfraid you done lose. ,.9

Another miner shouted, “There is a group of men in this

41 b i d . , p. 107.

5 Fred Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields (Morgantown,
West Vi rgi ni a : West Virginia University Press, 1967), p.
66.

■

61 bid.

7 I bid.
81 b i d .

91 b i d .

I
1

-19audience who have been overseas fighting to make the world
safe for democracy, but we find conditions here more hell..10 These two comments fired
ish than they were over there.
up the miners, and violence seemed unavoidable.

The Governor went to his car to return to Charleston.
As he departed, a loud shot rang out.

It was foil owed by

other gunshots.
II

You will frighten those women," Keeney shourted. 11

II

Hell of a note if we can’t fire a salute to our own

Governor, when during the war we were forced to salute every

jackass that happened along just because he had big ears,"
retorted a miner. 12
After the Governor departed, the cry of "On to Logan"

was taken up.

The marchers began to move in the direction

of Logan.

By the next morning 1,500 miners had continued their
march to Danville, a pro-Union stronghold north of Logan in

Boone County.

Mr. Keeney went to Danville by train.

In the

meantime Governor John J. Cornwell had contacted President
Wilson to request federal military aid if violence should
erupt. 1 3 Keeney managed to convince the miners to give

^°U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and
W
Labor, est Virginia Coal Fields, 67th Congress, 1st Sess.,
1921 , p. 169.

^Mooney, Struggle in the Coal

Fields , P. 66.

12Ibid.

^Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War:

Violence in

-20-

Governor Cornwell a chance to correct the situation in
Logan County.

The Governor had sent two special trains from

Charleston to take the miners home.

The miners finally

agreed to board the trains and go home.
averted. 1 4

The crisis had been

Within a week of the insurrection Governor Cornwell

directed an investigation into conditions in Logan County.

Major Thomas B. Davis, acting adjutant general of West
Virginia, and Colonel George S. Wallace were chosen by the
Governor to investigate the situation.

The Governor

instructed Davis and Wallace to investigate the conditions
in Logan County in accordance to the promises that he had

made to the miners at Marmet.

The Governor also requested

that they investigate the causes of the mobilization of
early September and to "ascertain and fix responsibility"
for the insurrection. 1 5

The commission did find irregularities in Logan

County, including the paying of Sheriff Chafin and his deputies
by coal operators, the beating of pro-union miners by police

officials, and the forceful expulsion of union representatives

from that county.

However, they did not find any evidence

that women and children had been murdered in Logan.

the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1927." Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connect!cut; Greenwood Press , 1 9617, p^ 1 03.

**4 l a n e , Civil War in West Virginia, P. 107.
1 5 West Virginia, Committee Appointed by Governor

r

-21County. 16

Since Cornwell was a lame-duck governor, the com-

mission was ineffective.

No corrections were made in Logan

County.

The United Mine Workers of America were still not
satisfied with conditions in Logan County.

Deputy sheriffs

severely battered fourteen miners in that county for their

union sympathies in August 1919.

These miners went to Gov-

ernor Cornwell to plead for intervention on behalf of the
pro-Union miners in Mingo and Logan Counties.

They demanded

that the bill of rights in the West Virginia constitution be

enforced.

The UMWA was not satisfied with Cornwell's actions

and decided to show that their determination to unionize the
southern West Virginia coal fields had not waned because of
the insurrection. ?
Governor Cornwell and officials of the UMWA reached

a verbal agreement to avoid confrontation in Logan County

until the Cornwell Commission had a chance to become effecti ve .

However, Frank Keeney sent several organizers into

The organizers were forced out of the county
by Don Chafin’s deputies. 18 This infuriated Governor Corn-

Logan County.

well.

When Cornwell met Mooney and Keeney on a street in

Cornwell in Connection with the Logan County Situation, Re
port , Charleston, West Virginia, 1919.

16L a n e, Civil War in West Virginia , P. 108.

**?West Virginia Coal Fields , P. 170.
^Arthur Nelson, "Private Ownership of Public

-22Charleston soon after the attempted infiltration of Logan
County, he branished his cane and threatened them for acting
in bad faith.

"You fellows have received all the assistance

from me that you will ever get," the Governor is quoted as
saying. 19
The first march on Logan provided the miners with

the weapon of mi 1itary-style action against the coal mine
opera tors.

It also provided West Virginia politicans and

coal mine operators with an example of the weapon of mi 1i-

tary intervention by American federal troops against Union
representatives and striking miners. 20
West Virginia was still a powder keg ready to explode.

The march and the attempted infiltration of Logan County had
solved nothing. Conditions in Logan and Mingo Counties had

not changed.

The possibility of a second insurrection

haunted the new Governor of West Virginia, Ephraim F. Morgan.

Officials," Nation, Volume 110, No. 2865 (May 29, 1920), p. 75,
^Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 65.

20Elizabeth Commetti and Festus P, Summers, The
Thirty-Fifth State: A Documentary History of West Virginia
(Parsons^ West Virginia: McClain Printing Company, 1 966) ,
p. 541,
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CHAPTER IV

REVOLUTION IN THE COAL FIELDS:
WAR IN MINGO COUNTY
In the spring of 1919 the miners of Mingo County de

cided to organize with the help of the United Mine Workers of

This decision sent shock waves among the coal mine
operators throughout southern West Virginia. 1 The operators

Ameri ca .

reacted by ordering lockouts not only in Mingo County, but
in Logan, McDowell and Mercer Counties as well.

The actions

of the coal mine operators backfired, however, when the
Mingo County coal miners officially applied for membership

through Frank Keeney, President of the UMWA District 17.

Local police officials evicted many miners from company homes
Some miners also had their
2
credit at the company stores revoked.

in Mingo County in retaliation.

When hearing of the firing, the miners flocked to the

UMWA in droves .

In Mingo County the UMWA announced during a

church meeting that they would use that place of worship to

sign up miners for the UMWA.

The church was filled three

^Trachtenberg and Glassberg, The American Labor Yearbook , p. 196.
2
dIbid., p. 226.
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1
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The miners reacted with a
3
They were not under any duress of any kind.

times within one-and-one-half hours.

free will.

Mingo County was geographically located in the southern

coal field.

The southern coal mine operators had gained advan-

tages over their northern competitors by not having to meet
high Union pay scales.

This advantage allowed them to sell

their coal more cheaply in northern markets than the coal operators in the north where the UMWA already had organized the

mi ners .

Strikes by UMWA miners in the North increased pro

fits for southern coal mine operators.
A nationwide strike by UMWA miners in 1920 would have

had little effect on the United States.

Non-union coal mines

in West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia and Alabama,
with a potential production of six hundred million tons of

coal a year, enough to supply the United States’ domestic and

export needs, could prevent a nationwide coal shortage.

This

fact convinced southern coal mine operators that the UMWA
would eventually destroy the northern coal industry, and the

southern coal industry would step in and become the heir apparent to that industry. 4 Despite this belief, southern

coal operators had expressed great concern about the success
of the UMWA in northern West Virginia.

The coal mine opera-

tors in southern West Virginia were determined that the UMWA

3West Virginia Coal Fields, P. 103.
4
Ross, Machine Age in the Hills, PP. 142-143.

-25would not infiltrate the mines there.
During the spring of 1920 the UMWA continued to in-

crease its membership in Mingo County.

The operators retali-

ated by evicting men from their homes as soon as their member-

ship became known.

Operating out of Bluefield, West Virginia,

the Baldwin-Pelts detectives did the actual evicting since
Sheriff Blankenship of Mingo County refused to evict the
The detectives would go into the homes of the evicted
5
miners and throw their belongings into the company streets.

miners.

These detectives were unpopular in Mingo County because ear
lier they had served as bounty hunters who were paid to cap
ture or kill members of the Hatfield family during the famous

Hatfield-McCoy feuds.
As a result of the evictions in Mingo County, Sheriff

Blankenship, unable to stand back and watch the evictions,

ordered the arrest of twenty-seven detectives for disobeying a West Virginia state law requiring thirty days' notice

before evictions.

Soon Blankenship was joined by Sid Hat-

field, the local sheriff of Matewan, and the mayor of that
small river community, Cabell Testerman. 6
In an effort to control the miners in the town of

Sprigg, the local coal companies posted notices announcing

wage reductions for miners.

Several hundred miners left

Mingo County at this point and went to Charleston.

5
Ross, Machine Age in the Hills , P. 143.
61 bid.

They

-26-

presented Governor Cornwell with petitions demanding the
right to join the UMWA without retaliation by the coal mine
operators.?

Meanwhile, in retaliation for Sid Hatfield’s support

for the mi ners , the Baldwin-Felts detectives descended on
Matewan, throwing furniture into the streets.

The UMWA was

not prepared for these evictions and brought in Canadian army
tents to house the newly evicted miners

By July, 1920,

about 2,700 miners had been evicted in Mingo County.

These

miners along with their families were forced to live in tents

in large “tent colonies ".8
Immediately following the evictions in Mingo County,

C. E. Lively appeared upon the scene.

A spy for the Baldwin-

Felts detectives, he had participated in the massacre of

Union miners and their families in Ludlow, Colorado, while
in the employment of the Baldwin-Felts detectives and had

served time in jail for those actions.

In Matewan he oper-

ated a restaurant beneath UMWA headquarters and gained the
confidence of the miners and the union officials.

He then

turned all this information over to the Baldwin-Felts de9
Lively
tectives and to the local coal mine operators.

openly boasted of his support of the Union and advocated
armed resistance to the coal mine operators.

The miners

^Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 71 .
8
West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 15.
9
Ibid. , p. 354.

-27used his restaurant as a rendezvous, therefore, making

Lively's position even more important to the operators.

10

On May 16, 1920, William Blizzard and Frank Keeney

visited Matewan and spoke before 3,000 spectators in a driv

ing rain.

Rumors had spread throughout western Mingo County

that the Baldwin-Felts detectives were about to invade the

Matewan area and carry out arrests and evictions.

Keeney

and Mooney asked the miners to stay within the boundaries
of the law but to prevent the gunmen from taking power from

duly elected and qualified Mingo County police officials.
Blizzard and Keeney declined an invitation from Lively to
spend the night at his home and returned to Charleston. 11

The local sheriff of Matewan was Sid Hatfield, a former

miner who was sympathetic to the UMWA.

He weighed only 135

pounds and stood only five feet nine inches tall, but he had
a reputation of having a quick draw with a pistol. 12 Hatfield was a direct descendant of the Hatfield clan that had

battled the McCoys in earlier years.

Hatfield had become

very angry at the sight of evictions and had promised friends
in Matewan that they would come to an end.

The mayor of Matewan was Cabell Testerman, who owned

!
i

i
a jewelry store and a soda fountain.

He also was prepared

^Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P. 72.
11 Ibid .

^West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 205.

-28to use force against further evictions. 1 3

At 11:47 A.M. , on a rainy May 19, Albert Felts, the
brother of Thomas L. Felts, the director of the detective

agency, stepped down from a train onto the passenger unloading platform in Matewan. 14
Felts was wearing the badge of a "deputy sheri ff" of
Harlan County, Kentucky.

He had been one of the chief gun-

men used by the coal operators in the Ludlow, Colorado mass
acre of 1913, when nineteen people were killed, of whom
twelve had been miners' wives and children. 1 5 His reputa
tion had followed him to West Virginia.

He was one of the

most feared and hated men in the Tug Valley.

Felts went to

Mayor Testerman to speak with him about some demands to be
made by the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency.
ti

We wish to make the town our headquarters while down

here and to mount some machine guns on top of the brick buildings in the town, with your permission, of course," Fel ts
announced . 16

No objections to your making the town your headquarters
13

Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields , P- 73.
^Richard D, Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners:
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archen Books,
WestVirginia 1907-1933
1 979 ) , p. 98.
l5John L. Lewis, The International Union: United Mine
Workers of America from 1~917 to 1 952 (Indianapolis: The
International Executive Board of the United Mine Workers of
Ameri ca, 1952), p. 29.

l6Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P. 73.

i

-29just as long as you wish to stay," stated the mayor, "but

what is the idea of mounting machine guns on top of the
buildings? ,.17
II

So we can command the surrounding community,

II

re

plied Felts.18
"You cannot mount machine guns anywhere in this town

and as long as you are here, you are going to conduct your19
selves in accordance with the law," the mayor protested.
Many citizens of Matewan had gathered because of the

argument, and Sheriff Hatfield had been an interested bystander during this conversation.

By this time Felts had

been joined by nine other detectives.

Hatfield walked over

to the group and joined in the conversation.
ii
What do you aim to do here, Lee? ,,20 he inquired of

I

I

Felts.

We are going to evict those miners from the coal com21
pany houses," he replied.
ii

"According to the law?" asked the sheriff.

??

23
"Well, some might think so," retorted Felts.
17
Ibid.

18

Ibid .
19

Ibid.
20
Ibid.
i

21
Ibid .
22
Ibid.

23
Ibid .

i
i

f
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"I have nothing to do with what you do outside the

town limits but some of those Stone Mountain miners live
inside the corporation and you are not going to throw their
household goods out without due process of law, not while I
am chi ef of poli ce, ii answered Hatfi eld. 24 By this time

other members of the community, some of them armed, had be
gun to gather near the arguing group.

Having become flustered and staring at Hatfield,

Felts repli ed, “Then maybe you won't be chief very long. ..25
Sheriff Hatfield's patience had run out.

"Whether

I as chief 15 minutes or 15 years, you and your men will

abide by the law while in this town or in the calaboose
you will go. ii Hatfield shouted. 26
"We'll see, we'll see," Felts answered sarcastically.
ii

We can make it attractive to you if you will do as we say. „27
28
"In what way do you mean?" inquired Testerman.

Then he turned to Mayor Testerman.

"You can name your price if you will let us operate
29
unmolested while here," he offered.

"I am not for sale, gentlemen, and you can consider
24

Ibid.
25

Ibid.
26

Ibid., p. 74.
27

Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid .

-31the interview closed," the mayor said. 30

The detectives,

angry and frustrated, then left for the northern part of

town.

"Well, that's that, and where do they go from here?
said the sheriff.

an answer.

,,31

Hatfield would not have long to wait for

Soon someone came from the north end of town

screaming that the detectives were telling miners that they
were going to throw their furniture into the streets.

Hatfield walked calmly to the north end of town where
he found the detectives talking to a miner about disposses-

The sheriff inquired, "Felts, have you got an

sing him.

order from the court giving you authority to evict these
miners? >,32

"No , " Felts replied.

"I do not need one. „ 33

i

"You will need an order before you evict anyone and
you had better let them alone until you secure such a writ.

.,34

Many of the citizens of Matewan had gathered and were

listening.
Felts became infuriated.
„35
business, fellow.

"You better mind your own
■
i

2
ii

30

E

Ibid .

31
Ibid.
32

Ibid.
E

33

Ibid.
34
Ibid.

35

I.

Ibid .

I
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"I’m minding my own business and I’m telling you for
the last time not to try it."

Hatfield turned away from the

detectives and returned to the bank where many citizens had

gathered.

"Folks , I want 40 or 50 of you to act as deputies.

Get your guns and I will swear you in.

Those fellows are

going to start something directly and we never can tell
from what direction it will come. .,36
It did not take long for a group of citizens to gather

in front of the bank, well armed and ready for action.
Felts and his associates came up to Hatfield and announced,
"We are going to place you (Hatfield) under arrest. .,37

"What for?"38

inquired the sheriff.

39
"For interfering with the law," Lee Felts announced.
"That's rich," said the chief as his face broke into
.
, grin.
.40
a broad

In the meantime a bystander ran to the office of
Mayor Testerman.

He ran up to the mayor and informed him

that Sid Hatfield was being placed under arrest.
walked up to the detectives.

In an angry tone of voice, he

shouted, "What are you doing here? »41

36
Ibid.
37

Ibid. , p. 75.

38
Ibid .

39
Ibid.

40

Ibid.
41

Ibid.

The mayor

I
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We are going to arrest Chief Hatfield for interfer

ing with the law,"42 Felts answered.
ii

The chief has not interfered with the law and you

cannot arrest him and take him out of this town .

We wi11

give bail for him, if there is a charge, but you cannot ar
rest him and take him away, ..43 said the mayor.

Felts presented Testerman with a piece of paper, pass -

ing it off as a warrant.
and cried,

H

The mayor glanced at the warrant

This is a phoney warrant!

And even it were

I 'm
We'll go any bail he sets-- ..44

real , I ain't letting you take my Chief of Police!

going to call the judge.

As Mayor Testerman turned into a doorway to telephone
the judge, Felts drew his gun and fired at Sid Hatfield.

The

bullet missed Hatfield, but it hit Mayor Testerman, who was
killed instantly.

Before Felts could fire again, Hatfield

took aim and shot him in the forehead, mortally wounding

him.

Soon al 1 of the citizens who had brought guns began

to use them with deadly force, and in the ensuing battle

three Ba 1dwin-Felts detectives and two coal miners were

killed instantly.

Miners in near-by houses, who had been

watching the hated detectives, opened fire.

The detectives

panicked and those that survived the volley of fire fled

42Ibid.
43
Ibid .

44
Spivak, A Man in His Time, P. 90.
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to the Tug Fork River and swam across it into Kentucky.
Another detective hid in a trash can and fled Matewan that
45
night.
The entire incident took around five minutes.
The dead included:

Albert Felts, Lee Felts, brother

of Albert, C. B. Cunningham of Bluefield, C. T. Huggins, a

former chief of police in Galax, Virginia; A. J. Boorher ,
a former policeman of Marion, Virginia; and J. W. Ferguson,

a former policeman of Princeton, West Virginia.
detectives survived the gunfight.

Only two

In the town of Matewan,

Mayor Testerman and two miners, Robert Mullins and Tot Tins
ley, were dead.46

Testerman was taken to a hospital in
Welch, where he was announced dead on arrival. 47
Hatfield began an immediate search of the corpses of

the detectives.

On one detective he found a slip of paper

which ordered the men to proceed to Matewan and "get the
Mayor and Chief of Police, no matter what it required. .,48

The Operators Association charged that Sid Hatfield

and UMWA officials had conspired to kill the Baldwin-Felts
detectives.

They felt that the seven-to-three kill rati o

in the battle was suspicious.

Hatfield complicated matters

further by marrying Mayor Testerman's young and pretty

45

Ibid.
i
i

46

Kyle McCormick, The New-Kanawha River and the Mine
War of West Virginia (Charleston, West Virginia: Mathews
Printing and Lithographic Company, 1959), p. 151.
47

Lane, Civil War in West Virginia , pp. 74-79. •

48
Ibid.

i

-35widow within ten days after the battle.

The operators felt

that it was Sid Hatfield, with a romantic motive, that killed
49
Cabell Testerman, not Albert Felts.
The Mingo County Court returned indictments against

nineteen persons for the Matewan incident. Charged with

murder were Sheriff Hatfield, his deputy, Ed Chambers; and
miners Jim Maggard, Reese Chambers, C. H. Kesser, Fred

Burgraph, Nat Attwood, Lee Toller, Clare Overstreet, Bouser
Coleman, Ben Mounts, Bill Bowman, Van Clay, Art Williams,

and Hallie Chambers.50
Tom Felts, the director of the Baldwin-Felts Agency.

took two dozen of his toughest men and established a base
at a hotel in Williamson, the county seat of Mingo County.
Felts was prepared to avenge the death of his two brothers,
51
either by legal justice or by vigilante force.

Anderson Hatfield was owner and proprietor of the
only hotel in Williamson.

He was on the payroll of the Felts

agency and was to be the most important witness against the
Matewan defendants before the grand jury that was to meet in

Willi amson.

While sleeping one afternoon on the front porch

of the hotel, someone fired a shot from behind the south end
of the freight house which was located near the hotel.
4 9 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners,
P- 99.
5 0 Howard B. Lee Collection (Morgantown, West
Virginia; West Virginia University Department of Archives
and Manuscripts, A&M 2139).
51 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields,
PP- 76-77.

I
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The bullet exited
52
He died instantly.

striking Anderson Hatfield in the mouth.

through the back of his head.

In the meantime, a civil war of sorts had broken out

in Mingo County.

By the last days of June, 1920, almost

6,000 men had joined the Union and nearly 3,000 had been
discharged and evicted from their homes.

On July 1, 1920,

the miners held a mass meeting in Williamson and decided to
call a strike in protest.

However, the operators refused

to negotiate with the miners, and the fighting continued. 53

When hearing of the strike the operators took action
at once.

They brought in many "strikebreakers" who were

usually unemployed persons from rural areas outside West
Virginia and who had no idea what the mining conflict was

about.

Before the year ended, about one-tenth of the miners

in Mingo County aere strikebreakers who had been brought in
by the operators. 54

The operators also used immigrants as strikebreakers.

I
I

many of whom were from Eastern Europe, especially Hungary,
i

Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

They were likewise largely ignorant of the conflict in West Virginia. 55

i
1

I

Another favorite target for the strikebreaking role

52

53

Ibid.

I

West Virginia Coal Fields, P. 1 03.

i

54

Ibid. , p. 13.
55

Ibid. , p. 157.

I
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by the operators were poor, uneducated southern Blacks.
Some of the companies employed Baldwin-Felts detectives to

go to states in the deep South to recruit.

They usual ly

were well armed, traveled in pairs, and carried a large

amount of money to entice the Blacks to come to West Virginia to mine coal. 56 The Baldwin-Felts detectives were
usually accompanied by two Black recruiters "who were skill

fully selected for their persuasive eloquence and conscienceless disregard for the truth. ,,57 The detectives would disappear while the Black recruiters held mass meetings in
churches to describe the advantages and opportunities of

working in the West Virginia coal mines.

Many Blacks, frus-

trated with the poverty of living in the rural South, swal-

lowed this heaven-on-earth description and were willing to
go to West Virginia.

The recruiters told the Blacks to
I

bring enough food for six meals.

They boarded a "labor

train" which traveled throughout the South picking up prospective Black miners.

Once on the train, the men were

1

placed under the control of the detectives who locked the

!

I

coach doors until the train arrived in West Virginia.

The

reason given for the locked doors by the detectives was to

56
Negroes and
Kenneth Bailey, "A Judicious Mixture:
Immigrants in the West Virginia Mines,, " West Virgin!a
History Quarterly Volume XXXIV, No. F2 (January 1 973 ), p. 157.
57
William Livingston, Coal Miners and Religion (Un
published Thesis, Union Theological Seminary of Richmond,
Virginia, 1951), p. 29.

i

i

-38prevent the Blacks from falling off the train should they
wander too far.

It was more likely that the doors were
locked to keep them from jumping off the train. 58 When the

Blacks arrived in southern West Virginia, they found segre
gated towns similar to their native deep South, only this
time the hatred directed toward them because they were

"scabs “ added to their confusion.
Recruiters assured many of the strikebreakers that

West Virginia had been organized.

They had been assured

by the operators' recruiters that there was no industrial
conflict.

When they arrived in Mingo County, they were

threatened as scabs and were forced to flee West Virginia,
having left their belongings behind. 59
Harry Olmstead, Chairman of the Labor Committee of

the Williamson Operators Association, provides a vivid

description of how miners resisted strikebreakers.

Accord

i ng to him, the miners kept scouts aboard all the incoming
trains and the scouts in turn would get word back to the
miners in Williamson that the train bearing strikebreakers

was coming.
ti on .

Great crowds would assemble at the train sta-

When the train bearing the strikebreakers arrived,

t.

the miners and their families would surround the train bear
ing signs announcing a strike was in progress and asking the
58

Bailey, "A Judicious Mixture," West Virginia His
tory Quarterly, p. 157.
59
West Virginia Coal Fields, P. 1 58.
■

I

-39-

strikebreakers to return to their homes.

Any strikebreaker

who tried to get off the train was threatened, and even the

Williamson police helped the miners.

Olmsted reported that

at Williamson he once came upon a train surrounded by pickets.

The operators herded the strikebreakers through the streets
of Williamson to the headquarters of the operators' associa

tion.

A policeman named Deerfield entered the headquarters

and advised the new men to leave Williamson and not to
scab.

Olmsted told the policeman that if he came there to

talk the strikebreakers out of working, then he should leave.
He also insisted that Deerfield offer the strikebreakers
safe passage through Williamson.

The policeman left with

the promise that he would send a squad of policemen to guar
antee safe passage for the strikebreakers through William-

son, but he failed to return, and Olmsted had to get a

judge to come and warn of arrest if there should be any
further attempts to interfere with the bringing in of the

strikebreakers.^0
The next day another train bearing strikebreakers

came to Wi11i amson.

The miners again surrounded the train

and begged the new arrivals not to scab.

Judge Damron, who

had aided Olmsted earlier, came to the train platform with
federal troops and arrested a miner by the name of Page.

Soldiers arrived, formed the strikebreakers into a line,

placed Page at their head as a shield against rifle fire,
60

Ibid. , p. 263.

I

I‘i
-40and marched them through town.

When the strikebreakers ar-

rived at their destination, the federal troops placed Page
in the Mingo County jail. 61
Armed insurrection continued to be a problem in Mingo

Armed patrols organized by the operators attempted

County.

to prevent Union officials from entering the county.

Stri k-

i n g miners interrupted mining in Mingo County and in Pike

County, Kentucky, with constant rifle fire.

On July 7 , a

battle erupted as pro and anti-Union forces fired back and
Mine tipples were the
favorite target of the pro-Union forces. 6 2
forth across the Tug Fork River.

On August 21, a three hour battle erupted between

pro and anti-Union forces near the Tug Fork River.
tle left six men dead.

The bat

A week later Baldwin-Felts detec-

tives and miners fought a battle.

Both sides were armed

Major Payne, the leader of the dectectives, died in the fighting. 63

with machine guns.

On August 30, 1920, Governor Cornwell asked for fed-

era! troops.

The officers and men of the infantry stationed

at Camp Sherman, Chillicothe, Ohio, entered the coal fields

and stationed themselves at every mine and hollow along a
fifty mile part of Mingo County.

The troops were equipped

61

i
Ibid.

62
New York Times, July 5, 1920, p. 23.

63

Ibid., August 29, 1 920, P- 23.
i
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with machine guns, rifles, and a one-pound cannon.

Civil

courts still functioned, however, as martial law was a. .
64
voided.
Ironically, the striking miners welcomed the troops

as a symbol of authority and a deterent against the atroci-

ties committed by the operators1 hired army.

cials did not share this attitude.

UMWA offi-

Frank Keeney charged

that federal troops were actually used by Governor Cornwell as strikebreakers .

Governor Cornwell consented to

withdraw the troops on the condition that Sheriff Blanken
ship appoint 1600 deputy sheriffs who could meet the personal approval of Judge Damron. This completed, the federal
troops began to withdraw. 65 But the federal troops had
barely left Mingo County when, on October 6, one deputy

sheriff was killed and two miners wounded as the sheriffs
attempted to raid a UMWA local in Blair, Logan County. 66
On November 25, 1920, Governor Cornwell sent a telegram to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, in Washington, re-

questing federal trooos.

A similar request was made by

the judge of the circuit court and the prosecuting attorney

of Mingo County.67

64

65
66
67

On November 20, federal troops returned

Ibid. , August 30, 1920, P- 1 .

Ibid., September 29, 1 920 , P. 17.
Ibid. , October 6, 1920, p. 1 .

United States National Archives, Wash i ngton , D.C.:

-42to Mingo County under the command of Colonel Herman Hall.

The military forbade all assemblies in Mingo County except
for worship services.

The military also prevented demon-

strations against local, state or federal authority.

The

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, P. C. March, sent a telegram to Major-General George A. Reed, commander of the Fifth
Army Corps at Ft.

Benjamin Harrison in Indiana, recommend-

ing a short stay in West Virginia for the federal troops.
March later remarked that it was up to Governor Cornwell to
68
maintain law and order in his own state

On November 30, 1920, General Reed received word from
Governor Cornwell recommending the replacement of local officials in Mingo County with federal troops because they
It appears, however, that
were corrupt and incompetent. 69

the governor had grown weary of Sheriff Blankenship's pro
Union stance and preferred that Colonel Hall take over law
enforcement in Mingo County.

On December 1 , President W i 1 -

son refused to allow Colonel Hall to relieve Mingo County
officials of their offices. 70 Reed also began pressuring

Governor Cornwel1 to take personal responsibility for the

Files of the Adjutant General's Offices.
Central Decimal
File, Project Files 1917-1925, States and Territories, West
Virginia to Wyoming, Box No. 1580, RG 407.
68
Ibid.
69
Files of the Adjutant General, o . c i t.

70
Ibid.

-43administration of law and order in Mingo County.

On Decem-

ber 21, Cornwell told Reed that he did not feel that he had

sufficient forces to hold the peace in Mingo County until
the “Matewan Massacre" trial began on July 17th.

He re-

quested that the National Guard remain in Mingo County un

til the trial began.7
Meanwhile, during the first weeks of December Colonel
1

Hall ordered a "clean up" of Williamson, forcing pro-Union
At Nolan and Sprigg flooring and tents arrived to house the evicted miners. 72

miners to flee.

On December 5 the UMWA headquarters in Indianapolis
released the following statement to the press:

The international Executive Board declared
that these industrial struggles in Alabama
and West Virginia must be continued until the
coal operators recognize the rights of their
employees. The principle of human rights is
at stake. There can be no compromise of this
principle.73

Besides the Baldwin-Felts detectives and the National

Guard, there were two other law enforcement agencies i n
Mingo County.

The state police operated under Captain J. R.

Brockus, a Tennessee native and an army veteran allied with

the coal operators.

The Department of Public Safety, under

i

I

I

the direction of Jackson Arnold, also operated in Mingo
71

Ibid.
72

West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 12.
73
New York Times, November 30, 1920, p. 24.

i
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County.

74

The majority of Brockus' men were ex-servicemen.
Out of a total force of one hundred men under Brockus'

- thirty-five had to be discharged because of bad

command

conduct.75

The conglomeration of authorities in Mingo County
aided in the confusion there

To make matters worse, mem

bers of the police department and of the state police as
signed to Mingo County had to be approved by a citizens'

council.

This council was made up of lawyers, a rabidly

anti-Union minister whose congregation included several coal

operators, and businessmen both sympathetic to and asso
ciated with the operators.

Farmers, miners, union sym-

pathizers, Negroes and immigrants were kept off the police
75
force and off the citizens' council.

On February 15, 1921, just before the grand jury was
to meet concerning the Matewan Massacre, federal troops
77 By this
left Mingo County by orders of President Wilson.

time guerilla warfare had claimed over one hundred lives in

Mingo County, with forty of those deaths occurring in the
7 8 The departure of federal
months of July and August alone.

74Arthur Warner, "Fighting Unionism with Martial Law,"
Nation (October 12, 1920), p. 325.

7 5West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 341.
76Ibid. , p. 60.

77Files of the Adjutant General's Office, op. ci t.
7A

Evelyn L. Harris and Frank J. Krebs, From Humble
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troops ushered in a wave of terror against pro-Union forces,
causing many miners to leave Williamson and Matewan to live

in tents.

Dirt floors characterized these dwellings.

coal camps failed to provide sanitation facilities.

The
The

evicted miners and their families were not allowed to have
medical care at the local hospital.

The public schools re

fused to admit the children of striking miners.

Food was

scarce and malnutrition was a constant problem.

There was

no running water, and drinking water was taken from streams
that were often polluted with human waste.

These people,

ostracized from their own communities by the occupying antiUnion forces, were often harrassed by the local and state

p o1 ice.

The winter months brought snow, sleet and freezing

rain to compound the tragedy.

These poor, embattled miners

and their wives and children were living testimony of the
hypocrisy of the interpretation of constitutional rights

of American citizens as conceived by state and local offi
cials in West Virginia in the 1 920's.'7^
Sheriff Blankenship resigned under pressure from the

citizens* council on January 1, 1921.

On January 16, Blanken-

ship was the victim of an assassination attempt at the Norfolk

___________
Begi
nni ngs : West Virginia Federation of Labor 1 903-1 957
(Charleston, West Virginia: The West Virginia Labor His
tory Committee, 1960), p. 153; Morgantown (W.Va.) Post,
November 28, 1920, p. 1.
79
New York Times, December 6 and 7, 1920, p. 1.
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and Western station in Williamson.

Fortunately, he was

able to knock the pistol out of the hand of his attacker as

the bullet missed, and the would-be assassin

it went off;

escaped.

80

It appeared that certain coal operators would

go to any length to eliminate their opposition.
Hoping to avoid violence, many of the smaller coal
operators in Mingo County chose to cooperate with the United
Mine Workers of America. 81 However, most of the coal mine
operators remained steadfast in their determination to retain
complete control over their mines and to prevent unionization
at all costs .

Attempting to raise public support for the organization
of the miners, UMWA President John L. Lewis made the

following statement to the press on January 9, 1921:

The sufferings which the men, women and
children in both these coal fields have undergone
challenge the admiration of every member of our
union. They have been thrown out of their homes,
have been denied the right of free assemblage,
been subjected to the brutal treatment of a
private army of hired thugs and gunmen employed
by the coal operators and by repressive military
regulations which have been employed by state and
federal troops.83

80Ibid.

(January 17,

^West Virginia Coal
oo

1921),

Fields,

p.

2.

pp.

124-130.

Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1927," Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood PresT, 1961) , p7 103.
88New York Times (January 10, 1921), p. 2.
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The climax of the cause of much of the violence was
at hand.

The trial of Sid Hatfield and his co-defendants

got underway under the fear of violence.

On January 31,

Williamson was attacked by rifle fire from the Kentucky side
of the Tug Fork River.

attackers in vain.

Soldiers searched the hills for the

It was widely believed that the Hatfield

clan had divided in support of Sid, and that they were fighting it out in the hills north of Williamson.

problems in the selection of a jury.

There were

Man refused to serve.

The mores of the mountains held that capital punishment inflicted by legal authroity was improper. 84 Jury selection
had become so tedious that by February 5 there was doubt if
a trial could be held.

After examining over one thousand

citizens the jury box remained unfilled.

Prospective jurors

were excused from duty on three major grounds:

union sym-

pathy, refusal to impose the death sentence, and kinship to
..
i 85
the
accused.
While the jury selection dragged on, the joint houses

of Congress began to take action.

The United Mine Workers

of America had lobbied for congressional hearings on the
situation in West Virginia.

On February 7, Senator Hiram

Johnson, of California, introduced a resolution calling for
an investigation into the situation in Mingo, Logan, McDowell

84Ibid. (February 1 , 1921), P. 5.
851 bi d . (February 6, 1921), Section II, p. 1.

I
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and Mercer Counties in West Virginia. 8 6

This resolution

passed, and on July 14, 1921, Senator William Kenyon, of

Iowa , convened the West Virginia Coal Fields’ Investigative
87
Committee under the Department of Education and Labor.
On July 20, 1 920, David Robb, the financial agent of
the union in Mingo County, was arrested along with twelve

men for unlawful assembly.

They were arrested at the United

Mine Workers of America headquarters in Williamson.

Robb

was in the process of handing out relief to the discharged
miners whose only means of support was through Union funds.

Robb was not released until he promised to leave West

Virginia.

The UMWA sent letters to Governor Cornwell and

President Wilson protesting the use of a military rule by the
operators to maintain their form of order over the miners. 88

On September 6, Judge Damron finally opened trial at
the Mingo County Court House in Williamson.

The State of

West Virginia charged Hatfield and twenty-five other
defendants with the murder of eight Ba 1dwin-Felts detectives
in Matewan.

Judge Damron replaced forty-two deputy sheriffs

appointed by former Sheriff Blankenship because of their

uni on sympathi es. They were replaced with twelve Williamson

861 bi d . (February 8, 1921), p. 24t
^Michael P. Jordan, ’’The Mingo War: Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1927.” Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press , 1961p^ 103.
88New York Times (July 9, 1921), p. 1 .

-49-

busi nessmen.

Damron also revoked all gun permits in Mingo

County and had all men near the court house searched for
..
firearms
. 89
The prosecution, led by the operators and the Baldwin-

Felts Agency, tried to prove that Hatfield fired the first
They claimed that Hatfield
killed Testerman so that he could marry Testerman's wife. 90

shot and killed Mayor Testerman.

They also tried to prove that Sid Hatfield murdered Anderson Hatfield, but this was disproven when a witness for the
defense proved that Sid Hatfield was in another part of town
when the shooting occurred. 91 The Baldwin-Felts Agency did

little if anything constructive to help convict the defend-

ants .

The defense introduced to the jury the slips of paper

found on the bodies of the detectives ordering the murder of

Sid Hatfield and Mayor Testerman.

They attacked the prin-

ciple that Hatfield planned to murder Testerman because

Hatfield himself was the primary target if a shootout should

They also introduced for consideration the forged

occur.

warrant.

The director of the detective agency, Thomas Felts,

refused to give any testimony that might damage his company. 92 A handwriting expert was brought to the trial. He

89West Virginia Coal Fields , P. 207.
90Ibid.
91 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields,
P. 77.
9 2 W e s t Virginia Coal Fields, p. 210.

-SOtestified that the warrant was indeed a forgery.

93

The jury

acquitted Hatfield and the other defendants of the charge of

murder.

Felts swore revenge, calling Hatfield and his ac-

compli ces "Bolshevi ks".
On May 12, 1921 , the "Three Day Battle" began .

It

was the heaviest confrontation in Mingo County since the

"Matewan Massacre" and involved larger numbers.

The "Three

Day Battle" was a siege and involved miners and law enforce
ment agents in Mingo County. The miners poured shots into

Merri mac, Rawl , Sprigg, Matewan, and across the Tug Fork
Governor Ephraim Morgan or95
dered state troopers into Mingo County again.

River into McCarr, Kentucky.

On May 12 Captain Brockus led the police circuitiously through the back hills to surround the miners.

However,

he only succeeded in getting ambushed himself and barely es

Newspapers throughout the United States
announced that anarchy prevailed in Mingo County. 96 Govercaped with his life.

nor Ephraim Morgan again asked Secretary of War Weeks to
send federal troops to West Virginia. 9 7 Passenger trains

2

=

were also attacked by miners near Matewan.

The passengers

and railway workers protected themselves by lying down on

■

i
■

93Ibid. , p. 424.

9^West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 881 .
95Files of the Adjutant General's Office, o . c i t.
96Ibid.
97Ibid.

i
■
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When the railway workers tried to make repairs
98
to the train, they were attacked by rifle fire.
the floors.

On May 14, Governor Ephraim Morgan sent the follow

ing telegram to Secretary of War Weeks:

More than a half dozen (people) reported killed.
Many wounded in Mingo County. Towns being shot up.
Women and children driven from their homes. Firing
from Kentucky into West Virginia for the past 48
hours continuous, unabated. Authorities absolutely
unable to cope with situation. Are we compelled to
witness further slaughter of innocent law abiding
citizens with no signs of relief from the Federal
Government?99

The second day of fighting resulted in the introduc
tion of automatic rifles and machine guns by the state po
lice.

The miners resorted to a systematic attack on the

coal mines.

A blast from a powerful fox horn would cause a

volley of shots to pour down from the hills.

Three trum-

pets on the horn would result in complete silence. Forty
miners were pinned down by gunfire in Merrimac. 1 00

Fearing widespread social unrest in his state, Gov-

ernor Edwin P. Morrow of Kentucky ordered out the National
Guard on May 14.

Moreover, he sent a telegram to West Virginia Governor Ephraim Morgan urging him to do the same. 101

I

I

On the same date a local Matewan businessman, C. R. Wilson,
sent a telegram to the United States Secretary of War
981b i d (May 13, 1921 ), p. 1 .
"Files of the Adjutant General's Office, o . ci t.
10°New York Times (May 14, 1921) , P. 1 .

101Files of the Adjutant General's Office, O£. cit.

R
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Elihu Root, stating:

In the name of God and Humanity please hurry
federal troops to Matewan. Our citizens are be
ing shot down like rats and women are being fired
upon by striking miners and are held in cellars
without aid from state constabulary who are power
less. Our mining property is being fired upon
every day.
Five deaths known to be the result
and hundreds will be killed unless aid comes
quick. Our Governor has asked for aid from Wash
ington. Why is it not forthcoming? Our property
will be destroyed by dynamite tonight we fear.102
A Williamson businessman sent a similar telegram to
the commander of Fort Benjamin Harrison in Indiana. 1 03

Despite the pleas of Governor Morgan and the citizens

of Mingo County, President Harding stood fast in his refusal
to commit federal troops to stop the violence in West Vir-

gi n i a .

He telegraphed Governor Morgan and notified him of

his decision on May 15.

Governor Edwin P. Morrow of Ken-

tucky influenced the President’s decision.

Governor Morrow

felt that the violence in Mingo County had already run its

course.

Also influencing Harding was C. F. Thompson, Assist-

ant Chief of Military Intelligence, who filed this report:

My conclusion is that the local and state
authorities have not taken sufficiently active
measures to meet the situation.
For purpose of
both political and economic gain they have decided
to rely on federal protection.
I believe Kentucky
is able to provide the necessary public power, but
that West Virginia has waited so long that the state
would be unable to counteract the public hysteria
which will probably follow resumption of the firing.
I believe that disinterested opinion bears me out
in the statement that a delay in sending federal
troops has been a beneficial effect in arousing the

1021 bid,
1031bid .

1

-53community and officials to a sense of o b 1 i g a tion J04

Thompson’s report to the President on May 15 was accompanied by a telegram from Huntington attorney Randolph
Bias hysterically pleading for federal troops. 105

On May 15 Senator Howard Sutherland of West Virginia
visited President Harding and presented him with the re
quests of several coal operators in Mingo County asking for

On the same date Governor Morgan sent his
106
third request for federal troops to the President.

federal troops.

On May 16, both sides of ammunition and an eerie

peace reigned over the Tug Valley.

Three hundred miners at-

tacked the Kentucky town of McCarr with rifle fire but the
Kentucky National Guard soon flushed them out of the

hills.107

Also on that date state police accused Sid Hat-

field of hitting a coal mine operator over the head with a

rifle.108
The operators continued to fear a mass demonstration

on the first anniversary of the "Matewan Massacre.

ii

Harry

Olmsted, president of the Coal Mine Operators Association,
flooded Washington with telegrams pleading for federal

104Files of the Adjutant General’s Offices, op. c i * •
1°5Ibld.

106New York Times (May 15, 1921), p. 1 .
107Ibid.
1081 bid.

i
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-54assistance to prevent a bloodbath on that day.

Gove rno r

Morgan announced that a militia would be formed to police
Mingo County on Matewan Day.
declare martial

Governor Morgan also decided to

law in that county by signing the following

executive proclamation:
Whereas, by my proclamation dated the nineteenth
day in May, in the year of our Lord one thousand
nine hundred and twenty-one, I, Ephraim F. Morgan,
Governor of the State of West Virginia, and as such
Governor ex-officio Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the State, did declare and proclaim
a state of war, insurrection, and riot to ex i st i n
the County of Mingo and State of West Virginia, and;
Whereas, Said state of war, insurrection and riot
has continued to exist and still exists in said
county, and it is necessary that sa i d county should
remain under martial law until necessity therefore
ceases to exist, and
Whereas, the Judge of the Circuit Court, and
the Sheriff and Prosecuting Attorney of said Mingo
County have again declared to me their inability to
put down or control such insurrection and riot, and
have further represented to me that there is grave
and imminent danger of greater and more serious
trouble in said county, and
Whereas, the State is without adequate organized
militia to execute and enforce the laws of West
Virginia and said proclamation in said county, and
the Act of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed
April 28, 1921 (Chap. 117 of the Acts of the Legis
lature of West Virginia, Reg. Session, 1921), is
not yet in force and effect, and
Whereas, in view of the premises, it is neces
sary to enroll the persons liable to military duty
in said County of Mingo, and, when such enrollment
is completed, to call out a portion of the enrolled
militia of the said County of Mingo for active duty
to execute and enforce the laws of West Virginia,
said proclamation and this proclamation;
Therefore, I, Ephraim F. Morgan, Governor of the
State of West Virginia, as such Governor ex-officio
Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the
State, in view of the foregoing, and in order to exe
cute and enforce the laws of West Virginia, to
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protect the public peace, lives and property of
the citizens, by virtue of the Constitution and
the laws of the State of West Virginia, do here
by declare and proclaim a state of war, insurrec
tion and riot has continued to exist and still
exists in said Mingo County.
And I do hereby further declare and proclaim
that said county is, and shall continue to re
main, under martial law until necessity there
fore ceases to exist and my further order; and
do hereby call out for active duty in said
County of Mingo, when such enrollment is completed,
to execute and enforce the laws of the State of
West Virginia, said proclamation of the nineteenth
day of May in our year one thousand nine hundred
and twenty-one, and this proclamation,
In furtherance hereof the following orders
are hereby promulgated:
1. The assessor of said Mingo County shall
forthwith make an enrollment of all persons liable
for military service in said county. Such enroll
ment shall state the name, residence, age and occu
pation of the persons enrolled. Two copies of such
enrollment shall be made; one shall be filled in
the office of the Adjutant General of the State of
West Virginia.
2.
Immediately upon the completion of said
enrollment, the Sheriff of Mingo County shall forth
with, by written order or oral notice to each in
dividual, or by proclamation, appoint a time and
place for assembling of such enrolled militia at
convenient place in said Mingo County, and shall
then and there proceed to draft one hundred and
thirty volunteers and shall forthwith forward to
the undersigned a list of the persons so drafted or
accepted as volunteers.
3. The one thousand and thirty men so accepted
shall be immediately mustered into the service of
the State of West Virginia for sixty days, but may
be discharged in less time.
4. Said men as accepted and mustered into the
service of the State, shall be organized into two
companies of sixty-five men each, which companies
shall be designed as Company A and Company B, West
Virginia Enrolled Militia, respectively.
5. Major Thomas B. Davis, Acting Adjutant Gen
eral of the State of West Virginia, heretofore de
signated and appointed and commissioned Commanding
Officer of the Militia of said Mingo County, is
hereby continued as such, and shall muster said
men into the service of the State, and shall organ
ize said men into two companies, said organizations
shall forthwith elect lieutenants.

L

i

-566. All persons in said County of Mingo are
required to observe and obey my said proclamation
of the nineteenth day of May, in the year of our
Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one,
and the rules and orders promulgated thereby and
embraced therein, and this proclamation, and such
further rules and orders as may, from time to
time, be promulgated by the undersigned, or by the
Commanding Officer of the militia of said County
of Mingo.
This proclamation is hereby declared and
proclaimed to be supplemental to my said
proclamation of said nineteenth of May, in the
year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and
twenty-one, and last mentioned proclamation being
still in force and effect.
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Great Seal of the State to be
affi xed.
EPHRAIM F. MORGAN 1 09
In effect, Governor Morgan conceded in his proclamation

that West Virginia was fighting a civil war.
Despite all of the hoopla and concern, Matewan Day
came and passed with little violence. At War Eagle in Mingo
County a tipple was dynamited. 11 0 There was hope that the

!

violence that rocked Mingo County for so long was finally

coming to an end.

On Matewan Day Charles A. Tulley, Superintendent of

the Rawl Creek Coal Company, claimed he was shot at while
111
driving past the Tent Creek tent colony in Mingo County.

^^Ephraim Franklin Morgan, State Papers and Public
Addresses (Charleston, West Virginia: Jarrett Company,

1 925TTpp. 86-87.
%ohn M. Barb, Strikes in the Southern West Virginia
Coal Fields, 1912-1922 (Unpublished thesis, West Virginia
University, 1940), p. 82.
Ill Ibid .
1

-57He stormed into Williamson and made fiery speeches to the

landed businessmen there.

Vigilante groups began to form.

There was talk of doing something "patri oti c" for Armistice
Day.

The violence in Mingo County was about to reach its

most ugly and violent stage.

■

CHAPTER V

"THE MEEK SHALL INHERIT THE EARTH:

II

LIFE IN THE TENT COLONIES

The mine war which had engulfed Mingo County reached

a violent and bloody climax in the spring of 1921.

Nei gh-

bor fought neighbor, mines were attacked and evictions con

The degree of violence in West Virginia finally for

tinued.

ced President Harding to abandon his hands-off policy.

returned General Banholtz to Charleston.

He

Banholts informed

the President that West Virginia was in effect a victim of

However,
he did not recommend intervention by federal troops. 1 On

poor leadership on the part of Governor Morgan.

May 25 striking miners killed two West Virginia state troopers
in an ambush, and the next day a Mingo County grand jury in2
In truth there was enough
dieted seven miners for murder.

violence in West Virginia to warrant federal intervention.
In explaining the situation in West Virginia, General Band-

tholtz told President Harding what he wanted to hear:

that

the State of West Virginia could handle her own affairs and
that the federal government could stand by and do nothing.

^Trachtenberg, The American Labor Yearbook 1921-1922,

P- 198.
2

Ibid.
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By the spring of 1921 most of the striking miners in
southern West Virginia lived in tents furnished by the UMWA.

Despite the fact that these miners and their families lived
in abject poverty, compounded by disease and ostrasism, these

people were close-knit and determined to endure hardship in
an effort to escape the slavery imposed by the coal operators .

The tents in which the miners lived had been used by

the Canadian army during World War I.

They encircled a com-

munal cooking pot which also furnished the only heat for the
tent colony.

The overall attitude in the tent colonies was

that the accommodations furnished by the coal companies were
not much better in many coal camps where the small company

houses, rough and paintless, usually had decaying porches
and grime.

Flies abounded and the streets were masses of

mud when i t rained.

Typhoid was a constant killer in Mingo

and Logan Counties.

Living in tents did not seem to be much

harder than living in company houses.

The mountain women

joked about "camping out", where the air was a little bit
-p

freer. 3

The coal operators did not see the tent colonies as
an escape from subjugation.

A spokesman for the coal opera-

tors stated before the United States Commission on Inter
state Commerce:
These tent colonies were instituted at the
beginning of the strike by the UMWA organiza
tion. They furnished shelter for the workers who

3 Fin ley, The Corrupt Kingdom, p. 128.

■
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had been induced to strike and in them that or
ganization supported in idleness all those who
preferred to stay on the spot rather than seek
work elsewhere. The companies offered to pay
the moving expenses to union fields to former
employees, their families and household goods.
The organization used the tent colonies as a
means of securing public support and sympathy
as a reason for raising a national assessment.
The tent colony has come to be recognized as
primarily a weapon of offense of the UMWA or
institution..44
ganization and not as a relief institution
This statement ignored the facts.

Despite the pro

paganda value of these camps to the UMWA, most important use
was providing shelter for the men, women and children who
had been evicted from their homes in a brutal fashion. The
5 Deputies carried out
miners had no other place to live.
evictions in a most ruthless manner in the coal

camps:

Sheriffs and their company-subsidized deputies,
with an eye for melodrama, would generally choose
the hour just before dawn for their eviction jobs,
and if the weather was foul, so much the better.
Fortified by liberal portions of white mile and
ostentatiously showing off sawed-off shotguns,
high-powered rifles and revolvers, they would de
scend upon a sleeping town. Along the cinder
streets in front of the company houses, each of
the drab counterpart of its neighbor, they would
march, huddled together, until they came to the
house of the miner of whom the order had been
served.
If the door didn’t open at once to their
pounding, they would break it in and come piling
through to pull the digger out of bed and stand
him up against the wall at the points of their guns.
Then they would herd the women and children out in
to the street and go to work on the mean furnishings
oftheplace.
I once drove up on a union truck loaded with
tents and food to the outskirts of town where an
hour before sunup six families had been sent out.
Through slashing rains, our truck sloshed along a
Col eman, Men and Coal , p. 100.

51 b i d .

R
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valley trail to the coal camp, where we found the
women in drenched house dresses trying to calm
their frightened children. They had taken re
fuge under the shed back of a small church.
The men were standing ankle-deep in the creek
water that had overflowed its banks and was
swirling past the doorsills of the company houses.
In the sulphur-yellow water there was a con
fusion of broken bedstands, cribs, chairs, tables,
toys.6

Moreover, McAlister Coleman evaluated the character
of the evictors as follows:

Negroes were often used to do the actual
work of "setting out" beds, bureaus, cookstoves,
pictures, etc. The deputies would not fail to
point to the white miner, backed against the wall
with his hands on high, that he was being "set
out" by "niggers.”7
Despite the constant attempts to keep outsiders away
from the affected area, the curiosity of the American people

demanded first-hand observations of the mine war in West Vir
ginia.

The accepted explanation of

ii

Bolshevik" agitation

in the West Virginia coal fields gave way to nationwide con

cern because of reported atrocities in the Mountain State.

Stories published by the New York Times embarrassed the coal
operators because they showed the tragic side of the tent

colonies .

Such a story was published in that newspaper on

December 7, 1 920:
Some of the children were anameic and underfed
and the women showed traces of the life they were
The women
forced to endure some for many months,
appeared to have lapsed into> a state of hopelessness and even among the children it was difficult

6Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom, p. 127.

7Col eman, Men and Coal , p. 101 .

I
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that the visitor had brought candy. A miner's
wife said, 'We've had enough to eat and the
union has done all that could be expected, but
the course of life has been hard on all of us,
especially the children.
If only I had some
milk for the baby. The little girl has been
sick ever since we got here. We cannot get
the proper food for her and camp life is hard.
But what are we to do?8
The ever increasing concern among citizens in the

United States was not matched by a similar compassion by the
churches and charitable organizations in West Virginia.

The

fundamentalist churches or Charleston came under the

influence of the famous evangelist Billy Sunday, who was

brought to West Virginia in a plush railroad car by the coal
mine operators.

It proved to be a wise investment.

Sunday

held revival services throughout Southern West Virginia,
Some of his more notable quotes concerning the strikers

during these services included the following statements;
I cannot believe God had anything to do with
the creation of these human buzzards.
I'd rather
be in hell with Cleopatra, John Wilkes Booth and
Charles Guiteau than to live on earth with these
1 i ce . 9
The radicals would turn the milk of human
kindness into limburger cheese and give a polecat
convulsions.10

8 New York Times (December 7, 1920), p. 5.
9 Charles Guiteau assassinated President James Garfield, Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in
■' Coal
' 1 Fields, 1921-1922." Gary
the Southern West Virginia
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds. , Essays in Southern Labor History
1 03.
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 103.

10Ibid.
■

I
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If I were the Lord for about 15 minutes, I'd
smack the bunch so hard that there would be nothing
left for the devil to levy on but a bunch of whis
kers and a bad smell.il
Blindly, Charleston ministers accepted Sunday's version of the tent colonies and the mine wars without question.

Sherwood Eddy of the YMCA had become concerned about the

strike situation and visited the coal camps himself.

When

he attempted to raise relief funds with the help of the

Charleston ministers, he was refused on the grounds that
there was considerable ii immorality in the tents. ,.12 The
Red Cross refused to help the miners on the grounds that
no "act of God" had caused their sufferings and that they

could have food, shelter and clothing if they went back to

work on the operators1 terms.

The secretary of the Young

Men's Christian Association in Charleston refused to allow
that organization to help the miners on the grounds that
strikes were a controversial issue with which the YMCA could

not become involved.

It was a fact that the coal mine oper-

ators had made a handsome contribution toward the construction of a new wing on the YMCA building in Charleston. 13

Perhaps material gains meant more to the YMCA in Charleston
than their Christian duty.

Persons in that city either self-

appointed or elected politically or religiously to carry out

11 Ibid.
1 o

Coleman, Men and Coal, p. 1 00.

^Finley, The Corrupt Kingdom, p, 127.
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hypocrisy while the miners suffered.

The spreading of the gospel was used for nonreligious

purposes by the striking miners and their families so well.
The women in the tent colonies would hold "prayer meetings"
on the public roads leading to the mines.

Often these

religious meetings had secular goals:

(At such meetings) a deep-voiced woman with
evangelical training would stand in front of her
kneeling companions and, as the strikebreakers
came down the road, she would pray in hog-calling
tones that God Almighty would spare the lives of
these poor, misguided 'un-Union' men who were
taking the bread out of the mouths of decent workers.
She prayed that the strikebreakers would not throw
their picks into a gassy pocket, that rocks would
not fall on them, and that they would not have their
limbs severed by a runaway mine car.14

Very often the strikebreakers would become so unnerved
by the rather descriptive prayer that they would return to

town fearing bodily harm from working in the mines.
A child psychologist would have appreciated the
effect the serene behavior of the mothers had on their

children.

Children of school age were not allowed to attend

public school, therefore, any education they received often

came from their parents in primitive form.

The women spent

their time picketing around mine tipples, toting water from

springs and creeks, scrubbing and cooking and trying as

best they could to entertain their children and keep them
from "running wild".^

This was in direct conflict with the

1 4 Coleman, Men and Coal , p. 103.
15
ibid., p. 102.

I
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"life of idleness" painted for the wife of the striking
16
coal miner by the press agents of the coal operators.
Despite hardships, disease, loneliness and despair,
the brave striking coal miners and their families refused to
give in to the coal operators' demands.

Their resistance

to involuntary servitude in the mine camps made them con

stant targets for pogrom-like attacks from the West Virginia
State Police, Baldwin-Felts detectives, and the hired thugs

of the coal mine operators. The greatest tragedy of the Mingo
War awaited the people of the Tent Lick colony located out
side of Williamson in Mingo County,

1 61 b i d . , p. 104.

CHAPTER VI
VIGILANTISM IN THE COAL FIELDS:
THE ATTACK ON TENT LICK

The United States had been under the influence of the

"Red Scare" since the First World War. The fear and appre

hension caused by this phenomenon did not spare West Vir

ginia or Mingo County.

Coal mine operators repeatedly used

the fear of a Bolshevik revolution in the Williamson news

papers in order to marshal public support against the strik
ing miners.

The propaganda campaign of the operators per-

petrated the idea that the striking miners were good-natured
at heart but that they were being misled by dangerous Commun
ist union organizers.

As a writer in a Williamson news-

paper noted:

It is unbelievable that a big labor ogganization
should demand an ownership in property in which it
has no investment. They are as revolutionary as
the reddest of the Reds in the International Workers
of the World. Are you ready to have all property
held in common? Are you ready for a nationalization
of industries as obtained in Soviet Russia? The men
are being exploited in the leaders’ ambitions to at
tain the power of a Lenin or a Trotsky.l

The real targets of such propaganda, however, were
the businessmen of Williamson, as the following articles

1 Ro s s , Machine Age in the Hills, p. 146.
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point out:

Coal mines pay out taxes which the roads and
schools are supported and bring into the com
munity practically every dollar that comes
2
for the subsistence of our business community.
Socialist propaganda is trying to compel
the operators to relinquish control of the
company stores.
If the UMWA gains the upper
hand, their 'no profit' plan would destroy
the independent business of the community.
No merchant of Williamson could survive
this kind of competition.3
The baiting propaganda of the coal mine operators
found fertile ground among the upper class citizens of
Williamson.

They had become more and more apprehensive con-

cerning the mine war that was being fought around them.

It

was very easy for them to accept the idea that the Kremlin
was behind all of the trouble.

The northern UMWA's plat-

form demanding nationalization of all coal mines in the
United States only fueled this fear. 4 Williamson was a
powder keg ready to explode.

Armistice Day once was celebrated in the United States
as a most revered holiday.

It was more than the date that

Germany surrendered to end the First World War.

It was a

day to prove one's patriotism to the United States.

Germany,

a broken and defeated nation, had ceased to be the evil

threat to the American way of life that she had once been.

21 bid.
3
° I b i d., p. 147.
4
Ibid . , p. 146.
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free enterprise system, had assumed the role of the great
enemy of the United States. Williamson was preparing for

Armistice Day like towns across the United States.

However,

November 11, 1920, in Williamson would prove to be anything
but normal.
With the arrival of Armistice Day eve, Charles A.
Tulley, the superintendent of the Rawl Creek Coal Company,

was in an ugly mood.

On Matewan Day several months earlier,

he claimed that his car had been shot at by striking miners

of the Tent Lick tent colony outside of Williamson.

Further-

more, he was upset that the "Bolsheviks” at Tent Lick had
not been properly punished.

Soon Tulley had organized a

mob of vigilantes made up of, among others, Captain Brockus

of the local West Virginia State Police, Dr. J. W. Carpenter,
Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Major Harvey Cameron,

commander of the local post of the American Legion, Sheri ff
Pinson, Secretary S. L. Domer of the Young Men's Christian

Association, and Harry Preece, the Assistant Prosecuting At5
According to Brockus, the vigitorney of Mingo County.
lantes included "the men in business who have property, what
6 These upper class
we term the better class of citizens”.

citizens of Williamson were prepared to defend with armed
force what they considered the American way of life.

5New York Times, May 20, 1921 , P. 1 .

$West Virginia Coal Fields, p. 339.
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crowd arrived at Tent Lick

I a w-and-order

in two automobiles.

I ove, an u na rmed coaI miner,
policeman while surrendering.

Alex Breed

was shot to death by a state
The vigilantes tore the tents

to pieces with their bayonets and then burned the stark furniture in the tents.

They then segregated the menfolk from

the women and children.
tent colony,

After completely destroying the

which had housed two hundred families, the v i g i -

lantes threw the body of Alex Breedlove into a truck and

drove back to Williamson.

The vigilantes marched fifty-six

miners to Williamson at bayonet point and placed them i n

the county jail.

Breeklove’s body was dragged through the

streets of Will iamson as part of the celebration for Armist i ce Da y.

The most vivic descriptions concerning the attack on
the tent colony came before the Kenyon Committee on Educa-

t i on and Labor by various coal miners from the Tent Lick

Colony in the forms of affidavits:
James Williams, being duly sworn upon his oath,
says when Alex Breedlove was murdered he was
about thirty feet from Breedlove, and saw James
Bowles, State Policeman, shoot him; Bowles was
about six or seven feet from Breedlove, and Breed
love has his hands up above his head at the time
he was shot; Bowles said to Breedlove, ’Hold your
hands up, God damn you, and if you have anything
to say, say it fast’, and Breedlove said, ’Lord,
have mercy’ and instantly the gun fired and
Breed Iove fell.
7

Ibid., pp.

I 66-167.
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At the same time Victor Blackburn, a special
state policeman, was shooting at Garfield Moore,
who was behind a tree, the same tree that Breed
love had just come from behind, and after Bowles
had called Breedlove to come out from behind the
tree and put his hands up and he had done so and
was shot, Bowles immediately turned his gun on
Garfield Moore, but did not have time to fire until
he was shot in the back by another state policeman
who was lying flat down on the ground straight
down the hill below policeman Bowles, then at the
crack of the rifle a half dozen or so women who
were standing there screamed out, ’Look out, man,
you are shooting at your own men,' and asked him to
get away from there, that he would get them all
killed.
Affiant there upon said to the man who had shot
Bowles, ‘Yes, you done shot this man here now,'
and at that he said to the affiant, 'You are a damn
liar, you damn black
, you get away from
there.' Bowles fainted, and was carried off the
ground by Willie Ball and carried under a bridge
across Lick Creek.8

William H. Ball, being duly sworn, says (when the
policeman who had shot Bowles was carried beneath
the bridge) the women began begging them not to
bring him under there lest they get them all killed,
and to them the following language was used by Cap
tain Brockus, 'If you do not hush, I will knock your
God damn brains out with my gun.' Then Brockus gave
orders to take the miners out from under the bridge
and line them up in the country road and required to
line up together, and then orders were given by
Brockus to break into the tents, and thereupon his
orders were carried out.
They broke into tents where they had doors and
were locked and where no doors existed they cut
their way in. Then they proceeded to cut the tents
into pieces; break up the furniture, break up the
tents, trunks, rifle drawers, and destroy food and
clothing. They rounded up fifty-six of us, and after
they had destroyed everything we had, they drove us
at the point of their rifles down through the city of
Williamson and put us in the city lockup.
There was a room about twenty feet by forty feet
with a concrete floor, without chairs or bed, and
only one open window about twenty-eight by thirty-two
inches in size, and one door which opens from the

81 b i d . , p. 557.
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hall. The sink was stopped up and running over;
there was five commodes, and four of these were
stopped up and standing full of human excrement;
the floor was covered with water about half sole
shoe deep and all kinds of filth lying around on
the floor in this water.
Fifty-six of us were put
in this place and a guard placed at the door over
us and we were denied the privilege of speaking to
our attorney or any other person, and held in this
room from about 3:30 Tuesday evening at 9:00 Thurs
day night when we were taken out and taken to the
grand jury room in the court house and there de
tained until Saturday evening, and all released
except Garfield Moore and Richard Combs.
I also heard Captain Brockus and Bill St. Clair,
the deputy mine inspector, who was a volunteer
state police, say that all the ‘God damn
ought to be burned,' that the women ought all to
be piled up and the tents put on top of them and
burned.
I also heard Dr. Lawson, a volunteer
state police, say to a woman that ‘he would knock
a kid out of her big enough to walk,‘...and all
of this was done in the presence of Captain Brockus.
They also tore down our American flag and stamped
it in the dirt in front of us all.9

The first shots were fired by Sheriff Pinson,
Major Davis and Captain Brockus as they came in
view of said camps from the country road.
They came
for the sole and only purpose of murdering men,
Some
women and children, and they shot up the place,
of us, running helter skelter in a frantic effort to
escape, was soon overtaken by Governor Morgan's thugs
and his honor Mr. Pinson’s gunmen.
They threatened
our women with rape, our camp with arson, and men and
boys with powder and lead if they should resort to
any means other than smiles.10
I was working in my garden when the two autos
came up, the men in those cars without being molested
by anyone. They began to fire with machine guns, high
power rifles, and pistols.
I ran home.
By the time
I got there, about fifty state police, Mr. Ben May
nard of Kentucky, and Mr. Boyd McCoy, began busting
and breaking up everything. My little girl of four
years old was knocked down and ran over by Captain
Brockus. They then marched me out with the other boys.

g
* I b i d . , p. 167.

1 ° I b i d . , P« 557.
■
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get over the fence Captain Brockus knocked me
over the head with his pistol. After they
had us in jail they told us that we did not
11
keep quiet they would blow up the county jail.
The testimony of Captain Brockus before the Committee of

Education and Labor was damning because it disclosed that an
incident was staged to further infuriate the townspeople of
Williamson into administering vigilante justice.

He testified

that Major T. B. Davi s , a number of state policemen, Sheriff
Pinson and himself went to Tent Lick Colony early in the

morning of Armistice Day and sprayed the tents with machine

gun fire.

They then leaped into their cars and returned to

Willi amson.

Upon arriving at the county seat of Mingo County

they announced that they had been fired upon by striking

miners.

Several toots of the fire whistle were used as a

signal for the vigilantes to gather.

Brockus testified that

the miners fired upon the mob first.

He said that he ordered

a search of the tents and the capture of all residents of the
Tent Lick Colony, but he denied seeing any damage done.

Brockus claimed that the men were held in prison in Williamson

because of confusion by Mingo County officials concerning
the prosecution of the miners. 1 2
Ironically, the vigilantes failed to achieve the

goal of totally destroying the colony.

The women of Tent

Lick Colony remained at the charred campsite until their
11 Ibid.
1 2 I b i d., pp. 333-334.

j
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menfolk returned from jail.
tents by the UMWA. 13

The colony was rebuilt with

The attack on the Tent Lick Colony was important
for many reasons.

First, the "Red Scare" fears of a "Com-

muni st" uprising in southern West Virginia proved prophetic
in an unusual way. The conflict at Tent Lick was a class

struggle with the rich landed merchant class and law author
ities from Williamson on one side and the poor striking work-

ing class coal miners on the other.

In southern West Vir-

ginia the coal operators were seen as evi1 by the striking

miners while the landed class accused the striking miners
In the eyes of each side it was impossible to see degrees of virtue for the other cause. 14 The

of being Bolsheviks.

ironies of this mentality are described by Malcolm Ross:

The man who cried 'agitator' or 'gun thug' has
come to a conclusion that half-hearted measures
are useless.
He begins to polish up his weapons,
whereupon the issue is taken away from his intel
lect and handed over to his emotions.
In this
way the radical laborite makes certain that he will
not be swayed by any glimpses of honesty on the
part of an operator.
The same system makes it pos
sible for the operator to be heartless, while still
retaining a conviction that he is working for the
ultimate good of the miner's wife he makes home
less . 1 5
Second,

the Tent Lick massacre also pointed out the

failures of the judicial

system in West Virginia.

The West

13Trachtenberg and Glassberg, The American Labor
Yearbook 1921-1922, p. 198.
1 4Ross, Machine Age in the Hills, p. 139.
15

°Ibid.
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Virginia State Police ignored the constitutional rights of
Ameri can citizens.

State troopers murdered miners, searched

without warrants and even destroyed their homes, arrested
miners without proper judicial procedure and held them for

five days without cause.

The Lowendon Case points out the

inadequacy of the judicial procedure in West Virginia.

On

June 17, West Virginia's Supreme Court under Judge Poffenbarger decided, in the case of E. Lowendon, a mine organizer

for the United Mine Workers of America arrested for carry
ing a pistol, that martial law could be maintained only by
regular military troops and not by state troopers.

granted a writ of habeas corpus to Lowendon.

He

However, Gover-

nor Morgan chose to ignore the Lowendon ruling when on June
28 he re-issued martial law in Mingo County when a battle

between state police and miners resulted in the death of a
highway patrolman. 16 In effect he ignored the ruling of the

Supreme Court,
The United States government finally realized that
the situation in West Virginia had reached dangerous proporti ons .

The Tent Lick Massacre caused the United States Sen-

Senator Johnson asked the Senate to in17 The Senate named
vestigate the violence in West Virginia.

ate to take action.

Senator William Kenyon of Iowa as its chairman.

Testimonies

^Trach ten berg and Glassberg, The Arnerican Labor Yearbook 1921-1922, p. 198.

17Ibid.

I
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from this hearing were offered earlier in this chapter.

For the first time there were hopes that a peaceful
settlement could be reached through intervention by the

federal government.

However, the widely publicized hearings

only caused further frustrations and made the situation in

West Virginia seem unsolvable.

Once again the federal

government had failed to provide much-needed leadership. 1 8
This was underscored by the fact that the Kenyon Committee

directly tied the problems of the state of West Virginia to
the refusal of the coal mine operators to recognize the UMWA.

Despite the findings of the Kenyon Committee, President
Harding refused to give his support to that committee. 19

Governor Morgan of West Virginia attempted to
negotiate between the UMWA and the coal operators.

operators frustrated his attempts.

The

On July 12, Harry Olmsted,

the chairman of the executive committee of the Windsor Coal

Operators Association, said that the violence in Mingo County

was due to "Mountaineer lawlessness” and cleared the coal
mine operators of any wrongdoing. 20
The Tent Lick Affair and subsequent action or in
action by the governments of the West Virginia and the

8Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in
the Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922.” Gary
M. Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 19 61), p.110.

1^Trachtenberg and Glassberg, The American Labor
Yearbook 1921-1922, p. 198.
20Ibid.
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United States angered the union coal miners who had threat

ened to invade Logan and Mingo Counties during the administration of Governor Cornwell.

They became frustrated at the

failure of politicians to protect the miners in the non
Union areas.
emoti ons.

Such dissatisfaction fostered revolutionary

Since vigilantism had worked well for the coal

mine operators, the union coal miners recognized the poten

tial of vigilantism in alleviating their problems.

i

CHAPTER VII
MARTYRDOM IN McDOWELL COUNTY:
THE ASSASSINATION OF SID HATFIELD

Southern West Virginia's constabulary often appeared

to be dominated by greed and corruption at the turn of
the twentieth century.

dox.

Sid Hatfield, however, was a para-

Most law enforcement officials in the coal mining re

gions of that state were openly anti-Union and were willing

to use violence to control the interests of the coal mine

operators in their jurisdictions. a fact which the Tent Lick

Massacre underscored.

Sid Hatfield was a former coal miner

who condemned the evictions of miners and the mistreatment

of the people of southern West Virginia by rich and powerful
forces both within and foreign to West Virginia.

His heroic

but nevertheless violent actions in 1919 resulting in the

massacre of Baldwin-Felts detectives in Matewan and his sub

sequent murder trial elevated him to a level of omnipotence
among the besieged coal miners in southern West Virginia.

Although Sid Hatfield was still inclined to represent the

coal miners of Mingo County more than the representatives
of the UMWA, the UMWA did not seem to mind.

They produced

a propaganda film entitled "Smilin’ Sid" that was distri-

buted throughout the coal camps as an organizing

-77-
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The UMWA officials portrayed Sid Hatfield as an idol

of the union miners, his six-shooters drawn in an aggres2
sive position, always with a broad smile on his face.

After his acquittal of murder charges resulting from
the Matewan Massacre, the twenty-six year old Hatfield re
signed from the Matewan police force. The people of the

Magnolia District of Mingo County elected him constable soon

afterwards.

He had inherited the wealth of the deceased

Mayor Testerman, the first fatality of the Matewan Mass-

acre , as a result of his con troversia 1 marriage to Tester

man's widow.

Hatfield transformed the former mayor's

jewelry store into a gunshop, using his fame to advertise
3
the store.
He continued to confront coal officials in the
Magnolia District and his fame as a hero of the striking

miners continued to grow.^

The fame of Sid Hatfield was a continuous embarrass
ment to the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency.

The Matewan

Massacre stood as the lone defeat for that agency in their

goal to keep the Union out of West Virginia.

The ominous

slogan of this organization was "Nobody ever killed a

^Hoyt N. Wheeler, "Mountaineer Mine Wars: An Analy
sis of the West Virginia Wars on 1912-1913 and 1 920-1 921 ",
Business History Review (Spring 1976), p. 78.

2Carl C. Dickey, "Must Murder Be the Price of Coal?"
World's Work (March 1924), p. 516.
3New York Times (August 2, 1921), p. 1.
4
^Ibid.
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Nobody was more aware of this than Sid Hatfield.

..5

While in

Washington to testify before the Kenyon Committee Hatfield

told Fred Mooney that he ’’would never see him again. ..6
Since he had been marked for death by the Baldwin-Felts

detectives, Hatfield's life was in jeopardy in the southern
West Virginia coal fields outside of Matewan.

Shortly after the trial of Sid Hatfield in Williamson,
the mining camp of Mohawk in McDowell County, located on the

Mingo County border, came under attack.

The coal mine

operators claimed that the attack was carried out by striking

miners from Mingo County under the leadership of Sid Hatfield
tn an effort to coerce the Mohawk coal miners into joining

the UMWA.7

The union leaders were convinced that the McDowell
County mine guards were responsible for the attack.

They

felt it was staged by the coal mine operators to force

Hatfield and Chambers to leave the safe confines of Mingo

County to stand trial in McDowell County for attempted murder.
In truth McDowell County resembled a police state ruled by coal
8 Hatfield commented
mine operators and their mine guards.
in Washington that any trial in McDowell County would be a

5Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 6 5.
^Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 87.
7Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 65.
81 b i d .
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Q

Nevertheless, a McDowell County grand jury inThe

dieted Hatfield and Chambers for attempted murder.

court set a date for them to report to the courthouse at
Welch, the county seat of McDowell County, to give bond

and set a trial date for August 1.

Sheriff Bill Hatfield,

no relation to the defendant, gave assurances to the at-

torneys that their clients would have the complete protec10 Shertion of the McDowell County Sheriff's Department.
iff Hatfield's deputy sheriff promised the Hatfield-Chambers'
attorneys, "There isn't going to be any trouble.
to that. ..Il

We'll see

The UMWA contacted Sid Hatfield and urged that he
and Ed Chambers go to trial unarmed.

They feared that Hat-

field would be assassinated by mine guards who would then
plead self-defense.

Hatfield and Chambers both agreed to

leave their guns home, and it became public knowledge that
both men would come to Welch unarmed. 12
Assured of their safety, Sid Hatfield and Ed Cham-

bers arrived in Welch on August 1 by train.

Sheriff Bill

Hatfield, who had promised to protect the defendants, had

left McDowell County the day before to "take the waters

9

Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P- 87.
1° L e e, Bloodletting in Appalachia , p . 6 7.
11

12

Wheeling Intelligencer (July 29, 1921), p. 1.
Spivak, A Man in His Time, P. 92.
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Craig Healing Springs, Virginia.^

On the courthouse steps

waited a reception committee of Baldwin-Felts Detectives,
all of whom had been sworn as McDowell County deputy sheri ffs
Everett

to preserve the peace in Bill Hatfield’s absence.
Lively was also waiting on the courthouse steps.

This was

the same Everett Lively who, as a Baldwin-Felts’ secret

agent, opened a restaurant in Matewan three weeks before the
Matewan Massacre and won the trust of the townspeople there,

including Sid Hatfield.^

Among the Detectives was Bill

Salter, who had saved his life at the Matewan Massacre by
hiding in a wastepaper container until the middle of the

night and then swimming across the Tug Fork Riveriritd
Kentucky. **5

Hatfield and Chambers had walked into a death

trap.
The defendants, their wives, and C. J. Van Fleet, a
union attorney from Pittsburgh, went to a hotel and secured
From there they proceeded to the courthouse.

rooms.

Mr.

Van Fleet remained in the hotel to answer a long distance

call.16

Hatfield and Chambers, accompanied by their wives,

walked through downtown Welch to the courthouse.

They

climbed up a steep angled stairway to the level courthouse

1 3 Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 67.

14Ibid.
1 51 b i d .
16Ibi d.

i
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Lively, who had been leaning against a wall, turned

to Hatfield and approached him and his wife.

They met Lively

on the third step while the Chambers were at the bottom of
the flight of stairs. 18 Lively walked up to Hatfield saying, "Hello, Sid, glad to see you," drew a pistol and started firing.

Playing the part of Hatfield's Judas Iscariot,

Lively's actions were a signal to the other Baldwin-Felts
Detectives to begin firing.
The detectives shot Hatfield four times. Mrs. Hatfield
turned to run into the courthouse. 20 Shot three times, Ed
21 Mrs. Chambers
Chambers pitched headlong down the hill dying.

threw her body on top of her husband to protect him,
screaming out his name. 22 Immediately, a dozen mine guards
formed a cordon around the bodies and prevented the bystandards

from approaching.

An unidentified black man lay wounded

He had been shot in the hip during the attack by the
23 Mrs. Chambers begged Lively
mine guards and was ignored.

nearby.

to stop the atrocity, whereupon he placed his pistol behind

Chambers 1 ear and fired twice.

Mrs . Chambers began to attack

17Ibid. , pp. 67-68.

18 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields,
PP. 87-88.
^Spivak, A Man in His Time, P. 93.
9n

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 68.

21S p i v a k, A Man in His Time, P< 93.
2 2 Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia,

P. 68.

2 3 McCormi ck, The New Kanawha River,
P. 154.
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Lively with her parasol until two guards dragged the
.
24
No guns were on the bodies when
hysterical woman away.
the attack took place, but soon afterwards pistols were seen

clinched in the dead hands of the murdered victims.
Apparently, Detective Pence had placed the guns in the hands

of the murdered victims so that the detectives could claim

seif-defense.

Detective Nathan Ash then emptied his colt

revolver into the corpses.

Seventeen bullets pierced

Hatfield's body, while Chambers was shot thirteen times.

The bodies were so permeated that neither could be embalmed. 2 6
In the meantime Detective Hughey Lucas fired a number of

shots against the stone wall of the courthouse to make it
appear that Hatfield and Chambers were armed and had fired
first at the detectives but had missed. 27

While the murders were taking place James Kirkpatrick,

a deputy sheriff of Mingo County, and John Collins, another
defendant in the Mohawk incident, ran for the train.

The

detectives did not notice that Kirkpatrick and Collins were

missing until after the atrocities had been committed.

The

conductor of the train locked Collins and Kirkpatrick in a

compartment onthe train and refused to reveal their hiding

2 4 L e e , Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 68.
25Ibid., p.
26Mooney,

191 .

Struggle in the Coal

Fields, p. 88.

27Lee, Bloodletting in appalachia,

I

p.

68.

-84place to the gunmen who searched the train for them.
Why was Sid Hatfield murdered?

28

An anonymous letter

had arrived in Welch before the incident took place claiming that Sid Hatfield planned to come to the courthouse and
29 Certainly
shoot the Baldwin-Felts detectives on sight.

nothing was more important for orderly government in West
Virginia than keeping Sid Hatfield alive.3^

tion often takes precedence over reason.

However, emo-

Thomas Felts had

sworn vengence on the "Bolsheviks" who had murdered his

brother during the Matewan Massacre.
complete.

Now his mission was

The bodies of Hatfield and Chambers were taken

Hatfield‘s famous smile was frozen on
31
his face even in death.

to a Welch morgue.

The question of a conspiracy has to be evaluated.

Before the trial began Mr. Van Fleet, the attorney for Mr.
Hatfield, had asked Governor Morgan for state protection for

his client.

Morgan refused to provide protection on the

grounds that the McDowell County officials had promised pro

tection.32

This is another example of the lack of leader

ship on the part of Governor Ephraim Morgan.
28
2Q

Mooney, Struggle in the Coal

Fields, p. 88.
x

Wheeling Intelligencer (August 4, 1921), p. 1 .

30John W. Owens, "Gunmen in West Virginia", New Re
public (September 21, 1921), p. 91.
31Cabel
Cabel Phillips,
Phillips, "The West Virginia Mine War", Ameri
can Heritage (August 1974), p. 58.

32New York Times (August 2, 1921), p. 2.
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The Wheeling Intelligencer conducted an investigation
and publicly charged that Hatfield and Chambers had been vicIt was well known in Welch that Lively and

tims of a plot.

Pence fired first and that fifteen or twenty gunmen had drawn
pistols and joined in on the murders. The people of Welch,

tor the most part, believed that neither Hatfield nor Chambers were armed, that the killings were a put-up job and that
33
both men were, in every sense of the word, murdered.
The actions by the constabulatory forces in Welch must

also be examined.

It has already been established that Sher-

iff Bill Hatfield left Welch at a most questionable time and

deputized Baldwin-Felts detectives to enforce the law in his
absence. During the massacre Welch Chief of Police Mitchell
stood across a narrow street and watched the assassina
.. ons . 34 The town of Welch was also a detachment for the
ti

West Virginia State Police.

Why did they fail to protect

Hatfield and Chambers?35
The conspiracy theory is given much support by the

comments of I, C. Herndon, a resident of Welch and then Judge

of the Circuit Court of both Mercer and McDowell Counties.
Herndon was convinced that the Mohawk camp incident was

staged by the Baldwin-Felts Detectives and certain McDowell
County officials were out to "get” Hatfield and Chambers

33Wheeling Intelligencer (August 3, 1921), p. 1.
34 T
. . ,.
Ibid
Oc

1

(August 4, 1921), p. 1 .

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 68.

I
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in revenge for the killings at Matewan. 36

Under West Vir

ginia law, Herndon had the authority to investigate the

killings by calling a special grand jury.

Herndon gave the

following reason for not doing so:
I know it would be impossible to get a grand
jury that was not controlled by the coal opera
tors and mine guards.
I also knew that if I
started an investigation I would be killed before
a grand jury could assemble, and I was not ready
to die to avenge the murder of two such notor
ious outlaws as Sid Hatfield and Ed Chambers.

When Howard B. Lee was Prosecuting Attorney of West
Virginia, Mercer County officials brought a moonshiner to
his office.

He had been transporting moonshine from Shoot-

ing Creek, Virginia to McDowell County for use by county

officials there.38

The moonshiner placed a call to a prom-

inent McDowell County coal operator.

Lee became interested

in why a moonshiner would be calling such a prominent citi-

zen .

The moonshiner claimed that the coal operator would

send somebody because he was a juror at the HatfieldChambers murder trial.

The following conversation ensued

between Lee and the moonshiner:
‘Your jury service sounds interesting.
Lee :
Tell me about it.'
Moonshiner:
'There ain't much to tell. About
a week before the trial date, a deputy sheriff
came to me and said:
'If you were called on the
jury to try the Baldwin-Felts men for killing
Sid Hatfield and Ed Chambers, how would you vote?'

36Ibid., p. 70.
37Ibid.
381bid . , pp. 70-71.

-87I replied, 'By God, I'd vote not guilty', The
deputy sheriff then pulled a blank summons for
jury duty out of his pocket, wrote my name on
it, and handed it to me.
Lee:

"Did you serve on either j u ry ? "

Moonshiner:
'Yes, on the jury that tried
them for killing Sid Hatfield, and we all voted
not guilty.'

Lee: 'Were the other jurors selected the
same way you were chosen?'
.39
Moonshi ner:
'Sure they were.
The McDowell County coal operators sent a bondsman
40
to free the moonshiner shortly afterwards.

A prominent citizen of Welch made the following com
ment in 1937:

Among those who are familiar with the facts
the opinion now is the same as it was when the
killings occurred — that they were carefully plan
ned and deliberately carried out by the mine
guards, with the connivance of certain county
officials. And it is likewise believed that the
trials of the killers were judicial farces,
staged for the sole purpose of acquitting them.
There can be little doubt that the deaths of Hatfield

and Chambers were planned, calculated murders that were planned well ahead of time.

The Hatfield-Chambers funerals were held on August
1 .

In spite of inclement weather crowds of miners had come,

mostly on railway baggage cars, to pay their respects.

39 Ibid. , p. 71 .
40 Ibid., p. 71 .
41 Ibid., p. 72.
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Despite the fact that the State of West Virginia did not see
fit to send police forces to Welch to protect the victims,
there were plenty of state troopers in Matewan, sawed-off
shotguns in hand, to prevent trouble during the funeral pro-

cession.

The anger of the people of Matewan was well re-

presented by Samuel Montgomery, who gave the funeral ora
tion at the service;
We have gathered here today to perform the
last sad rites for these two boys who fell vic
tims to one of the most contemptable systems
that has ever been known to exist in the his
tory of the so-called civilized world. Deliber
ately shot down, murdered in cold blood, while
they were entering a place which should be a
temple of justice, and by whom? Men who are
working under the direction of and taking their
orders from coal operators who live in Cin
cinnati, Chicago, New York City, and Boston.
Sleek, dignified church-going gentlemen who
would rather pay fabulous sums to their hired
gunmen to kill and slay men for joining a union
than to pay like or lesser amounts to the men
who delve into the subterranean depths of the
earth and produce their wealth for them. At
the same time these same men prate of their
charities, their donations to philanthropic
movements, act as vestrymen and pillars of the
churches to which they belong.
Even the heavens
weep with the grief-stri ken relatives and the be
reaved friends of these two boys42
Mrs. Hatfield, who had been a widow twice in three

years, buried her second husband beside her first, Mayor
Testerman, leaving enough room between them for her own
43
body when she died.
42 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, pp. 88-89.
43 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, p. 99. Accord
ing to Howard B’ Lee, Mrs. Chambers remarri ed and moved to
Fl ori da .

-89The verdict of the trials of the Hatfield-Chambers

murders was already decided, despite the overwhelming evidence

of guilt.

On December 17, 1921, C. E. Lively, Buster Pence,

and William Slaters were acquitted by the jury.

Many

witnesses testified that Lively fired the first shot.

Pol ice

Chief Mitchell, who had told reporters that he did not see

the first rounds, testified at the trial that he had seen
Deliberating only fifty-one minutes,
44
The
the pre-picked jury returned an innocent verdict.

Hatfield shooting first.

mocking of justice was complete.

With Hatfield out of the way the Mingo operators were

again free to keep wages below union scale.

They increased

the production of their old mines and opened new ones.

Their prosperity lasted just a few years as the national

price of coal fell forcing the Mingo coal mine operators to
try to outbid each other resulting in widespread poverty
45
throughout Mingo County.

Sheriff Don Chafin of Logan County used the occasion

of Hatfield's death to commit atrocities against pro-Union
46 Hatfield’s
coal miners throughout Logan County.
assassination, the massacre at Tent Lick and the atrocities
in Logan County infuriated the miners in the Kanawha Valley.

^^Parkersburg Sentinel (December 18, 1921), p. 1,
4 $ r o s s , Machine Age in the Hills , p , 151 .
‘
;
A
46Robert Y, Spence, The Land on^the Guyandottej
Harlo
Press,
1937),
pT
History of Logan County (Detroit:
n
no"7. .
450,
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-90Robert Y. Spence describes their reactions:
Calls upon the state authorities, they
knew, would be unavailing, and as they often had
done in the past, the miners determined to seek
justice on their own harsh terms — to avenge Sid
Hatfield's death, to crush Chafin's tyranny and
liberate their brethern from Chafin's jail, and
to smash the anti-Union monopoly in Logan and
Mingo Counties.
To what extent this warlike spirit was
encouraged by the local union leaders is unclear—
certainly they were aware of it — but spread it
did, like fire in dry grass, up and down the
desolate creek bottoms and along the winding
47
railroad spurs where the miners' shaties stood.

Mother Jones contacted Frank Keeney, President of the
UMWA District 17, and Fred Mooney to call for a mass meeting
48
ihe miners held a mass
“somewhere in the Kanawha Valley".
meeting on the capitol grounds in Charleston, on August 7,
1921 .

For an hour Mother Jones harangued the gathering,

attacking Governor Morgan as a "tool of the goddamned coal
opera tors" and reminding the miners of the atrocities that
49
had been committed in Logan, Mingo and McDowell Counties.

Keeney reportedly told the crowd that

Since the governor refused to lift martial
law, you have no recourse except to fight.
The only way you can get your rights is with
a high power rifle, and the man who does not^g
have this equipment is not a good union man.
Fred Mooney and Samuel Montgomery talked to the crowds as

47Ibid.
4R

Fetherling, Mother Jones, p. 184.

49Ibid.

501 bi d .
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well and advised them to go home, keep at work, and let the
_
51
law enforcement agencies handle the problems.
The miners

were well beyond a willingness to listen to conciliatory

talk.

In 1919 they had been promised by Governor Cornwell

that something would be done to stop the atrocities in Logan

and Mingo counties.

They, in return, had returned to their

homes and did not invade Logan County.
change in the past three years?

Had there been any

The miners were prepared to

fight for the freedom of their brothers in the southern coal
fields.
Mother Jones and Frank Keeney had decided that the
UMWA should resort to force.

They believed that the UMWA

in the entire state of West Virginia was at stake.

They

realized that an armed revolution in West Virginia could

force the abdication of power by the coal mine operators

in that state and would leave the UMWA free to unionize
any mine in the state.52

This was a tremendous gamble.

If

such an armed insurrection was a failure that union would
be cast out of the West Virginia coalfields altogether.

On August 20 the miners gathered at Marmet, their old

rendezvous point, to await further orders from their union.
There were about 3,000 miners, well armed and ready for combat. Their purpose was to free more than 100 strikers who
were imprisoned in Mingo County jails, destroy Chafin's

51 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields , pp. 89-90.
52

Michael Meador, ” T h e Red Neck War Of 1921 J. Goldenseal, Vol. 7, No. 12 (April-June, 1981), p. 46.

■
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power, avenge the death of Sid Hatfield, and unionize south

ern West Virginia.53
Some of the armed miners came from as far away as
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.

.....
_
-54
World War I uniforms.

Most were dressed in

West Virginia was on the brink of

open civil war.
As long as Sid Hatfield lived there had been some
hope among the union coal miners that justice would emerge

eventually in the southern coal fields of West Virginia.

Hatfield’s death had extinguished any hope of change with
out violence. The vicious murder of the hero of the coal

miners had changed normally law abiding citizens into an
organized, infuriated and dangerous mob.

Hatfield's murder

had condemned West Virginia to insurrection.

The Baldwin-

Felts detectives and the coal mine operators would soon
find out that Sid Hatfield was more dangerous dead than a-

live.

5 3 Fetherling, Mother Jones,
P. 185.
54^Michael Meador, “The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal, p. 46 .

CHAPTER VIII

TOTALITARIANISM IN WEST VIRGINIA:
THE KINGDOM OF LOGAN COUNTY
Revolts and revolutions usually do not occur in na
tions where there is hope for justice or economic wel 1being.

For three decades the coal miners of West Virginia

had witnessed the wanton disregard for the constitutional
rights of pro-Union citizens within the borders of the Mou-

tain State.

The angry mob that gathered on the steps of

Charleston, on August 7, 1921, stood as testimony to the
willingness of pro-Union miners to use violence if necessary
to curb the violations of human rights in Southern West Vir

ginia.

The men and women who gathered at Charleston were

neither vigilantes nor violence oriented.
seemed to underscore this.

President Harding

When asked about the violence in

the coal mining regions, Mr. Harding said, "I cannot believe
that the thoughtful, loyal mine workers throughout the coun-

try mean to imperil the welfare of the people of the United
States . ..1

However, Mr. Harding did not take into account

the monstrous atrocities committed in Southern West Virginia,
including the Tent Lick massacre and the murders of Sid
1

Eugene Trani and David Wilson, The Presidency of
Warren G. Harding, p. 98.
-93I
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Hatfield and Ed Chambers at Welch.

The use of violence by

thug police forces in the war to keep the United Mine Wor
kers of America out of Southern West Virginia had forced
the law-abiding citizens of West Virginia to take up arms

against their antagonists.

This was typified by the actions

of a pro-Union Protestant minister who, at the end of his
sermon , picked up a firearm and stated,

H

Now I lay down my

Bible and take up my rifle in the service of the Lord.

u2

The Hatfield-Chambers murders and the Tent Lick mas-

sacre stood as examples of vigilante rule in Southern West
Virginia.

Even more infuriating to the pro-Union miners,

however, was the anti-Union posture of Sheriff Don Chafin in

Logan County, who ran a corrupt but efficient political ma
After being elected in 1908 as assessor of that county

chine.

he had courted the powerful Democratic Party bosses, most of

With their help he had been
3 Chafin immediately
elected sheriff of Logan County in 1912.

whom were coal mine operators.

formed the most powerful political machine ever seen in West
Virginia.

He exacted ten cents on every ton of coal mined

in Logan County for personal wealth and to finance an Anti4
From 1921 to 1 924 , Chafin hi.red a total of 457
Union army.
deputies.

The sole purpose of this army was to keep the union

o

Spivak, A Man in His Time, p. 67.
Spence, The Land of the Guyandotte, p. 446.
4Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia , p. 91 .
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out of Logan County. 5

Moreover, the funds raised by Chafin

were used to stock an arsenal of machine guns and high pow6
ered rifles in a room at the Logan County courthouse.
Attorney General Howard B. Lee of West Virginia, who

took personal interest in the corruption of Logan County,

described that county under the administration of Don Chafin

as foilows:
(Logan County) was a leer in the face of liberty,
a feudal barony defended by soldiers of fortune in
the pay of the mine owners. To its industrial overlords the miners1 union was a nightmare, and to ex
clude it from their domain they exercised a suzer
ainty over the county government and suspended the
constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press,
and peaceable assembly.7

Don Chafin was not particular in the methods he used
to maintain his stranglehold on Logan County.

West Virginia

Attorney General E. T. England, a native of Logan County,

accused Chafin of packing juries with his henchmen.

He also

accused Chafin of holding political power over Logan County's
8 Chafi n supervi sed
circuit judge and prosecuting attorney.
the hiring of public schoolteachers who would be dismissed
by Chafin for pro-Union sympathies. 9 Chafin directed the fin a n c i a 1 support for churches whose ministers dared not

5

°Ib i d.
6 Ibid. , p. 87 .
7 Ibid., p. 87.
8 T. . I

Ibid., P. 89.

g

Arthur G1eason, "Company Owned Americans," Nation,
Vol . 110, No. 2867 (June 12, 1920), p. 37.
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criticize the despicable conditions of Logan County.

To do

so would result in financial support being cut off by Chafin
and the coal mine operators to that congregation. 10 The
coal mine companies supervised health services and denied

medical care to citizens who spoke in opposition to the
status quo of Logan County.

Don Chafin had no qualms about using violence against
possible opponents to his dictatorial powers.

People who

refused to follow Chafin’s orders were asked to leave the
county.

Citizens who ignored this warning were in danger

of death or injury at the hands of Chafin's deputies, who
were notorious for maiming or killing their prisoners in

self-defense, or while the victim was "res i sting arrest," or
"attempting to escape".^

Chafin also held complete control of elections in
Logan County,

He managed to maintain his hold over that

county through an alliance of coal mine operators and Demo
cratic Party bosses.

The night before election day, Chafin's

deputies would arrest and jail Republican election offi

cials, replacing them on the morning of the election with

corrupt Democrats. Republican dominated precincts in Logan
County often were either not allowed to open on election day
or the ballots were seized and burned before they could be

10Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p, 90.
11P
,
"Company Owned Americans," Na ti on , p. 37.
Gleason,
1 7

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 90.
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counted. 13
Beatings were commonplace in Logan County.

An ex

ample is offered by Howard B. Lee:
J. L. Heiser, Chief Clerk in the (West Vir
ginia) State Department of Mines and also a high
state official in the Knights of Pythias Lodge,
went to Logan Town on an official visit to the
local lodge, and to assist in the initiation of
a class of candidates. As he entered the town,
he was stopped by a couple of Chafin's deputy
thugs who demanded to know his name and his
business in the county. Heiser unwisely replied,
'That is none of your business.1 Thereupon, the
thugs dragged him from his car, beat him with
blackjacks until he was unconscious, and left him
lying by the roadside. Some passerby took him to a
hospi tai.14
Chafin was fearful of any stranger who entered Logan

Such people could be ‘'communistic” union recruiters

County.

or officials from either the state or federal government

who had been sent to investigate the corrupt system in
Logan County.

The lack of transportation into Logan County

helped Chafin keep strangers out.

Howard Lee describes how

Chafin succeeded in keeping unwanted persons out of his
county:

During the early years of Chafin's rule, there
were no roads in the county, and the only means
of ingress and egress was by railroad. He guarded
his domain against union organizers by keeping one
or more of his deputy-gunmen at every railway
station.
It was openly charged that when a stranger
got off the train he was approached by these 'merry
gentlemen,' who demanded to know his name and
business in the county.
If the replies were not
satisfactory, he was told to get back on the train
and leave the county.
If he refused, he was arrested

1 3T. • J

Ibid.

14

Ibid. , p. 91.
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and taken to the county jail as a 'vagrant*,
he resisted arrest, he was sometimes soundly
beaten and his limp form tossed back on the
train, to be carried out of the county, more
dead than ali ve.15

If

Chafin became so emboldened by his rule that he walked
in the headquarters of the United Mine Workers of America in

Charleston in early September, 1919 and demanded that a union

employee be turned over to him because a warrant was sworn
out for him in Logan County. 16 According to union officials

present Chafin was drunk, armed and hostile.

The vice-

president of the union, Bill Petry, drew a 12-pistol and
shot Chafin, seriously wounding him.

hospital where he recovered.

Chafin was taken to a

Petry was indicted in Kanawha

His claim of self-defense was
so strong that he was never tried. 18

County for attempted murder.

Chafin was corrupt financially as well as politically.
He pocketed much of the severance tax that he placed on coal
mined in Logan County.

In 1921, before the U.S. Senate Kenyon

Committee, he admitted a net worth of $350,000, although his.
annual salary as sheriff was only $3,500. 1 9 The Kenyon

Committee made the following conclusions concerning the Logan
County sheriff department:

1 51 b i d . , p . 90.

16I^id., p. 92.
171b i d . , p. 93,
18Ibid. , p. 93.
19Ibid., P. 91 .

r
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funds contributed by the operators, as the testimony
shows has been done in Logan County, is a vicious
and un-American policy.
Public officers should be
paid out of the public treasury.
It is freely
admitted that the purpose of the plan is to prevent
men from coming into the county to organize the
United Mine Workers. Men have been driven out of
the county who attempted to do so.
It would be just
as logical to have members of Congress paid by
certain interests, or to have judges paid by other
i nterests.20
It would be unfair to state that Don Chafin was feared

by the majority of citizens in Logan County.

Logan County

historian Robert Y. Spence claimed that there are literally
hundreds of tales of how Chafin helped people in that county
by lending or giving them money.

Even his opponents in

Logan County, some of them who were supporters of the United
Mine Workers of America, admitted that Chafin was a generous

man ; their main grudge against him was that he represented
21 Chafin was the
and protected the coal mine operators.

benevolent dictator of Logan County.

He was respected and

feared by the majority of its citizens.

It was a recognized

prerequisite that one must be anti-Union to survive in Logan
County.

Most citizens there managed to forfeit their

personal freedoms for the privilege of living under Chafin's
"protection" .

Chafin's power in Logan County is illustrated by the
anecdote about an Italian immigrant tried to obtain the right

20Ibid., p, 92,

21 Spence, The Land of the Guyandotte, p, 446.
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to vote in the early 1900's in Logan County.

When he ap-

peared before the Logan County Board of Registrars to establish his qualifications, he was asked to name the President

of the United States.
Chafin".

The immigrant replied, "Meester Don

He was registered as a legal voter in Logan County.

This stands as a single humorous example of life in Logan

It also stands as testimonial for the total power
22
Chafin had over the citizens who lived within his domain.

County.

Revolt against the rule of Don Chafin would not come

from within the borders of Logan County,

The political ma

chine there was too complete and Chafin's army too power-

ful .

The state government of West Virginia also was too

weak to deal with the violation of human rights in Logan

Nothing was done despite the findings of the Corn-

County,

well Committee in 1919 which condemned Chafin for various

cri mes, 2 3

Chafin seemed to be the single most powerful in

dividual standing in the way of unionization in the State of

West Virginia,

The Union coal miners of West Virginia de

cided that Chafin had to be removed from power by force if
Logan and Mingo Counties were to be liberated, West Virginia
was on the brink of civil war.

22

Fetherling, Mother Jones, pp. 181-182.

23

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, PP. 91-92,

CHAPTER IX

THE INSURRECTION RETURNS:
"WE'LL HANG DON CHAFIN FROM
THE SOUR APPLE TREE"

The numerous violations of human rights in Logan and
Mingo Counties, especially the assassination of Sid Hatfield
in McDowell County, had stirred up angry feelings among

officials and miners alike among the ranks of the Unied Mine

Workers of America.

This was complicated by the failure of

state and federal officials to punish those responsible.

Miners gathered on the Capitol steps in Charleston, on August

7, 1921, to protest these violations.

The meeting, attended

by thousands of coal miners and addressed by such firebrands

as Mother Jones and Frank Keeney, should have been a danger
signal to the federal government of the United States and

the state government of West Virginia that peace in the

Mountain State was in grave danger.

The Harding administration

ignored the obvious threat of violence in that state.

West

Virginia Governor Ephraim Morgan chose to go for a ride in the
countryside rather than to listen to the mob that had gathered

at the Capitol.

This was a tragic mistake and a foolish lack

L u n t, Law and Order vs. the Mi ners, p. 123.
-101-
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-102of concern on the part of both Harding and Morgan. By August
16, miners began to gather at Marmet, near the site of the
threatened insurrection of 1919.

had grown to 12,000 miners.

By August 26th their number

They were waiting for orders

from the officials of the United Mine Workers of America to

invade and liberate Mingo and Logan Counties.

The citizens

of the Charleston, fearing an attack on the capitol, braced

in fear of possible revolt and mob rule.
There was a variety of reasons for the gathering of

the miners and their willingness to use violence.

The major

reason was the conduct of law enforcement officials in Logan
County, particularly Don Chafin.

Organizers and union

officials would leave that county with bruised bodies and

cracked heads.

These events helped to feed a rash of rumors

that Chafin and his deputies were responsible for recent

atrocities in Logan County involving the murder of women
2
Overall dissatisfaction over the outcome of
and chi 1dren .
the First World War and boredom among veterans were also
3 The assassination
almost certainly major causes of the arrest.

of Sid Hatfield caused the miners to congregate.

A story in

the Charleston Gazette that the United Mine Workers of
America had called for a general strike in Logan County gave
4 Any violent incident would cause
the gathering legitimacy.

2McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, p. 155.
01 bi d., p . 156.
4
HIbid.
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the miners to march.

Fifty-one organizers left Charleston by train and
headed for Logan County with the goal of unionizing the

county and preparing the miners there for a strike.

When

the train bearing the organizers entered Logan County another

train soon pulled along side of it on parallel tracks.
The other train was loaded with deputies of Logan County who
were armed with machine guns.

The train would stop at

stations and more deputies would get on the train and stare

at the union organizaers.

The deputies held up the train for

forty-five minutes at Dingess Run and seven more guards
armed with Winchesters and Remingtons boarded the train there.

When the train stopped at Man in Logan County, sixty armed
guards boarded the train.

at Lorado.

Deputies stopped the train again

The leader of the organizers, one Mr. Mitchell,

was wearing a pin of the Railway Brotherhood.

He located

the conductor of the train and asked him, "Brother, man to

man , I would like for you to tell me why this train is held up
this long?"

The conductor said, "Brother, I will tell you.

They are making up a special train of guards down below to
see that you people don't get off this train, land in this

county,

That’s all T know.”

The organizers got off the

train and boarded a northward-bound train back to Kanawha

County, paying their fares station by station.

Throughout

Logan and Boone Counties Chafings guards stood armed and

-104ready for action.

5

The first major peaceful attempt to

unionize Logan County had been met with the threat of

violence.

The officials and rank in file of the union alike

were infuriated. The general attitude of the radical
element of the UMWA was that a show of force was the only

way to bring the United Mine Workers of America to Logan

County.

Empty rhetoric would not succeed.

The makeshift

army at Marmet would more than suffice.
The army at Marmet, despite an outbreak of flu and
dysentery, was prepared and ready for action. 6 Their

presence caused a panic in Charleston where the citizens were
convinced that the capitol itself would be the target of
an attack to seize the government of West Virginia. 7

Cabel1 Phillips offers this description of the armed
camp at Marmet:
Over the next few days the miners numbers
swelled to between four and five thousand. They
were a tatterdamelion lot in blue jeans, worn
corduroy, bits of army khaki, slouch hats, and
miners' caps. Many brought their women and
children along, loaded in ancient jinteys and
farm wagons or trudging on foot over the hills
from as far as fifty miles away.8 They cooked

5IWest Virginia, Committee by Governor Cornwell in
Connection with the Logan County Situation, Report,
Charleston, West Virginia, 1919, p. 57<
^Meador, ’’The Red Neck War of 1921,

II

Goldenseal , p.47.

7 Ibi d .

According to Kyle McCormick in The New-Kanawha River,
p, 155, some of the insurrectionists also came from Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois by train. Most, however, were from
West Virginia, especially Kanawha County.
J
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beans and fatback over open fires and slept on
the ground in a cold drizzle. Most of the men
were armed, some with pistols and shotguns,
others with high powered hunting and military
rifles. They were leaderless from the start—
Keeney, Fred Mooney, Bill Blizzard, and other
UMWA officials denied any connection with the
mobilization — but out of the turmoil of gossip,
impromptu harangues, and the boredom of
inaction a semblance of organization began to
assert itself. The miners, many of whom were
World War I veterans, divided loosely into
companies based on the communities from which
they came; Disciplinary details were set up
to take care of trouble-makers and interlopers.
Reporters and bootleggers were sent on their way.
Armed patrols kept round the clock vigil on the
road and mountain trails, A commissary emerged
that depleted the food from stores from miles
around, and a medical unit of six doctors and
eight nurses was set up.
Still, no single leader emerged — none, in
fact, has ever been identified — but by Tuesday
night the mounting tensions spilled over. The
men had grown restless and irritable. Wild
rumors of atrocities and lynchings by Chafin's
men whipped their passions for revenge. They
milled noisily about a dozen campfires, and
their horse exhortations and rebel yells, punctuated
with the erratic crack of rifles into the air,
reverbrated from the dark surrounding hills,
'On to Logan!'' they yel
yelled.
1ed . ''Let's get the dirty
thugs!' ''Remember Sid Hatfield!'9

West Virginia stood helpless in the event of a revolt.

There was no constabulary force in West Virginia that could
have stopped the army at Marmet from either invading Logan
County or attacking Charleston.

Governor Ephraim Morgan had

no troops to use because the West Virginia National Guard
had been drafted during World War I and had not yet been

reorgani zed.

mi ners .

He requested federal troops to disperse the

President Harding took the position that the task
Q

Phillips, "The West Virginia Mine War," Ameri can
Her i tage, p, 61,

-106of enforcing civilian rights in West Virginia belonged to
the state, and that Governor Morgan had done little to carry
out his responsibilities.^0 Nevertheless, Secretary of War

Wainwright appointed Harry Bandholtz to report to Charleston

to study the situation.^

Federal officials also stockpiled

rifles , machine guns, and airplane bombs at the Edgewood
Arsenal in Charleston in case the insurrection in West
12
Virginia eventually required federal intervention.

On August 26, the miners began to march down West
1 3 Their plan was to
Virginia Route 119 to Logan County.
invade Logan County after passing through Madison, a pro
Union stronghold in Boone County.

The marchers were accompanied

by Mother Jones, who began to have doubts about the wisdom of

the march.
On August 24, Frank Keeney, Governor Morgan and
Mother
General Bandholtz asked the miners to return home,
Jones decided that it would be in the best interest of the
miners to capitulate before fighting and bloodshed took place.
She announced to the miners that she had received a telegram

14

from the President of the United States and read it to the

°Maurer Maurer and Calvin P. Senning, "Billy
Mitchell, The Air Service and the Mingo War," West Virginia
History Quarterly, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (October 1 968), p. 341 .

Files of

Adjutant General's Office, o . c i t.

12Ibid.
■

^Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal , p. 47.

14Fetherli ng , Mother Jones:

L

The Miners' Angel, p. 186.
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To the miners encamped to or near Marmet
with the avowed intention of marching on Logan
and Mingo Counties: I request you abandon your
purpose and return to your homes and I assure
you that my good office will be used to forever
eliminate the gunmen system from the State of
West Virginia.

--Warren G. Harding 1 5
Immediately Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney suspected
that the telegram was a forgery.

They demanded to see the

Mother Jones retorted that the telegram was "none
16 The
II
of their business" and that they could "go to Hell
telegram.

miners began to fight among themselves.

the request of the President.

was a forgery.

Some wanted to honor

Others thought the telegram

Guards were posted on both sides of West

Virginia Route 119, which was used by the miners in their
southward march on Logan County, to prevent any of the miners
1 7 Fred Mooney
from leaving until the truth was discovered.

returned to Charleston and wired Washington for a confirmation

of the telegram.

In a major error of judgment George B.

Christian, Secretary to the President, sent the following
message back to Mooney:

sent by h i m. " 8

"President out of city.

No such wire

Mooney returned to the mine camp and told

1 5 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P. 90.
16 Fetherling, Mother Jones : The Miners* Angel, p.

186.
^Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal , P.
47; Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 90.
1 8 Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P- 91 , If

i
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not authentic, was good, and that the miners would be wise to

However, the knowledge that the telegram was a

return home.

forgery only infuriated -the miners more.
southward march towards Logan County. 1 9

They continued their

The Charleston Gazette then asked Boone County Sheriff
John L. Hill his opinion of several thousand armed miners

marching through his jurisdiction with the intention of
invading Logan County.

The sheriff replied that he only had

three or four deputies and as far as he was concerned the
miners were

ii

perfectly welcome to walk along the highway

through Boone County.

20

At two o’clock on the morning of August 23 the fire
sirens sounded in Logan.

This was a pre-arranged signal to

the townspeople that the marchers were on their way to attack

Chafin's well-armed and corrupt deputy force
was ready for combat. 21 A militia of sorts was founded in
Logan County.

Logan, with World War I veterans commanding the makeshift

army of anti-Uni on men.

Most of the pro-Union people in

Logan County went into hiding for their own protection.

A

Mr. Christian had had the insinht to notify the President of
the contents of the telegram, Mr. Harding may have agreed to
its contents, and the entire tragedy may have been avoided.
19Ibid.
20
^uMeador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal, p. 47.
21 George T. Swain: _____
Facts_ _about the Twe Armed Marches
on Logan (Charleston, West Virginia: Jones Printing Company,
1 962 ) , p. 13.
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train filled with guns and ammuntion arrived from the coal
operators in Kentucky, and these weapons were handed out to
the people of Logan County under chaotic conditions.

Many

eleven-and twelve-year-old-boys were walking the streets of
Logan with high powered rifles. There was little doubt that

panic, largely engineered by the dubious leadership of Chafin,
had reduced Logan to an armed camp, a citadel for the corrupt

who feared retribution for the years of mistreatment of the
miners around them. 2 2
A prominent southern West Virginia businessman
describes the arming of Logan as fol 1ows :

Sheriff Don Chafin was the boss and he handled
the army through his deputies. He had no military
experience, and the handling was difficult. The
trouble was bringing up of supplies. We had nothing
at that time to transverse the poor country roads
but Model T Ford cars, and all the provisions and
supplies had to be transported with them. Everything
had to be done in too much of a hurry.
While West Virginia was dry, Logan County did not
prove to be much that way and there was considerable
drinking.23

On August 26 a gueri11 a-1ike attack occurred in Logan.
Don Chafin had an army observation plane and two Logan County

planes converted to bombers. Some pro-Union fighters managed

to attack the planes despite the large number of armed
24
anti-Uni on volunteers in Logan.

Chafin, in a state of panic, began to press as many

22 Ibid .
23 McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, pp. 159-160.
24 New York Times (August 26, 1921),
P. 1 .
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people as possible into his little army.

One of the first

places Chafin went was his own county jail.

An affidavit

given by Mr. Floyd Greggs provides corrobative evidence:
Floyd Greggs filed this affidavit with the
U.S. Senate Kenyon Committee in which he stated,
in substance, that he arrived in Logan August
24 looking for work; that five days later, two
deputies took him to Chafin's office and Chafin
asked him if he had been in the army; that he
said:
'Yes, in the Marines'; that Chafin ordered
him to select a rifle and join the forces moving
to the front and he refused; that Chafin put the
muzzle of a pistol to his face and said, 'You will
either fight or die'1 that he still refused and
Chafin ordered him to return to his cell.
On September 1, continued Greggs in his
affidavit,hesaw a union bricklayer from Huntington
shot to death in the jail corridor, not three feet
from his cell, because he refused to fight, Two shots
were fired by the deputy. Two deputies then took the
dead man by his feet and dragged the body from the
jail, across the railroad tracks toward the river.
(Greggs was) released at midnight, September 3,
and told by a deputy to be out of the county by
daylight or 'have your brains blown out'.25
A resident of Logan gives his story:
While I lived at Proctor they had the Union
fight at Blair Mountain. A deputy come to me and
asked me to go fight the union men.
I told him I
wouldn't fight agin' ’em.
I never belong to no
Union, but I didn't want to kill no man, maybe had
a family. He come back a third time. Then the forth
time he said that Don Chafin, the high sheriff, said
that I could either fight or leave the county in four
days. I said, 'You tell Don Chafin he can have two
of his days back. If I want to fight, I can join
the army, but I won't go fight agin' another miner,
who might have a family or be a fellow member of the
Odd Fellows. I had a two-hundred pound hog and a
good cow, and a washing machine I had just paid $35
for. I sold them all for $100 and moved. We went to
Wayne County for maybe three or four months till the
trouble blew over, When we come back I couldn't get
no job for a month. They wouldn't take us back who
25 Spence, The Land on the Guyandotte,
P< 455.
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wouldn't fight.28
Governor Morgan ordered all available members of the
West Virginia State Police to go to Logan County to assist
Don Chafin.27

He also requested that all American Legion

posts located near Logan County give all available assistance

to Logan County, stating that they needed to help defend the
’’frightened men, women, and children of Logan County against

an angry and violent armed body of men who had assembled on

the border of Boone County threatening invasion of Logan
County. ..28
The overall attitude of American Legionaires pressed
into service seems to be represented by Samuel Solins, a
member of the American Legion Post No. 8 in McDowell County:

The Legionnaires did not take up arms to interfere
with the unionizing of Logan County miners, that they
acted from a sense of civic duty to protect citizens
from what they regarded as a species of mutiny and
treason by armed, hostile and dangerous men. Many of
the legionnaires themselves were men who worked in
the mines, for the railroads, shops and other
29
industries in McDowell County and neighboring counties.

26Homer L, Morris, The Plight of the Bituminous Coal
Miner (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1934),
p. 123.
27Phil 1 ips, ’’The West Virginia Mine War," American
Heri tage, pp. 61-62.
28Mrs. Samuel Solins and Mrs. Paul Jones; McDowel1
County History (Ft, Worth, Texas: University Supply, 1959),
p. 68.
29Solins and Jones, McDowell County History, p. 68,
Despite the statement by Mr. Solins, McDowell County was as
controlled by coal company totalitarianism as Logan County,
as the assassination of Sid Hatfield will attest.
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McDowell County, through the leadership of former West
Virginia Governor Henry Hatfield, Sheriff Bill Hatfield, and
Colonel William Eubanks managed to recruit an army of 1,000

men to stand up to the pro-Union miners.

30

The people of

McDowell and Mercer Counties were convinced that the marchers
would attack their counties as well and panic was widespread.

31

At 2:00 A.M., on August 27, General Harry Bandholtz

called Keeney and Mooney to a meeting at the Governor's
offi ce.

A showdown was about to occur between union officials,

the Governor, and the representative of the United States.

The time for petty squabbling was past.

West Virginia was

on the verge of bloody civil war.

Governor Morgan continued to stand by his version of
the conflict in West Virginia:

There is no fight in West Virginia between the
operator and union miner.
In three large coal
mining counties in West Virginia, that were unorganized,
the feelings between the operators and the miners
is as amicable, if not more so than the organized
In these counties operated by non-union labor
fields.
in order to secure employment the employees have
accepted voluntary reductions in wages.
All the trouble that has arisen is the result
of some agitators and organizers representing the
United Mine Workers, not resident in the unorganized
fields, desiring to organize same.32

30McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, p. 157.
31 Ibid.
32

Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, p. 124. The
"outside agitator" theory used by Governor Morgan is
hauntingly familiar to claims by Southern politicians in
the 1960's to condemn the civil rights' movement in their
prospecti ve states.

1
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Keeney and Morgan were convinced that the armed

marchers were indeed out of control.

They were also convinced

that the marchers would never surrender to state or county

authorities for fear of torture or death. They did feel that
they would surrender to federal authorities who would offer
them protection from Chafin and his deputies. 33
Genera 1. Bandholtz tried to remain neutral in the

argument.

He saw himself as a federal and military

representative of the President.

It was his responsibility

to restore law and order to West Virginia and to prevent

bl oodshed.34

The atmosphere of the meeting changed greatly at
3:00 A.M. when news reached General Bandholtz that pro-Union
coal miners had hijacked a train at Danville and had

progressed to Blair in Logan County.

Anti-Union territory

had been invaded for the first time and Chafin would be
expected to .counter with force by daybreak. 35 If General

Bandholtz had any compromising opinions at this point, they
evaporated very quickly.

In effect Bandholtz gave an

ultimatum to Mooney and Keeney:
Bandholtz:

You two are the officers of this
organization and these are your people.
I am going to give you a chance to
save them, and if you cannot turn them

33Phillips, "West Virginia Mine War," American Heritage,
62,
34 Ibid,
°^
3 5 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners,
PP< 125-126.
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back we are going to snuff this
thjng out just like that.
/_Bandholtz then snapped fingers under
Mooney's nosej This will never do,
there are several million unemployed
in this country now and this thing
might assume proportions that would be
difficult to handle.

Mooney:

Would you arm us with a statement
signed by you telling the miners what
the consequences will be if they do
not turn back?

Bandholtz : No.

Then I believe that our trip will be
fru i tless .
36
Bandholtz : Yes, I will give you a note.

Mooney:

Mooney and Keeney secured a taxi and left Charleston
for Madison.
the main body.

They passed scores of miners marching to join

They managed to locate the main body of

miners at Danville on a football field.3?

Many of the

miners were singing a makeshift anthem, M We'll Hang Don
Chafin from the Sour Apple Tree. ..38 The men were divided
into companies with an ex-soldier at the head.

Seven hundred

of the marchers were veterans of either, the Spanish-American
War, the First World War, or both.'

Mooney and Keeney read

Bandholtz's message to Harvey Dillon, who had been the

61bi d t Note the presence of the "Red Scare" theory
in Bandholtz’s threat. • Perhaps he, too, was convinced
that the workers of America were about to rise up against
capitalist authority, and that revolution could easily
begin among the angry coal miners of West Virginia.
37 Lunt, La.w and Order vs. the Miners, p. 126.
3 8 Swain, Facts about the Two Armed Marches on Logan,

P. 14.
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Dillon had been an

orderly under Bandholtz in the Spanish-American War and
recognized his signature.

saying ,

ii

Dillon then addressed his men,

Boys, we can't fight Uncle Sam, you know that as

well as I do.”

Many of the men, including Dillon, broke into

tears.

Most were dressed in regulation army clothing,
39 Many shouted that
including rifles, helmets and gas masks.
they were going on.

Mooney warned them, "Boys, you better

listen to reason, for you all are going to be slaughtered if
you proceed. h40 Frank Keeney then stepped forward and
addressed the miners;
I've told you men God knows how many times that
any time you want to do battle against Don Chafin
and his thugs I'll be right there in the front
lines with you.
I've been there before and you know
that. But this time you've got more than Don Chafin
against you. You've got more than the Government of
West Virginia against you. You've got the Government
of the United States against you!
Governor Morgan hasn't got the guts to enforce
the laws of this state that protect your rights.
Instead of standing up to the operators he runs
crying to the Federal Government.
President Harding has sent an Army general down
here to see what the trouble is, and I have just
come from a conference with him in Charleston, He
wants you to break off this march and go home. He
promised me that if you do it, you won't be troubled
by the constabulatory. And he has promised to get
trains in here today to take you home.
Now I'm telling you for your own good and for
the good of the cause, you've got to do it. Break
up this march and go home. Get back to your jobs.
You've got Uncle Sam on your side now, and he won't
let you down. You can fight the Government of West
Virginia, but by God you can't fight the Government

3 9 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners,
P. 127.
40Ib1d.
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of the United States.
Keeney's speech worked.

to go home.

Most of the miners agreed

The trains arrived at 5:00 A.M. and the miners

crowded aboard. The trains ran from Danville to St. Albans
through Charleston to Fayetteville.

A,special train ran to

Cabin Creek Junction in Kanawha County from where most of
the marchers had come.^2

West Virginia had been spared civil war for the time
being.

On Saturday, August 27, the Charleston Gazette

reported that the miners were homeward bound and stated in
a relief shared by people throughout West Virginia, "The

march on Mingo County which started as a protest against
.,43
martial law is now history.

General Bandholtz prepared to return to Washington
to give President Harding the good news.

General Billy

Mitchell flew to Charleston to pilot Bandholtz back to the
44 While flying back to Washington
nation's capitol.

Mitchell proposed that if trouble should brew up again in
West Virginia that tear gas and bombs- should be dropped on
the miners from airplanes. 45 General Bandholtz ignored

41Phil1 ips, "The Mine War in West Virginia," Ameri can
Heri tage, p. 6 2.
42
Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 95.
^Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal , p. 48.
44
^Phi 11 ips , "The Mine War of West Virginia," Ameri can
Heri tage, p. 63.
45 Fetherling, Mother Jones: The Miner’s Angel, p. 187.
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Mitchell’s proposals.

He felt that the conflict in West

Virginia was over.
But Bandholtz had underestimated the violent nature
of the West Virginia coalfields. Certainly the miners
had been dispersed, but they were going home in an organized

fashion. The operators in Logan County used the disposal of

Bandholtz to resume attacks on Union coal miners in that
area .
force,

Chafin immediately increased the size of his fighting
He requested more volunteers from McDowell County.

Captain Brockus of the West Virginia State Police rushed
reinforcements to the Logan-Boone County border.
realized that Governor Morgan was weak.

Chafi n

He now wrongly

assumed that General Bandholtz had retreated from West
Virginia and that he could retaliate without resistance

from either state or federal government.
The coal miners had shown their loyalty to the United

States and their respect for President Harding by returning
to their homes.

Only an act of barbarism would force them

to resort to violence again.

Unfortunately, the sheriff of

Logan County did not want peace.

■

CHAPTER X

DON CHAFIN DEFIES THE PEACE:
THE WARRANTS AT SHARPLES

The exodus of General Bandholtz from West Virginia

left that state open to vigilante actions on the part of
either side in the mine war conflict.

The lack of federal

constabulatory encouraged Chafin to beef up his army in

case of attack.

Two or three thousand miners had not

returned home after Frank Keeney's speech.

Most of the

miners who remained were at Jeffrey, a town in Boone County,
located on a small stream bordering Logan County.

miners remained well armed and ready for combat.

The

Chafin

had dispatched a large number of deputies to guard the
watershed of the Coal and Guyandotte Rivers,

Conflict

seemed inevitable.^

Despite the threat of evidence, President Harding
continued his "no involvement stance," determined to keep

federal troops out of West Virginia.

Vice-President Calvin

Coolidge, whose uncompromising stand on strikes in

Massachusetts propelled him into the second highest office
2 The lack of
in the land, also chose to remain silent.

^New York Times (August 31, 1921), p. 2.
2
Direct Correspondence: Calvin Coolidge Memorial
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federal concern or involvement in West Virginia, coupled

with the indecisiveness of Governor Morgan, seemed to

insure more conflict in West Virginia.
The miners at Jeffrey, as well as those throughout
West Virginia, soon came under a propaganda barrage.

Chafin sent Lewis White into the camp at Jeffrey to spread
a rumor that women and children were being killed by
Chafinls men at Blair.in Logan County. 3 This was an attempt

to provoke a confrontation with the smaller force of armed

miners before reinforcements could arrive from Kanawha
County,

Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

and the Department of Justice in Washington had sent

investigators into the area to determine the extent of
Communist infiltration among the miners in Boone County.

After conducting an investigation, agent John J. Kelleher

notified Bureau of Justice Director William J. Burns that a
circular entitled "Stand By the Miners of Mingo" had been

published in Hartford, Connecticut by the Central Executive
Committee of the Communist Party of America,

This document

had been mailed from Pittsburgh and had been distributed to
miners in Benwood, Moundsville, Fairmont, Thomas, and
Mendin ,

However^ the pamphlet had not reached the armed

Room, Forbes Library (Northampton, Massachusetts, July 7,
1981 ) .
Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, p. 94.
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miners in Boone County.

Agent Harold Nathan notified Mr.

Burns that a coal miner named Oscar Akers was arrested for

carryi ng "radical literature" in Madison.

This literature

consisted of a songbook of the International Workers of the

World and some circulars and leaflets "in a foreign
language. ..5
The belief of Communist influence in West Virginia

was ri di culous.

Division Superintendent Spencer submitted

the final evaluation concerning Communist involvement in the

coal fields of southern West Virginia to Director Burns, on
September 5 , 1 921:

Neither now or in the past has there been any
evidence of specific Communist activity (in West
Virginia). Miners agitation is of extremely
radical type but agitating appears to be directed
solely against the coal operators.6’

After the federal investigating Governor Morgan

ordered Sheriff Chafin to strengthen his defenses around
Logan .

The Governor also gave Chafin permission to arrest

miners who, on August 17, had disarmed two state policemen
and two Logan County deputies.

The State Police Department

of Mingo County assisted Chafin in this operation.

At 5:00

P.M., on August 27, State Police Captain Btockus, accompanied

^United States Department of Justice: Files of the
(September 17,
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reel #69.
1920 - October 5, 1921). R.G. 65: West Virginia. Nati onal
Archives (Washington, D.C.).
5 Ibid,
61 bi d .
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by ninety state policemen, met Chafin at Ethel, a mining
camp four miles west of the Logan County UMWA stronghold of
Sharp!es .

Chafin turned over to Brockus two hundred
deputies and warrants for arrest. 7 Then he retreated to

the county seat.

The warrants not only included the arrest

of coal miners but for Frank Keeney.
17, UMWA, Fred Mooney and David Robb.

President of District
All three were to be

o

arrested for murder.

The armed lawmen moved up Dingess Run

and across Blair Mountain to Sharpies.

They surrounded a

group of miners who were around a small fire near a mine

Brockus shouted out the order, "throw up your hands,
you red necks, ..9 Before the miners could surrender Captain
tipple.

Three miners fell mortally
wounded and two others lay injured. 10

Brockus gave an order to fire.

Captain Brockus gave a different account of what
happened ;

We moved out about dark down past the creek
near the railroad and we were challenged by a
detachment of five men who commanded us to halt.
We stopped and they asked us who we were. We
told them and we ordered them to surrender which

Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, p. 129.
o

Trachtenberg and Glassberg, The American Labor
Yearbook 1921-1922, p. 199.

9Pro-union miners would wear uniformed identification,
red bandanas around their necks, usually with overalls or
khaki, so that they,could identify themselves in battle.
The term "red neck" probably had its origins in West Virginia.
It has envolved into a slang word meaning a narrowminded
laborer,
^Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners p, 130.
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they did without resistance, we simply walked
up, took their rifles away from them. There
were five men in the party, three high-power
rifles and two shot guns. Two of the men were
Russians and could not speak English and
admitted that they were not citizens of the
United States. We placed them under arrest and
put them at the head of the column and explained
to them if we were challenged again for them to
answer and tell the men who they were so that
they would not fire into the column.11 We
marched down I suppose some 300 yards and met a
car, it was a Ford car, I think, and it had
three men in it, they were all armed. We
disarmed them and placed them in with the other
prisoners.
We marched on to what is known as Sharpies.
We met another detachment of armed men. We
had already stopped when we saw them coming up.
I answered their challenge commanding us to halt
and they asked who we were.
I told them State
Police, they wanted to know what we were doing
there and I stated we were patrolling the road,
it was the first thought that had come (sic) to
my mind.
I asked what they were doing out there
armed at that time of the night. One man replied,
'By God, that is our business.' He had no more
than gotten the words out of his mouth when one of
the men fired on our party. They were pretty
well lined up in front of us. At that instant our
men returned the fire.12 All five of them hit the
ground, I heard afterwards two were killed and
three wounded. The firing became general, they
were shooting from the houses, from doorways and
windows, they turned all the lights on in this
little mining camp and it lighted up the public
road. Our men slid off the side of the road, it is
graded four or five feet through the camp. We passed
word back to all our men to cease firing which they
did. We decided the best thing to do was to move
back, get in the dark and assemble our men and check

Another possible hint of "Red Scare" thinking.
If
the miners spoke Russian, how did Captain Brockus determine
that they were not citizens of the United States? It is
possible that the miners were Polish, Czech or Croatian.
There were many Eastern Europeans in the southern West
Virginia coal fields.
It is likely that Brockus decided
that the men were Communists because they spoke a language
that he assumed was Russian.
1 2 It is important to note that there were no
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up to see if we had lost any. We found the police
were <all there and the deputies pretty well together
i n the rear of us . 1 3
Brockus failed to serve the warrants in Sharpies.

In

the confusion of the battle five of the prisoners escaped,

three deputies were captured by the miners, the lawmen lost
ammunition and several revolvers, and at Ethel the next

morning a Logan Mining .Company worker accidentally shot

Pri vate George Duling in the head, mortally wounding him. 14

Women and children fled the Sharpies' area for safety in
Boone, Kanawha and Putnam Counties.

Sheriff Chafin was

expected to retaliate at any moment and Sharpies was the
expected target.

In an effort to settle the situation at Sharpies,

Governor Morgan sent the Adjutant General of West Virginia
to try to cool down the miners.

He read a letter to the

miners from the Governor demanding that they lay down their

arms and go home.

The miners refused and suggested that

the Adjutant General should investigate how an armed force

of State Police from Mingo County and a vigilante mob of
deputies from Logan County could murder innocent miners

casualties among the State Police at this confrontation.
This is confirmed by Richard Luntls Law and Order vs. the
Miners on page 130. This would seem to contradict Brockus'
claims that the miners fired first. This, in addition to
Brockus' past conduct at Tent Lick, would have to leave
his version of the incident at Ethel in question.
1 3 Lunt, Law and Order vs . the Miners,
pp. 129-130.
14Ibid.,
P. 130.

-I 24whose only crime

was peaceful

the news of the attack spread

I5

assemblage.

I n the meant ime

like wildfire through West

Coa I

Miners began to return to the site.

Virginia.

compa n y

stores were I ooted for r i fI ex, ammu n i t i on , and supplies.
Trucks, automobiles and trains were confiscated at gunpoint.
Governor Morgan again appealed to President Harding

Morgan claimed that the insurrection was being

for help.

led by Bolsheviks from

Illinois.

Indiana, Ohio and

President Harding, now 1 a rgeI y influenced by the reports of
Genera I

Ba nd ho Itz and former West Virginia Governor Henry

Hatfield, refused to send federal troops on the grounds that
Morgan

ha d

not u sed all

the fighting.
situation

I7

the resources at

his command

to

President Harding did decide that the

in West Virginia could not continue without some

d i rect word from him to the coal mi ners.
fol lowing proclamation on August 13,

He

issued the

192 1:

Whereas, the Governor or the State of West
Virginia, has represented that■ domestic violence
exists in said State, which the authorities of
sa i d State a re unable to supress, and
W he rea s, it is provided in the constitution
of the United States that the United States
sha I I protect each state in this Union on appl ication
of the legislature or the executive when the

I 5

stop

Ibid., pp.

' ^Mooney,
1 1Lu nt,

129-130.

Struggle in the CoaI Fields,

Law and Order vs. the Miners,

P- 95.
P-

13 1.

I6

-125-

legislature cannot be convened, against domestic
violence, and
Whereas, by the law of the United States, in
persuance of the above, it is provided that in all
cases of insurrection in any state or obstruction
of the laws thereof it shall be lawful for the
President of the United States on application of the
legislature of such state or of the executive when
the legislature cannot be convened, to call forth
the militia or any other state or states or to employ
such part of the land and naval forces of the
United States as shall be judged necessary for the
purpose of suppressing such insurrection and causing
the laws to be duly executed, and
Whereas, the legislature of the State of
West Virginia is not now in session and cannot be
convened in time to meet the present emergency and
the executive of said state, under section four of
Article IV of the Constitution of the United States
for the purposes aforesaid, he shall forthwith by
proclamation command such insurgents to disperse and
retire peaceably to their respective homes within a
1imi ted time.
Now, therefore, I; Warren ,G. Harding, President
of the United States, do hereby make proclamation
and I do hereby command all persons engaged in said
unlawful and insurrectionary proceedings to disperse
and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on
or before twelve o'clock noon, of the first day of
September nineteen hundred twenty-one, and hereafter
abandon said combinations and submit themselves to
the laws and constituted authorities of said State,
and I invoke the aid and co-operation of all good
citizens thereof to uphold the laws and preserve the
pub 1i c peace.
To witness whereof, I have hereto set my hand
and caused the seal of the United States to be
affixed,
Done at the City of Washington, this 13th day
of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand
nine hundred and twenty-one, and the independence of
the United States the one hundred and forty sixth.
By the President.

WARREN G. HARDING18
1o

Commetti and Summers, The Thirty-Fifth State,
pp. 546-547.

-126Senator Sutherland of West Virginia, himself a coal

mine operator, led a delegation of West Virginia businessmen
to a conference with President Harding.

The delegation was

assured by the President that United States troops would be
sent into West Virginia if the armed mob failed to disperse.

19

At the time Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney learned that

they had been indicted for murder in Logan County.

They

quickly surrendered to law enforcement officials in Kanawha

County, who, in turn, placed them in the county jail at
Charieston.

Legally, they were the prisoners of Kanawha

County which refused to recognize extradition attempts by

Sheriff Chafin.

Despite the fact that they were "under

arrest”, Kanawha County law enforcement officials allowed
them to leave and re-enter the jail as they pleased. 20
Keeney and Mooney recalled the assassination of Sid Hatfield

and decided that it would be better to leave West Virginia

They arrived in Point Pleasant, West Virginia,
21
on September 1, and continued on to Columbus, Ohio.
al together.

General Bandholtz arrived in Charleston on September
1 and sent some of his officials, accompanied by Philip

Murray, Vice-President of the United Mine Workers, and David

Fowler, a UMWA organizer, to Sharpies to explore the situation

I^New York Times (August 30, 1921), p. 1.

? n Bituminous Operators Special Committee to the
United States Coal Commission (New York: Evening Post Job
Printing Offi ce , 1 923)’, p7 94.
21 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, p. 132.

I
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there.

Upon arriving they found that President Harding's

proclamation had backfired.

The miners and their families

refused to return to their homes unless United States

troops were present to see that they would be protected from
Chafin and his deputies. 22 A woman present cried out to Mr.

Fowl er:

By God, Mr. Fowler, it would be all right if
it were the union's affair, and we would say nothing;
but it is not the union's affair,, and the people of
West Virginia are here to protect their honor.23
General Bandholtz became less and less patient with

the situation in West Virginia.

He became infuriated with

Governor Morgan and the Logan County Sheriff Department.
He was angry at Chafin's "ill-advised and ill-timed" advance
movement of state constabulary on the night of August 27

resulting in bloodshed.

"Many persons seem to think that

they will disperse as soon as troops appear," Bandholtz
..24 Reports reached
declared , "I am taking no chances.

Bandholtz that the miners planned to invade Logan County to
force President Harding to send Federal troops.

This upset

General Bandholtz, who began to sympathize with the coal
miners, but also was aware of the attitude of President
Harding concerning the use of Federal troops to stop the

bloodshed in West Virginia.

22Ibid.

23Ibid., p. 132.
24Ibid., pp. 132-133.
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President Harding now was receiving tremendous pressure

to intervene militarily in West Virginia.
with the A. F. L. President Samuel Gompers.

He had a meeting

Both men agreed

that the people of West Virginia must not be in open rebellion

against the authority of the United States, but President
Harding turned down Gompers ' suggestion that a meeting be

held between the coal mine operators and officers of the

United Mine Workers of America to settle the differences
that were causing the conflict. 2 5
On the morning of August 26, President Harding met

with the Assistant Secretary of War J. Mayhew Wainwright
and the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff Major General James G.

Later that day he called a meeting of his cabinet
26 On
to discuss the insurrection in West Virginia.

Harbord.

September 30 when it became apparent that the insurrection

was not going to go away, he conferred with General John J.
27
Pershing over possible military action in West Virginia.

Also on August 30 he ordered fourteen U.S. Army airplanes to
fly over the miners and to drop the proclamation that he had
made earlier.

The government did not need to send fourteen

planes to deliver a proclamation of which the miners were
already aware.

President Harding viewed the overflight as a

25New York Times (September 4, 1921), p. 1 .
o

Maurer and Senning, "Billy Mitchell, the Air
Service and the Mingo War," West Virginia History Journal,
p. 342.
2^Spivak, A Man in His Time, p. 103.
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symbolic message that the planes could drop bombs just as
easily as proclamations.

28

In reality, President Harding continued to cling to

the policy of nonintervention.

In a speech on Labor Day

in Marion, Ohio, he commented on the situation in West

Virginia as well as the role of organized labor in the
United States under his administration.

I believe in unionism.
I believe in
collective bargaining.
I believe the two have
combined to speed labor to its just regards.
But I do not believe in labor's domination of
business or government any more than I believe
that capital shall dominate.29

Unfortunately, the time for empty rhetoric had
The miners at Jeffrey and Sharpies began to gear

passed .

up for an all-out invasion of Logan County.

No serious

attempt was made by the authorities to convince the miners
President Harding chose to ignore the problem.

to stop.

Governor Morgan was terrified of. them.
Keeney had fled the state.
al one.

Fred Mooney and Frank

West Virginia was left to stand

Scouts were already being sent over the mountainside

from Sharpies into Blair and Logan.

The invasion was imminent

and unavoidable. The miners had lost faith in the United

States government to do anything about Don Chafin.

The

anthem "We'll Hang Don Chafin from the Sour Apple Tree" was

28Spivak, A Man in His Time, P. 103.
7Q

Thomas R. Russel 1; The Illustrious Life and Work
of Warren G. Harding (Chicago; Published privately by
author, 1923), p, 149,

i
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more than a joke now.

At daybreak on August 30 the miners

planned to liberate Logan County.

Civil War had come to

West Virginia.

F

CHAPTER XI
THE INVASION OF LOGAN COUNTY:
CIVIL WAR IN THE MOUNTAIN STATE

The proclamation by President Harding demanding the
withdrawal of pro-Union miners to their homes had an early

positive effect on the miners.

When Frank Keeney pleaded

with them to return home because they were in violation of
the United States, the miners, showing their great loyalty
to the United States and the President, boarded trains for

Immediately Sheriff Don Chafin of Logan

Kanawha County.

County tried to frighten the miners who remained and even
attempted to arrest some of them.

He did this with the

help of the West Virginia State Police.’

Reacting to

Chafin's action, the pro-Union miners refused to obey the

President’s proclamation to lay down their arms.

They feared

that they would be slaughtered by Chafin's men if they did
so.

They would only surrender to federal troops who promised

them protection.

Hewett Creek.

The miners gathered at Craddock Fork of

They believed that they could cross over the

mountain to Crooked Creek leading into Logan and realized

that if they were successful that they would be difficult to
stop. 1

1 Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal , p. 49.
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In the meantime, the anti-Union leadership of Logan
County decided to build a defensive line on the crest of

Blair Mountain, which is located about five miles northeast

ofx .Logan.2

They hoped to stop any pro-Union miner march on

To implement the plan, Chafin
3
The stage was now set
had about 2,000 men at his command.
Logan by digging trenches.

for a World War I style battle complete with trenches, mass

offensive assaults and hand-to-hand combat.
On August 30th a special train sent by UMWA officials
4
The
arrived in Sharpies carrying food and ammunition.

lack of food and ammunition was no longer a problem concerning
possible invasion of Logan County on the part of the marchers.

Thousands of men continued to pour into the area to
support both sides, with anti-Union forces arriving in large

numbers from surrounding counties.

A dozen prominent

businessmen and society leaders from Huntington chartered a
5
train, loaded it with ammunition, and headed for Logan.

Pro-Union forces commandeered trains from Kanawha, Fayette
and Boone Counties in an effort to reach the Sharpies area.

West Virginia Attorney General Howard B. Lee describes

2 S w a i n , Facts about the Two Armed Marches on Logan,
p. 19; Spence, The Land on the Guyandotte, appendix map.

3Bituminous Operators Special Committee to the
United States Coal Commission, p. 87.
4
Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921,” Gol denseal , p. 50.
5New York Times (August 31, 1921), p. 2.

■

-133-

the march on Logan as fol1ows :

The miners drafted three doctors and a half
dozen nurses and forced them to join in the
enterprise to care for the sick and wounded.
Railroad trains were commandeered for the
transportation of men and supplies and stores
along the line of march were broken into and
robbed of all food, guns, and ammunition.6

There were many reasons for the sudden hostilities
on the part of the miners.

The attempted arrest of miners

at Sharpies angered the miners to action.

The miners were

also determined to force President Harding to use federal
troops to quell the insurrection.

The arrival of federal

constabulary would insure the safety of the revolting
miners.

Many miners felt that the Kenyon Committee would

convince President Harding that the miners should be
pardoned for their actions because of the evil and corrupt
mine guard system which were precipitated the violence,

miners were also encouaged that some of the coal mine
operators, including Colonel William Wiley of the Boone

County Coal Corporation and Thomas Richards of Blair, had

sided with the marching miners and were providing the men

with provisions.?
The miners also had gained a sense of legality at

this point.

United Mine Workers of America President John

L. Lewis declared that the miners of Logan, Mercer, Mingo
and McDowell Counties had been in constant fear of gunmen

6Lee , Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 100,

^Huntington Advisor (September 1, 1921), p. 1.

The

H
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and condoned the present insurrection by the miners 8
On August 30 the pro-Union army approached the

anti-Union defensive citadel on Blair Mountain.

Wi t h his

forces numbering around seven thousand, Sheriff Chafin had

prepared to defend a thirty-mile front secured on the crest
of Blair Mountain.

Reporters from across the United States

were on both sides of the hostile camps to cover the
g
The pro-Union forces planned to charge
upcoming battle.

the defensive positions, while Chafin had prepared his
forces for trench warfare.
The marching miners set up a one-room schoolhouse at

Sharpies as the command post for military operators while
patrols scouted the north side of Blair Mountain for the
come creeping."^0 On the
enemy. They used the password "I

afternoon of August 30 John Wilburn, the pastor of the

Baptist Church in Blair, spoke to a group of about one
hundred commanders at the schoolhouse.

He told them to

"plan on eating dinner in Logan tomorrow and not to take any

81 b i d .
9Saul D. Alinsky:: John L . L ew i s: An Unauthorized
Biography (New York: Vi
1 ntage Press-, 1 970), p. 41 .

*°The password for the anti-Union men was adopted
from the French in World War I, "They Shall Not Pass."
George Swain, History of Logan County (Kingsport, Tennessee:
Kingsport Press, 1 92 7 ) , p^ 162.
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12

On August 31 fighting continued along Spruce Ridge.
The operators reported that they had about twelve hundred men

in action and that more volunteers were coming from Bluefield
and Huntington.

Several anti-Union men had been killed.

On

that same day Governor Morgan issued orders to organize the
West Virginia National Guard by accepting all volunteers.

He planned to organize two companies in Charleston, two i n
Huntington, one at Logan, and one at Bluefield.

In

retaliation a throng of three thousand union sympathizers

who had congregated at the Capitol steps to protest the

call for troops threatened to assassinate the Governor.

Governor Morgan called out a riot squad to deal with the
mob.1 3
Panic was the rule rather than the exception in

Logan .

The following telegram was sent to Congressman Wells

Goodykoontz by W. R. Thurmon on August 31:

I wish you would see President Harding
personally quick and say to him that unless
he sends soldiers from Camp Sherman to Logan
by midnight that the town of Logan will be
attacked by an army of from four to eight
thousand Reds and great loss of life and
property sustained. Fighting on ridge all 14
day and casualties on both sides reported.
On August 31 Philip Murray, Vice-President of the

1?

Lunt, Law and Order vs, the Miners, pp. 134-135.

^New York Times (September 1, 1921), p. 2.
14

Files of the Adjutant General’s Office, o . c i t.
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-138United Mine Workers of America, sent the following telegram
to President Harding:

My judgment is that we can succeed in having
the mine workers disperse providing the federal
w
w
government
can give
the mine workers affected a
Qiihctan
+
ia
i
n
f
i
a
v*
a
n
t
o
a
substantial guarantee nf
of their
their lives,
lives, limbs and
property.16
During the early morning hours of September 1, the
first large force of miners stormed up White's Trace Branch
in an effort to seize the crest of Blair Mountains, Before
reaching their goal they were confronted by a small outpost
of mine guards. Reverend Wilburn led the miners up the side

of the mountain when the confrontation occurred. Shooti ng
started when the anti-llnion men asked for the password.
The first fatality in the confrontation was a Negro pro

Union miner who was struck in the back by a high powered
The pro-Union miners
rifle by one of the anti-Union men.
shot and killed three mine guards identified as John Gore,
18 The miners captured a
A. C. Cafalgo and George Munsey,
number of prisoners, including the son of Deputy Gore. The
prisoners were beaten in an effort to extract information
about the fortifications at the crest of the mountain and
young Gore was taunted by the death of his father.

At this

16Files of the Adjutant General's Office, op. ci t.

l^jack Brinkman, (Testimony)), State vs. Walter Allen,
Miner's Treason Trial (Charles Town>, West Vi rgi nia, 1921),
pp. 762-766.
18Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, pp. 134-135.
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point the offensive stopped to determine further actions.

19

On August 30, Governor Morgan appointed William E.

Eubanks , a National

Guard officer from McDowell County, as the

leader of the anti-Union forces, superseding Chafin's authority.
Governor Morgan also managed to obtain 20,000 rounds of

ammunition, 400 rifles, and two machine guns from the Governor
20
of Kentucky to supplement the arms of Eubank’s men.

Sheriff Chafin hired private airplanes to fly over
the miners and drop homemade bombs on them.

Made out of

four-to-six inch oil well casing, most of the bombs failed
to explode.

One which did go off was aimed at a one-room

schoolhouse which was being used as a hospital by the pro
Union miners at Craddock Fork.

The bomb missed the school

by one hundred yards and exploded in a field, making a
21
The pilots
crater large enough to hold a wheelbarrow.
dropped a bomb on two women who were washing clothes in their
22 Colonel Eubanks also
backyard.
They were uninjured.

ordered the bombing of miners on September 1.

A description

was given for the bombings by Eubanks before the Kenyon
Commi ttee :

I had reports that a number of men, from
three to five hundred, were coming up certain
19

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, P. 100.

2 0 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners,
P. 135.

2*1 Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921 ," Goldenseal, P. 49.
2 2 Maurer and Senning, " Billy Mitchell, The Air Service
and the Mingo War," West Virginia History Quarterly, p. 349.

i
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roads to attack my position, and as I wished
to stop them and as I could not advance by
order of the Governor, I dropped those bombs.
When they hit if someone got in the cloud or
the gas they would be made very sick — they
would vomit — it would cause extreme nauses;
the other bombs, if any part of it hit them
it would hurt very badly. They were made out
of six inch pipe nipples with union joints,
filled with black powder and nuts and bolts
and any kind of scraps like that.23
Most of the bombs missed their targets.

Nevertheless,

these events marked the second time in American history that
airplanes bombed American citizens in an effort to cause

destruction or bodily harm.2
According to eyewitness Harold Nathan, agent of the

United States Department of Justice, by September 2 the

fighting on Blair Mountain was taking the characteristics of

"fighting in South America" because of its brief but violent

confrontati ons.

Chafin's men had constructed land mines on

the ridges of Blair Mountain,

The mines were made out of

cases of dynamite.23

Four deputies were taken prisoner in an old abandoned
hut on Hughes Creek.

The angry miners discussed their possible

23Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, p. 135. Many
West Virginia historians claim that the bombings connected
with Blair Mountain were the first against American citizens.
This is false. According to the March 13, 1983 edition of
Parade magazine, the first bombing occurred on May 30, 1921,
when the police force of Tulsa, Oklahoma, bombed the Negro
quarter of that city during racial tensions, leaving seventyfive persons dead.
2 4 L e e , Bloodletting in Appalachia , P. 100.
2S

Files of the Adjutant General's Office, o . c i t. ;
Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal , p. 49.
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Fourtunately, more reasonable minds prevailed
26
and the deputies were spared.
execution.

The most important event on September 2 was the arrival

of a telegram to President Harding from Mr. Samuel B.
Mr. Montgomery was
Montgomery of Clarksburg, West Virginia.
one of the most powerful Republican politicians in the State

of West Virginia.

He was the chairman of the Citizen's

Organization of West Virginia, a body seeking social reforms
He was Commissioner of Labor under
for the coal miners.

Governor Cornwell and ran for Governor of West Virginia in
1 920.27
Up to this point, Harding had refused to send Federal
troops to West Virginia because of the fear of open

insurrection by the miners against the forces of the United

States,

Tn short, this would have required the use of force

against West Virginia on the grounds that some of her
citizens were practicing treason against the United States.
Montgomery ' s telegram altered President Harding 1 s thinking

Mr,

He now realized that
concerning the crisis in West Virginia.
Federal troops would be viewed by the marchers as a

trustworthy constabulary force.

The telegram read:

and
Miners u
.. farmers who are resisting the
‘
so-called constitutional authority
iin Logan County
be
murdered
if
they
surrender to
believe they will L_
—

Mooney, Struggle in the Coal Fields, P. 98,
27Direct Correspondence: Harrison County, West
Virginia Historical Society (Clarksburg, West Virginia,
November 6 , 1981).

I
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an armed force largely composed of Ba 1 dwin-Fe1ts
detectives and coal company deputies.
There is
no doubt in my mind but what many of them would
be killed.
Federal troops will meet with no
resistance.
Remember these miners are native
mountaineers. There is no foreign element
involved.28

On September 1, President Harding ordered General

Bandholtz to return to West Virginia.

In the meantime,

soldiers at Camp Dix, New Jersey, Camp Sherman, Ohio, and
Fort Knox,

Kentucky were put on alert and trains were equipped

to take them to Logan County.

The War Department also sent

a detachment from Maryland of the Chemical War Service,
.

with tear gas, to West Virginia.

9Q

The gas was not deadly.

It was slightly poisonous, causing headaches, vomiting, and
severe coughing. 30

The 88th squadron under the leadership

of General Billy Mitchell 1 eft Langley Field, Virginia, for

service in West Virginia.

President Harding was prepared to

trust Samuel Montgomery's instincts.

He also made sure that

a powerful military force be sent to West Virginia to deal

with the insurrectionists should they decide to use force
against the Government of the United States.

At daybreak on the morning of September 3 around
2,000 miners advanced toward the crest of Blair Mountain in

the first serious attempt to overrun the defenses of the

28 Files of the Adjutant General’s Office, o
2 9 Maurer and Senning, II Bi 1ly Mi tchel1 , II West Virginia
History Quarterly, p. 348.
30

Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, P. 138.

-143anti-Union forces.

After a three hour battle that engulfed

the entire thirty-mile front, the miners withdrew, bearing

their dead and wounded.

Around noon another attempt was

made to seize the mountaintop, but after four hours of

fighting machine gun fire repulsed the miners.

Mr. Milliken,

a company doctor at Blair mining camp, compared the fighting

at Blair Mountain on September 3 to the fighting at Manila
during the Spanish-American War in intensity. 31 Another
correspondent who served in World War I wrote later that the

fierce fighting and the fleeing civilians reminded him of

Belgium during that war.^

General Bandholtz and federal troops arrived in
Charleston on September 2.

They found the streets of

Charleston decorated with American flags and lined with
cheeri ng crowds , as if to greet a liberating army. 33

The

civilians brought cigars, cigarettes, coffee and pails of
ice cream to the soldiers. 34

Many people in West Virginia,

however, openly resented the presence of American troops in
their state and reacted as if West Virginia had been occupied
by a foreign power. 3 5

31 Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia,
P< 101 .
32
^Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal, p. 50.

33Ibid. , p. 51 .
34 Maurer and Senning, "Billy Mitchell," West V i rgi n i a
History Quarterly, p. 349.
351bi d .
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General Bandholtz tried desperately to make contact
with Union officials. Mooney and Keeney were not available
as they were hiding in Ohio because of their i nd i ctments

for murder in Logan County.

Bandholtz then contacted Phillip

Murray at the UMWA headquarters in Indianapolis.

Bandholtz

told Murray that he understood that "these men wi11 give up
their arms when the federal troops come to. protect them.
But they won't stop now just to be slaughtered by Don Chafin
..36
and his army of assassins.
On September 3, Federal troops arrived at Barboursvi 1 1 e
in Cabell County, West Virginia.

Bandholtz sent 1,000 men

under the command of General Smart up Coal River, to the rear
of the pro-Union miners, while the remaining 1,000 men advanced
37
up the Guyandotte River, behind the anti-Union defenders .
On that same date Governor Morgan announced that "West Virginia
..38
i s now in the hands of the United States Federal Government.
Reaction poured in from around the United States.
Many conservative groups claimed that the marching miners

were inspired by Lenin and Trotsky, and the red bandanas that
39 The Morgantown
they wore proved that they were Communists.

(W. Va.) Post remarked, "there is no question of unionism
It is only
involved so far as the authorities are concerned.
3 6 Spence, The Land of the Guyandotte, P • 459.
37 L e e, Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 101.

3 8 Huntington Advisor (September 3, 1921 ) , p. 1 .
3 9 New York Times (September 3, 1921), p. 1 .

I

-145..40 The Pittsburgh
a questi on of law, and its enforcement.
Chronicle-Telegraph stated, "the occurrences i n West Virginia
..41
The Pittsburgh
have been a blot upon the whole nation.
Di spatch commented, "When such an armed force can gather in
..42
"It is a
any state, something is dangerously wrong,
sorry spectacle that West Virginia presents, whinning for

Federal troops at each serious outbreak before exerting
every ounce of its own power i n upholding the law and
II
blasted the
protecting its own property and citizens,
Ri chmond Ti mes-Dispatch. 43 West Virginia needs to clean her
44
"The miners are a
house," concluded the New York Globe,
threat against the integrity and existence of organized
"For
Commercial-Appeal . 45
government," concluded the Memp h i s
permitting matters to reach such a pass West Virginia can

a n enraged editor of the Providence,
expect no sympathy, "46 An
The New Y o r k Even i ng World
Journal told his readers.

Latin America,
compared West Virginia to rebellious nations in
in the
stating, "We (the United States) must enforce peace

40"The Blame for West Virginia's War," Literary
Digest (September 10, 1921), p. 159.
41 Ibid.

42Ibid.
43Ibid,
4 41 b i d .
45 Ibi d .

46Ibid.
■
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United States, as well

as in Panama and Costa Rica.

On the morning of September 4 Federal

..47

troops arrived

at the Logan train depot and marched northward to Blair
Mountain.

In the meantime, UMWA officials

miners that Federal

informed the

troops were coming to stop the fighting.

Both armi es reached the battlefront at four o’clock in the
afternoon and demanded a cease-fi re. 48 The miners gladly

compi1ed , saying that the Federal troops "had brought the
Constitution back to West Virginia. ..49
The news of the arrival of Federal

troops was also

There was a feeling that
50
the matter was over, and that the danger had past.

welcomed in the town of Logan.

Samuel Montgomery’s prediction of nonviolence to
President Harding had proven accurate.

had been fired on Bandholtz’s troops.

Not a single shot

The only tear gas

that had been used was to put on a demonstration for
newsmen. 51
Major Smart offered this description of what Federal

troops found upon their arrival at Blair Mountain:
On my arrival at Blair, the miners were
thickly gathered around the school house at Blair.

47Ibid.

48

Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia , p.

101 .

49 Berman, Labor Disputes and the President of the
Uni ted States, p . 212.

5QWest Virginia Coal

Fields , P. 536.

51 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners ,
P.

138.
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I went over there to talk with them and see who
was in charge, and to give them the information
as to the arrival of Federa1 troops, and found
quite an efficient organization.
Here at the
school house were several female nurses in
uniform and they were operating an infirmary
there with two or three patients on pallets
on the floor of the room of the school house.
In another rations were being issued.
A line
was formed outside and each man received a
certain ration of canned fruit, bread, etc.
I
found they had quite a well organized arrangement
for sending men to the firing line, to relieve
others who came out and stayed back in Blair ror
a given period, when they returned to relieve
those who had relieved them.
In fact, we were
all surprised to see the efficiency.
Military intelligence officers investigated the

marchers.

Like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, they

found little evidence that either the Internationa1 Workers

of the World or the Communists had any influence over the
miners.

They estimated that ten per cent of the marchers

were Italians, Russians, Poles and Hungarians and made notes

of possible deportation proceedings.

described as

H

The marchers were

poor, ignorant creatures who will believe

anything that they are told, who eagerly join in mob rule;
.,53
and have little appreciation for right and wrong.
The coal mine operators quickly recognized that the

presence of the military would prevent them from taking

out their own form of justice on the miners.

These men held

a meeting to try to persuade General Bandholtz to exclude

Logan County from Federal martial law.

Bandholtz flatly

52 Bituminous Operators Special Committee, p p. 92-93,
53 Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners,
P< 138.

-148refused to even consider this

proposal.

54

General Bandholtz then brought in trains to take the
The mi ners compli ed . The crisis was over.
miners home.
The destruction of the Battle of Blair Mountain could
Both sides in the fighting
An estimated
refused to give details concerning casualties.
The confirmed
one million rounds of ammunition was fired.
never be totally calculated.

number of dead was four, but a more realistic figure would
be fifty. 55 Two dead bodies were left at the front steps of
The men were
the East Bank Funeral Home of J. W. Pryor.
56
Chris Pettry and William Guinn, natives of Raleigh County.
There can be little doubt that the miners would

have broken through the anti-Union defenses and may have
The
taken Logan itself if Federal troops had not arrived.

miners were breaking through the defenses when the troops
of the anti-Uni on
arrived. 57 Thi s fact was confirmed by one
58
military commanders.
The West Virginia crisis would take more innocent
On September 6, four pilots of the 88th squadron
terrain of
died when their plane crashed in the mountainous

lives.

^Trachtenberg and Glassberg, The American Labor
Yearbook 1921-1922, p. 200.

Anna Rochester: Labor and Coal
International Publishers, 1931 ) , p. 197T

(New York:

56McCormi ck, The New-Kanawha River, P- 1 59.
^Rochester, Labor and Coal , p
P .• 19 7.

58McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, p. 160.

■
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County.

Nicholas

The fatalities i n the crash were Harry

L. Speck , William S .

Howard.

Fitzpatrick, Arthur R.

Brown and Walter

Hazelton was seriously injured.

Corporal Alexander C.

Two other planes crashed trying to get back to Langley Field,

one in Charleston and one in Fairmont.
59
injuries in these accidents.

There were

no serious

However, West Virginia was not totally at peace.
September

10,

On

Senator Sutherland asked President Harding to

assign Marines

to

Charleston

to

help maintain

a "solutary

effect" on West Virginia. 60

Bandholtz decided

On Thursday, September 8, General
that things

were

quiet enough in West Virginia to allow the

troops to return to their basesx
Bandholtz

turned

On Monday, September 12,

the authority given

him back

West Virginia and returned to Washington.
However, the end of Federal

bring peace to West Virginia.
was secure,

to

the State of

61

intervention did not

Despite the fact that Logan

Don Chafin was determined to extract revenge on

the miners who had attempted an invasion of his empire.
This opinion was also shared by Governor Morga n .
authorities

of West Virginia were prepared

The

to try again to

give the United Mine Workers of America a death blow in the
Mountain

State.

5 9 Maurer and Senning,
History Quarterly, p. 347.
6 0 r— • -I

"Bi 1ly Mi tchel1 , " West Virginia

Files of the Adjutant General's Office, op. ci t.

61 Ibid.

CHAPTER XII

A QUESTION OF TREASON:

JUDGMENT AT CHARLES TOWN
The desire to punish the marching miners did not end
with the intervention of Federal troops and the withdrawal

of pro-Union miners from Logan County.

Sheriff Don Chafin

was a vengeful and paranoid man who was determined to

punish those who had tried to challenge his authority.
Within days of the departure of Federal troops , Chafin

convened a grand jury.

He wished to arrest the miners who

participated in the Battle of Blair Mountain on charges of

murder and treason.

Judge Robert Bland supervised the grand

jury which returned more than one thousand indictments.

Among those indicted were Frank Keeney, Fred Mooney, William
Petry and William Blizzard, all of whom were officials of
The charge of treason
the United Mine Workers of America. 1

was not against the United States but against West Virginia.
The large number of persons indicted by the Logan County

grand jury placed a heavy and expensive burden on West

Virginia, and therefore funds for such a prosecution proved

1 Lee , Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 104.
2

dI bid ,
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-151grossly inadequate.

The large number of miners who turned

to the state to provide council complicated matters further.
The state employed many attorneys for those who had been
attacked or accused of crimes because of the march on Logan.

The wel1-financed operators hired two prominent

Charleston attorneys, C. W. Ostenton and A.

N.

Belcher,

better known to the miners as the "coal dust twins, ii to
4 The operators had the
represent their interests in court.
ful 1

support and cooperation of Governor Morgan, who

released the following statement:
i

The insurgents willfully and deliberately
defied the President's,proclamation and the power
and authority of the United States until they were
confronted by a force that made resistance
They were not ordinary
dangerous and useless,
They
had
become
public enemies
lawbreakers.
whom the Army of the United States; was authorized
The laws
of the United
by law to shoot and kill.
-States expressly authorize that extreme remedy, not
as a punishment, but as a necessary preventive
measure.
Do such laws imply that those who are not
killed shall escape punishment for one of the most
serious crimes known to the law?
The West Virginia insurrection is over but
there will no doubt be others.
I do not recommend
the trial of all or of many of the insurgents.
The
trial of one or, at the most a few, is insufficient.
It is only necessary that the law be vindicated.5
Logan County officials issued warrants and immediately
the arrest of prisoners began.

West Virginia law enforcement

officials arrested hundreds of miners in Boone, Kanawha,

o

Bituminous Operators Special Committee, p. 94.

4 L e e , Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 104.
5
Lunt, Law and Order vs. the Miners, PP. 141-142.

3
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Raleigh, and Fayette Counties.

Don Chafin offered dubious

protection for these unfortunate men,

Logan County jail.

who were housed in the

Chafin and his deputies in fact

attempted to extort confessions from the prisoners.
Prisoner John Stollings describes his trea tme n t in

the Logan County jail:
After I was put in jail, they took me down
in the basement and stood me against one wall,
drew their guns ,, and asked me if I were ready
them I didn't know anything
to confess.
I told
t
to confess.
They fired shot after shot close o
either side of me, up and down the wall., the
bullets splitting against and ch iiPP 1+ o
the lead and concrete
concrete from the wall and
<-- - t'.:
slivers stung my back.
I
'Confess, God damn you/ they said,
again told them I knew nothing.
Then one of them
caught me by the hair of the head and drew a
butcher knife across my throat from one ear to
the other just hard enough to draw blood.
7
This incident left Stolling a physical and nervous wreck.
The Logan County jail soon was filled, and neighboring
counties refused to help Logan County officials in their
As a result,
request for aid in the form of jail facilities.
the promise that
hundreds of miners had to be released on
they would return to Logan County and appear in court upon

Logan County officials held seventy
five active participants of the armed march in jail without

notification of trial.
bond . 8

6Mooney, Struggle i n the Coal Fields, p . 114.

7Ibid,
8 Lee, Bloodletting in Appalachia, P • 105.
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The 1awyers furnished by the UMWA for the miners were
Indianapolis,
Harold Houston, an attorney on the UMWA staff in
Both
highly competent Charleston lawyer.
and Tom Townsend, a

barristers charged that no fair trial could be held in
Logan County and requested that the site of the trial be

moved at the state's degression.

West Virginia judicial

officials determined that the site of the trial would be
This small community in West Virginia's
Charies Town .

easternmost county is the county seat of Jefferson County,
The
and is located about fifty miles from Washington, D. C.
major industry in the county in

the early 1920's was apple

Coal mining was totally alien
The geographic location of the trial
far removed from the strife and conflict

growing and cattle farming.
to Jefferson County.

was ideal, for it was

The site also held historic i rony.
the site
Jefferson County's little red brick courthouse was
of America's most famous treason trial, that of abolitionist
of Logan County.

The
The state
state decided to prosecute William
Blizzard, the President of District 17, was

John Brown in 1859.9

Blizzard first.

considered to be the mastermind behind the invasion of Logan
trial was the
County. 1 0 The judge selected for Blizzard's
11
of Martinsburg in Berkeley County.
honorable J.

p. 33.

M. Woods

9Swain, Facts about the Two Armed Marches on Logan,

1 9Biturninous Operators Special Committee, p. 94.
11Swai n , Facts about the Two Armed Marches on Logan,

P- 33.
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Charles To wn

days of

the

Civil

had

not

Wa r .

seen

i

such excitement

Miners we re brought

si nee

the

into the

community by train f rom Logan County chained together by the
feet and

handcuffed. I 2

quiet farming community

Th i s wa s a

site for the

shock i ng

Man y of

i n the Shenandoah Vai ley.

the townspeople openly sympa + h i zed with the miners beca u se

of their treatment.
President John L .

Governor Morgan

Lewis we re among the curious spectators

who filled the courtroom at al I
propagand i sts,

and UMWA Nat i o n a I

t i me s. I 3

posing as Bible saIe sme n ,

of mine opera tor s’

brutal i t y. I 4

Mine wor ke r s’
came

what

mi ners and

The

t here

wou I d

be

labor officials

specific

an

with taIe s

Signs were posted a rou n d

Charles Town asking people to sta y a wa y. I 5
feared

in

attempt

to

State officials

free

the

i mprisoned

by an a rmed mob.

indictments against the miners and t he i r

officials were summa r i zed by C i rcu i t J udge Wood s:
First--That the defendants, with their confederates;
intended to invade Logan and Mingo Counties, and
by force, violence, murder, and open warfare to
deprive the people residing in said counties and
member s and citizens of the State of West Virginia
of the protection afforded to them by the laws of
t he State of West Virginia.

I2„
On Tr i a I
I 922) , p . 57 .
I3
I4
I 5

for Treason," Outlook Magazine

McCo rm i c k, The New-Ka na wha River,

PP •

Sol ins and Jones, History of McDowelI
Phillips,
p . 62 .

Heritage,

"The

(May 10,

i

161-162.
County,

i

P-

West V i rg i n i a Mine War," Amer i ca n

68.

-155Second — To destroy and nullify by force of arms,
violence, murder and open warfare, martial law in
said Mingo County, and the military occupation of
said county, which martial law had been duly
proclaimed by the Governor of the State of West
Virginia.

Third — To release from imprisonment persons who
had been duly and legally arrested incarcerated
Mingo County for violations of the law and
violation of the martial law proclamation of the
Governor.

Fourth—To take possession of the counties of
Logan and Mingo in said state and to prevent
the execution of the said state in said counties
and to deprive the people of said counties of
the protection afforded of the laws of said state.

P

Especially to destroy and nullify martial
ln
Mingo County, and to nullify the
clamation of the Chief Executive of the state.

Sixth — To release of prisoners duly held in jail
in Mingo County and also stated in the first
c ou n ty. 1 6

Of special interest to Judge Woods and the jury
involved in the Blizzard case was the definition of treason
in the West Virginia State Constitution:

Treason against the state shall consist only
in levying war against it, or in adhering to its
enemies, giving them aid and comfort.
No person
shall be convicted of treason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or
on confession in open court.
Treason shall be
punished, according to the character of the acts
committed, by the infliction of one or more of
the penalties of death, imprisonment or fine, as
may be prescribed by law.17

16 "West Virginia's Treason Trials," Li terary Digest
(May 13, 1922), p. 15.
1 7 James G. Randall,
Randal 1 , “The Miners and the Law of
Reason , " North American Review, Vol.
Vol . 216, No. 3 (September
1922), p. 316 .

I
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Judge Wood was extremely concerned that the jury
knew the difference between treason and a felony:
Every violent opposition to the execution of
the laws of the state, every resistance
.
------- by
~ force
and violence to the officers of the state ini the
performance of their duties is not treason.
Rioters may assemble together in an unlawful
act, or a series of unlawful acts. Their
purpose may be to commit a felony, or to commit
a misdemeanor, and they may proceed with arms
and with the intent to use violence to accomplish
their designs, and yet it wouldn’t be treason.
It would not be a treasonous reason for an
unlawful assemblage of individuals to come
together unless their purpose is by force and
violence to commit some act or some acts, which
if successful, will subvert the government in
whole or part.15
It was the intention of the attorneys of the state
to prove that the miners, under the leadership of the
United Mine Workers of America, intended to wage war on the

state of West Virginia.

The defense attorneys argued that

the uprisings were not an act of war against the state or
people of West Virginia, but rather an act against the coal

their
mine operators, who had a near dictatorial power over
workers through suppression of free speech, free assemblage,
of the
and other liberties guaranteed by the Constitution

United States and West Virginia.

19

Reaction in the national press centered around the
feasibility of a treason charge against the miners.

The

1 8Lun t, Law and Order vs. the M i ners , P. 161 .
1 9 "West Virginia’s Treason Trials, II Li terary Digest

P< 15.

■

I
■
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Virginian News-Pilot stated,

"There was much violence in

West Virginia, but no one believes that even the guiltiest

of the guilty parties were guilty of intent to overthrow
the state i n any way that is suggested by the word
‘ treason ’ , m20 The New York Evening Mail continued in the
same vein, stating:

” I f the miners have been violent,

them be punished for violence.

1et

If they have conspired to

commi t a crime, let them be punished for conspiracy.

..21
Neither conspiracy nor violence is, however, treason.

Lj-tery Digest comments, "Whatever their offenses, the
i

Unionist miners and their leaders were not trying to subvert
Logan

the Government of West Virginia in whole or in part.

County can scarcely be said to have been under the rule of

or to have had a republican form of government.

.. 22

The

New York Evening Post attacked the government and the

judicial system of West Virginia, stating "With so long a

record of violence on both sides it is rather late in the
day for West Virginia to awake to its injured dignity and
inyoke the charge of treason* «23 The Newark News continues,
’’It may be seriously questioned whether the march ever would
have taken place had there not been reasonabl e grounds that

2°Ibld.
21 Ibid.
22

v’Treas on ' and Reason,1' Literary Digest (June 17,
1 922), P< 14.
23
I bid.

-158the State Government was allied with the coal

operators.

ii

24

Outlook Magazine blamed the confrontation on the overbearing

tactics of both coal mine operators and union officials,
"There had been an overbearing attitude among
Associations of both kinds
both unions and capitalists.
have been laying down the law and enforcing their own
stating:

behests.

The public will

not tolerate too much of this.

,.25

The New York Times demanded that the marchers be found guilty
of treason, arguing that "examples be made of the leaders of
How
the mob who conspired against the peace of the state.
,.26
shall insurrection be defended?
realized that
Both the state and coal mine operators
a conviction of William Blizzard was essential for the

continued successful

prosecution of the miners.

Because of

had been
the conspiratorial nature of the charge, the trial
of the UMWA,
important in its implications for the future
Labor
not only in West Virginia, but nationwide as well.

itself seemed to be on trial.

27

i ntended
Blizzard’s defense argued that the march was

I

24t
. • A . , p. 1 5 .
Ibid
25"0n Trial for Treason, ii Outlook Magazine (May 10,
1922), p. 58.
26 "West Virginia’s Treason nrials," Literary Digest,
P. 1 5 .
“The Mingo War:
Violence in the
2 7 Michael P.
p. Jordan,
Southern West Virginia
Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary M. Fink
and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connect! cut": Greenwood Press, 1961), p7 103.

L
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to make a peaceful

demonstration,

that treason was no t

involved, but rather a desire by the coal
their homes and constitutional

miners to protect

rights from the corrupt law

The defense pointed

enforcement agencies of Logan County.

out that Blizzard was at the District 17 headquarters when
violence erupted in Logan County, and that he only returned

to Logan County at the request of General
induce the miners to turn back.

Bandholtz to

The jury accepted the
The trial

defense arguments and acquitted Blizzard.
28
four months and ended May 25, 1 922.

lasted

In Berkeley Springs, the county seat of neighboring
Morgan County, the murder charge against Frank Keeney ended

in an acquittal.

Of the hundreds of miners arrested for

various offenses, only three were convicted,

The Reverend

James Wilburn, a Baptist minister, and his son were found
guilty of murder and William Allen was

treason.

found guilty of

The sentences of the Wilburns were later commuted

by Governor Morgan and Allen "jumped bail
apprehended .

ii

and was never

29

The failure of the coal mine operators to convict
the UMWA officials and the miners at Charles Town marked the

end of the coal war in West Virginia.

It did not mean,

however, that West Virginia would be strife free from that
point on.

Don Chafin remained in unquestionable power in

28Lu n t, Law a nd Order vs. the Miners, P.
29
d * I b i d . , p. 162.

161 .
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Logan County.

McDowell, Wyoming, and Mercer Counties remained

under the control of the coal barons.

The verdict of the

treason trials did free the individuals involved in the March

on Logan.

It did not free the oppressed working classes in

the coal camps of West Virginia.

CHAPTER XIII
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS

Confrontations in the coal fields were not confined
to West Virginia.

West Virginia's difficulties served as

the catalyst for a nationwide coal strike.

This strike led

to an unusually large number of criminal actions, not only

in West Virginia but also in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
By October 1922, 631 members of the United Mine Workers of

America were under indictment for serious crimes, 411 for
murder. 1 However, the nationwide strike was futile as
postwar America was not prepared for a militant union.

Moreover, the United Mine Workers of America was

declining in West Virginia.

Despite UMWA victories in the

courts, coal mine operators managed to prevent the

unionization that threatened their undisputed rule in Logan,

Mingo and McDowell Counties.

Several external factors

strengthened their position.

Strikes in the union coal

fields between 1919 and 1929 had increased the nation's

demand for non-Union coal.

Increased sales resulted in

tremendous profits for the non-Union coal mine operators
and gave the consuming public a stake in their continued

1 E d w i n E . Witte: The Government
_______
in Labor Disputes
(New York: Arno & The New York Times , 1969). p. 169.
-161■

I
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operation /2

The nationwide anti-Union atmosphere, caused

by the Red Scare and the fear of Communism, helped to pardon
the coal mine operators for their questionable actions i n
West Virginia by claiming Communist influence within the

labor unions.

This attitude had an influence on the federal

government, which was cool in its attitude towards organized
1abor. The operators shared in anti-Union gains made in

other industries, such as the "open shop" policy in the steel

industry.3

The coal mine operators were confident that the

postwar atmosphere would not be conducive to legalized
arbitration or union recognition. 4

While the coal mine

operators were able to concentrate their efforts on resisting

UMWA membership and influence in West Virginia, the UMWA

was not able to concentrate on West Virginia because of a
5
The operators
multifront campaign across the United States.

used

traditional provincialism and hostility to outside forces

as well as the fierce individualism which was characteristic

of the mountaineer-miner to cause confusion and division

2

Albert C. Hendricks, The United Mine Workers of
America and Non-Union Coal Fields (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1923), p. 173.
3
Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in the
Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary M.
Fink and Mark, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut! Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 118.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.

I
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within the pro-Union rank and file. 6

The failure in West Virginia by the United Mine
Workers of America to unionize the coal miners of Logan and

Mingo Counties caused a nationwide decline in UMWA
membership that was not reversed until the 1930's.7

Because

of competition from anti-Union southern coal fields, many

companies in West Virginia closed their fields to the UMWA.

In 1929 the UMWA in West Virginia was said to have a paid-up
membership of barely six hundred.

The cause of the violence in West Virginia in the
coal fields cannot be dismissed as being caused by "Young
blood an' corn likker H as indicated by Oliver Holden of the

New York Times.

Q

Holden’s ideas typify the stereotype of

Appalachia which is still often used by the news media even
today to dismiss tragedies and confrontations in that region.
The anarchistic revolution that rocked Southern West Virginia

can be more accurately blamed on more concrete reasons.
Some of the basic reasons for the uprising are found
in the combined geographical and sociological realities of

the land and people of southern West Virginia.

^Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in the
Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary M.
Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 118.
71 b i d .
o

Fetherling, Mother Jones :
Q

The Mi ners Angel , p. 191.

"The Blame for West Virginia’s War," Literary Digest
(September 10, 1921), p. 237.
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Although violence was typical of industrial

disorders in post-World War I America, the Mingo War in
southern West Virginia stands out as the most excessive
example in duration and violence. One explanation for this

was the long-standing mountaineer tradition of substituting

force for reason, despite strong state laws prohibiting the
use of guns.

A union official in southern West Virginia

remarked that for the miners

"carrying a gun quickly became

automatic, like putting on a tie or lacing one's shoelaces.

..10

A second sociological reality which led to violence
was the strong feelings of the citizens of southern West
Virginia that they were not above the law but were above

the personal embodiment of the law. 11

t
u
This
was a

tradition largely born out of isolation.

inaccessible for decades.

deep-rooted

This region was

The discovery of coal and the

coming of the coal mining industry suddenly opened up the

region to the outside world.

The only authority which

existed before the coming of coal interests and state and
local constabulary was enforcement by individuals. 12 The

Hatfield and McCoy feud will attest to the fact that
sometimes this

H

enforcement II became vigilantism.

The sudden

10Spivak,
c . .
A Man in His Time, p. 77.
11 Ibid.

^Mi chael P. Jordan , "The Mingo War: Violence in the
Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary M.
Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
—— 1961 )', P- ng.
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1
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Chafin only fueled the desire of the mountaineers to enforce
the law the way they had for decades.

The corrupt

administration of the law by such individuals as Chafin and

the anti-Uni on tactics of state officials only confused the

local inhabitants concerning the fairness of justice
administered by these individuals.

Years of violence on the

part of those entrusted to enforce the law eventually caused

ci ti zens , including some police officials such as Sid
Hatfield, to take up arms against the established

constabulatory.

Moreover, the isolation of the mountains created
hostility towards state and local government.

The coal

miners of southern West Virginia had retained a sense of the

pioneer spirit which had long since faded on the American

frontier.

For decades these individuals and their

forefathers had conquered and domesticated some of the most
rugged and agriculturally poor mountains in the United
States.

Their fierce independence was just the opposite

of the feudal system that Don Chafin and the coal mi ne

operators tried to impose on that region.

Many reeasons for the conflict were purely economic.
The average annual earnings of bituminous coal miners had

increased substantially from 1915 to 1917.

In 1919, however,

the year immediately prior to the mine war, earnings dropped
substantially, from $1,211 in 1918 to $1,097 in 1919.

The

downward spiral in earnings continued throughout the 1920’s.

-16 6Violence seemed to follow the downturn of earnings after
years of improvement. 1 3

In the years prior to the outbreak

of violence the eight-hour-day had become common and the
company store system’s gross abuses had been eliminated.

days were more frequent.

Mine safety had improved.

labor had been abolished.^

Pay

Child

These changes had been brought

about largely as a result of the national emergency resulting
from America's entry into World War I.

Immediately after

the war the mine operators tried to remove the rights the
war had given to the miners.

Resentment and violence caused

by the loss of improved living standards were the natural

responses of a people who had been forced by rich mine
owners to 1i ve i n poverty^.

Blame for the
individuals.

H

March on Logan” can also be placed on

Governor Ephraim Morgan's failure to use

the power of his office to end the confrontation points out

how his poor leadership helped to escalate the situation.
He was sympathetic to the coal mine operators from the

This fact was well described in General Bandholtz's

start.

communications with President Harding.

Furthermore, Mr.

Harding himself must share some of the blame for the Battle
of Blair Mountain.

His failure to commit federal troops

earlier caused additional bloodshed which could have been

averted.
13

West Virginia Attorney General Howard Lee, in his

Wheeler, The West Virginia Mine Wars, p. 83.
14T
. . .
Ibid.
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book Bloodletting in Appalachia, gives much of the blame to

Sheriff Chafin, whom he describes as a "leer on the face of
1i berty. ..15 The ruthless tactics enforced by a Gestapo-like
police force under Chafin’s supervision caused the bulk of
the fighting.

The Washington Star also placed the blame for

the fighting on Chafin.

The following commentary appeared

on the front page of that paper on September 2, 1921 :

Everywhere one goes in this county he hears
the name Don Chafin, high sheriff of Logan County.
One can see that he has struck terror in the hearts
of the people of the Union fields. Although a state
officer, they do not trust him and his deputies.
He is king of the ‘Kingdom of Logan*.
He reigns
supreme by virtue of state machine, backed by the
power of the operators. It is Don Chafin upon whom
the miners and the people of this section place the
blame for the latest blot on the State’s history.16
Fred Mooney blamed the march on the short temper and
determined belligerency of William Blizzard, whose refusal
to negotiate helped precipitate the march into Logan

County. **

George Swain blames the conflict on the miners

and the UMWA,

although his interpretation of the incident

is openly biased in favor of the anti-Union forces.
There is little doubt that the cause of the fighting

was a combination of local and national conditions and the
actions of many people and organizations.

refused to blame any certain individual.

Mother Jones
Rather, she blamed

15,Lee , Bloodletting in Appalachia, p. 87.
16 Washington Star (September 2, 1921), p. 1 .

^Spence, Land on the Guyandotte:
County, p. 463.

History of Logan

-168the inevitability of confrontation on the years of injustice
and suffering endured by the miners,

Concerning the miners

of West Virginia, Mother Jones stated, "Cruel

is the life

of the miners with the weight of the world upon their backs.

And cruel are their strikes.
cruelty.

Miners are accustomed to

They know no other law.

When they are denied

justice, their reaction is equally harsh.

,.18

Mother Jones

did place some blame on the overall attitude in the United

States at that time:

Officials of state and nation squawk about the
dangers of Bolshevism and they tolerate and promote
a system that turns out Bolsheviks by the thousands.
A bunch of hypocrites create a constabulary supposedly
to stamp out dangerous 'Reds' but in truth the
constabulary is to safeguard the interests of the
exploiters of labor. The moneyed interests and
their servants, the officials of county and state,
howl and yammer about law and order and American
ideals in order to drown out the still, small voice
of the worker asking for bread. 19

Much blame for the problems in West Virginia in the
early 1920's has been placed on "Garyi sm" .

Many historians,

including Winthrop Lane, contend that President Gary of the
United States Steel Corporation was responsible.

U.S.

Steel owned the Norfolk and Western Railroad which hauled

coal out of the southern West Virginia coalfields to Norfolk
and up the Ohio River to the steel mill s of Pittsburgh.

The

company also owned large tracts of coal

lands in the state.

i8r
Spence, Land on the Guyandotte:
County, p. 464.
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It was the policy of U.S. Steel to keep the United Mine

Workers of America out of southern West Virginia at all

costs in order to keep cheap coal on the market from their
own coal fields.

The exploitation of cheap labor for the

purpose of easy and extensive profits can be the root of

the entire problem.

These factors underscore U.S. Steel's

responsibi 1ity in the conflict because of its funding of
anti-Union constabulary forces in southern West Virginia. 20

One heroic figure emerges in this tragedy.

General

Harry Bandholtz provided badly needed leadership during the

crisis.

His patience and understanding of the problem of

the miners and his willingness to use negotiations and

military protection in the war-torn area helped to prevent

a bloodbath resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people.
In 1921, West Virginians in general and the warring factions

especially could be grateful for his vision and leadership.
They should also be grateful that Harding sent Bandholtz to

West Virginia instead of an individual like Douglas MacArthur.
His use of heavy-handed techniques characterized by the

treatment of the Bonus Marchers in Washington during thr

administration of Herbert Hoover would have had catastrophic

results in West Virginia.

A direct military strike against

the miners could have caused open insurrection against the
United States itself.

The population of that area had

20,lThe Blame for West Virginia's War," Li terary
Digest (September 10, 1921, p. 237.
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its unwarranted use of force.
The violence and revolt of the miners in southern
West Virginia had little effect on the actual situation

there.

Logan County changed little after the Battle of

Blair Mountain.

It remained in the hands of the coal mine

operators for years.

Sheriff Chafin, whom historian George

Swain defends as a hero, was convicted by a federal court for

violation of the prohibition laws in the early 1920’s and
spent ten years in a federal penitentiary in Atlanta.

Upon

his release from prison he tried to buy control of coal

rights along Peach Creek in Logan County.
the Guyan Valley Bank.

He also purchased

The Great Depression, which led to

the collapse of both the coal market and the Guyan Valley

Bank, cost Chafin most of his ill-gotten fortune.

However,

he still had enough funds to purchase the ten-story Robson-

Prichard Building in Huntington.

He resided in Huntington

for the rest of his years, finally leaving Logan County to
21
determine its own future. He died on August 9, 1954.
Even after the arrest of Don Chafin, the coal mine

operators of Logan County found law officers and politicians

who would run that county to their liking.

The miners still

were bound in a type of involuntary servitude by their debts

at the company stores.

The coal mine operators maintained

21 Spence, Land on the Guyandotte:
County , p. 4 68.
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their power until the Wagner Act of the early years of the
New Deal finally opened southern West Virginia and the
nation’s coalfields to union representation.

In 1933,

President Franklin D. Roosevelt threatened to send the army
22
into West Virginia if operators resisted unionization.

This event, not the violence and bloodshed of the Mingo War,

broke the power of the coal mine operators in southern West
Virginia.

There can be no doubt that in 1933 southern West

Virginia left an age that can only be described as
authori tari an.

The Great Depression brought defeat to both the coal

miner and coal mine operator.

Despite their victory in

maintaining a stranglehold over the coalfields, the
non-Union coal mine operators made a serious mistake in the
Dominant in their power over the miners and the

1920’s.

economy and unafraid of the United Mine Workers of America,
the coal mine operators began to undersell one another.

Therefore, a severe depression hit the coal fields of
southern West Virginia which hurt both the miner and coal
mine operator. 2 3 The effects of this depression lasted

through the 1960’s in West Virginia.

The Mountain State

lost over a half million citizens between 1950 and 1969.

22
d^Meador, "The Red Neck War of 1921," Goldenseal,
P. 51 .
2?

Michael P. Jordan, "The Mingo War: Violence in the
Southern West Virginia Coal Fields, 1921-1922." Gary M.
Fink and Mark Reed, eds., Essays in Southern Labor History
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press , 1961).

J
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One person in four left West Virginia to live elsewhere.

Many of them left for the cities of the midwest in an effort

to find employment, especially Cincinnati, Akron, Detroit,
and Cleveland. 24 In many of these cities entire boroughs
are made up of former residents of Appalachia.

Many of the

mores and traditions of the hills have been maintained.
Withdrawal symptoms have been noted and the reaction of some

individuals resembles that of war refugees.

Many of the

people who left West Virginia in the 1950’s and 1960's have
returned in recent years, and they have helped to account

for the growth of West Virginia's population to almost two
million people, according to the 1980 census.

Most of the miners in southern West Virginia today

are members of the United Mine Workers of America.

The

gnawing knowledge of the past helped this region become one
of the most militant among the union regions of the United
Many coal miners in present day West Virginia

States.

recal 1 the hardships that their forefathers bore in the
The statement "those who forget the past are doomed

1920's.

to repeat it" has a special meaning for the coal mining
families of southern West Virginia.

The confrontation between the anti-Union and pro-Union

forces in West Virginia between 1919 and 1922 is certainly
more deserving of attention from scholars of West Virginia

history and American labor.

24

It is unique in its

McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, p. 175.

-173characteristics, and for the good of the country and coal
miners everywhere there must be hope that it remains that

way.

The following comment by Frank Keeney best summarizes
the feelings of the people of southern West Virginia in the
1920’s.

This attitude can still be found among many West

Virginia coal miners today.

I'm a native West Virginian. There are
others like me working in the mines here.
We don't propose to get out of the way when
a lot of capitalists from New York and London
came down here and tell us to get off the
earth. They played that game on the American
Indian. They gave him the end of a log and
then pushed him off that. We don't propose to
get pushed off.25

2 5 L a n e , Civil War in West Virginia , pp. 87-88.

EPILOGUE
WEST VIRGINIA TODAY

The mine war calls attention to the progress West

Virginia had made in the past forty years.

It is very

doubtful that such a tragedy could happen today.

No state

has changed more than West Virginia. 1

Despite this fact many Americans view West Virginia
as if the mine wars continue.

This is aided by the image

West Virginia is given by the national news media.
of this happened on April 27, 1 978.

An example

Fifty-one workers were

killed in the collapse of a scaffolding on a power plant
cooling tower under construction at Willow Island, St. Marys,
West Virginia.

The national news of a major national network

showed a picture of a one-room shack, complete with a coon
dog on the front porch and a junked car on the front lawn.
The narrator stated, "This is St. Mary's, a poor coal mining
2
This
community typical of so many throughout West Virginia."
was in direct conflict with the reality that St. Mary's is an

industrial town on the Ohio River with a very high standard
of living.

The only coal mining in the area was over one

1 McCormick, The New-Kanawha River, p. 175.
2National Broadcasting Corporation, Nightly News,
April 27, 1978. 6:35 p.m.
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hundred miles away in the state of Ohio.

West Virginia had

been stereotyped again by the national press.
The negative image of West Virginia is in direct

conflict with reality.

Many Americans view West Virginia

as a poverty-stricken area, a state populated with persons

who hold little respect for themselves or the law.

This

view is contradicted by the fact that West Virginia has the

lowest crime rate in the United States and the second highest
3
per capita growth rate for median family income as of 1979.
West Virginia also ranks ahead of Florida, Vermont, Georgia,

South Carolina, Idaho, New Mexico, North Carolina, Alabama,
South Dakota, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maine, Mississippi and

Arkansas in median family income.

The image West Virginia has gained among many Americans
will not change overnight.

11 wi11 take years to overcome

the negative publicity the state has suffered.

There can be

little doubt that West Virginians are a proud people.

They

may be the most nationalistic of the citizens of the
individual states.

The key to understanding West Virginia

is to base judgments on truths and realities rather than the

outdated but not outworn Appalachian stereotype.

3 "America’s Changing Population: What the Census
Shows . " U.S. News and World Report (April 26, 1982), p. 73.
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